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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation critically examines current notions of citizenship in order to 
address political exclusion in the context of the legacy of slavery and colonization in the 
African Diaspora. To this end, I consider the work of political philosopher Hannah 
Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution to show that the rights afforded 
by citizenship are not enough to overcome contemporary forms of exclusion that remain 
bound up with this legacy. Beyond citizenship, I argue that coming to terms with the 
global impact of slavery and colonization today depends on developing political forms 
of historical memory that enable the transgressions of the past to appear in public so that 
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I.1. Project Summary 
 
Philosophers of all stripes are concerned with the problem of political exclusion. 
In its broadest formulation, political exclusion may be understood as the loss of one’s 
status as a member of a political community, whether this takes shape through the 
explicit denial of the rights of citizenship or the tacit marginalization of certain 
individuals within a particular political community by such means as systemic racism, 
sexism, or class-based oppression that precludes their full recognition as citizens. While 
approaches to exclusion are as many as they are diverse, recent discourses in mainstream 
political philosophy, epitomized by the work of figures such as Richard Rorty, John 
Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas, have tended to stress the importance of expanding the 
rights of democratic citizenship to those who have yet to be integrated within the 
structures of liberal democracy. My dissertation challenges the wisdom of such 
approaches by critically examining current notions of citizenship for coming to terms 
with the global impact of the European legacy of slavery and colonization on political 
practice today.  
I take my point of departure for thinking about exclusion from the work of 
political philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose analysis of statelessness, along with the 
distinctive notion of citizenship that she develops in light of it, offers a novel critical 
perspective on liberal approaches to the problem of political exclusion. While Arendt has 
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come to be associated in recent scholarship with thinkers who endorse the expansion of 
the structures of liberal democracy, I argue that she has a deeper affinity to twentieth 
century critics of the Enlightenment, who maintain that violence and exclusion are 
contained within these structures and thus approach the problem of exclusion by calling 
for critique. By putting Arendt in dialogue with this heritage of political thinkers, my 
aim is to bring into focus the prescience of her critical insights into some of the basic 
assumptions that underlie notions of citizenship inherited from the liberal political 
tradition. With this, I maintain that while the critical dimension of Arendt’s political 
philosophy has yet to be fully appreciated, it not only plays a formative role in her 
political ontology, but also offers a crucial point of departure for intervening in 
contemporary discourses in liberal political theory, providing a frame for diagnosing 
forms of exclusion that remain operative in the structures that organize modern political 
life and thereby exposing the dangers involved in the expansion of these structures. 
With this, however, I argue that capturing the full weight of Arendt’s analysis of 
exclusion depends on expanding her framework beyond the European nation-state to a 
more global set of political issues that are crucial for understanding the problem of 
exclusion today. These issues concern the memory of the legacy of slavery and 
colonization in the African Diaspora. To this end, I consider Arendt in light of an 
analysis of the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) in order to challenge and deepen her 
political insights, particularly regarding her notion of citizenship. While this decisive 
event gave birth to the first instance of emancipation in the colonial world, the formerly 
enslaved who achieved French citizenship nevertheless remained subject to the violence 
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and exclusion that their enfranchisement promised to overcome. My project examines 
the echo of this original failure of Enlightenment citizenship in the racialized violence 
and exclusion that continues to haunt diasporic peoples decades and centuries after 
becoming citizens. With this, I show that addressing political exclusion today depends 
not only citizenship, as Arendt suggests, but also on the unending task of coming to 
terms with the repetition in present political life of the immemorial violence and 
exclusion of the past that I will argue is entailed by the very implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship. Drawing on figures such as Jacques Derrida and Édouard 
Glissant, I thus maintain that we are called upon by these immemorial legacies to 
develop political practices of historical memory—whether these are institutionalized 
forms of remembrance, or public gatherings and protests—that go beyond citizenship so 
as to ensure that the transgressions of the past are able to appear in public and 
authentically inform democratic discourse and policy formation.              
This project takes shape in three parts. I begin in my dissertation by elucidating 
the importance of Arendt’s thought for exposing the limits of liberal notions of 
citizenship for addressing political exclusion today. Whereas recent scholars have 
emphasized Arendt’s notion of the “right to have rights” in order to advance debate in 
liberal political theory, my project shifts the orientation of this discourse, bringing into 
focus her critical relation to the liberal tradition. To this end, I develop Arendt’s 
characterization of political exclusion with reference, not only in her account of 
statelessness, but also to her less appreciated discourse on the political phenomenon of 
loneliness as it unfolds in her analysis of the susceptibility of the structures of modern 
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political life to totalitarianism. By developing Arendt’s analysis of exclusion this way, 
my aim is to bring into renewed focus the decisive role that her critical concerns 
regarding the liberal tradition play in her insights into the failures and dangers of modern 
political life. We find in turning to this dimension of Arendt’s work that statelessness is 
not exhaustive of her diagnosis of the problem of exclusion as those who emphasize the 
right to have rights suggest; on the contrary, it is symptomatic of a broader and more 
endemic form of exclusion expressed in the loneliness of modern individuals. Through 
her account of loneliness, Arendt demonstrates that the emergence of totalitarian regimes 
in the twentieth century cannot be thought apart from the structures of modern political 
life, but must instead be understood as an effect of the worldlessness that modernity 
itself has produced. This worldlessness has its basis in the destruction of the public realm 
in the modern era, a consequence, she thinks, of the tendency to elevate the protection of 
liberty in the private sphere to the highest aim of politics.1 In light of this, I maintain that 
Arendt’s notion of citizenship serves as the basis to critique and, in turn, to remedy the 
loneliness that has been generated by some of the very principles that animate the liberal 
tradition. It is in virtue of this critique, I argue, that Arendt is led to develop a lived and 
embodied conception of citizenship that is oriented not by the liberal concern for the 
expansion of rights in the private sphere, but rather by our shared responsibility to make 
one another visible in the public sphere.  
                                                
1 See Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006), 142–69. 
 
  5 
In the second part of this project, I argue that while Arendt’s notion of citizenship 
provides a crucial frame for exposing the forms of exclusion that are perpetuated by 
notions of citizenship inherited from the liberal tradition, an internal inconsistency arises 
in her own notion of citizenship that keeps it from addressing the forms of exclusion that 
she diagnoses. This inconsistency turns on her account of the responsibility she believes 
citizens have to remember in political life.  On Arendt’s view, political life has the 
potential to engender an authentic sense of human belonging insofar as citizens take 
shared responsibility for preserving in their collective memory the legacy of the world 
they have inherited such that it can be appropriated anew and carried forward for future 
generations. She maintains, too, that it is only by participating in this event of 
appropriation through speech and action in the space of politics that human beings can 
enact their freedom and come into appearance as who they are in their singularity and 
diversity. Remembrance is thus central to Arendt’s conception of political belonging, 
providing the means by which we fortify the shared reality of a common world, while 
simultaneously creating the conditions for the possibility of the event of appropriation 
that she associates with the enactment of human freedom. On the basis of this, Arendt 
argues that it is only by affirming one’s citizenship in the space of politics through the 
commemoration of the legacy of the political tradition one has inherited that it is 
possible to overcome the worldlessness and loneliness that has made modern individuals 
susceptible to totalitarian domination.  
Yet, I will argue that the nature of the legacy of the modern political tradition 
resists being remembered in this way, thereby leading Arendt’s notion of citizenship to 
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fall into contradiction. In order to develop fully the nature of the legacy of the modern 
political tradition and the inconsistency it entails in Arendt’s notion of citizenship, I 
maintain that it is necessary to expand the horizon of our considerations beyond the 
European nation-state to a more global set of political concerns raised in colonial and 
post-colonial theory regarding the memory of slavery and colonization in the African 
Diaspora. To this end, I consider Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution, 
which began in 1791 on the heels of the French revolution when half a million enslaved 
Africans in the French colony of Saint-Domingue rose up in response to the promise of 
universal freedom set forth by the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen. While there may be many ways to expand Arendt’s thought within this global 
context, I turn to the Haitian Revolution for three reasons.  
First, the Haitian Revolution has an important role to play in understanding what 
Arendt describes as the revolutionary tradition of the modern age. In bringing the ideals 
of the European Enlightenment into direct confrontation with the European legacy of 
slavery and colonization, it not only constitutes an especially radical moment in the Age 
of Revolution, but, as I will argue, also exposes a thread of the political tradition of the 
revolutionary Enlightenment concerning the limits of modern historical memory that 
Arendt fails to appreciate. In this, it provides a unique point of departure for challenging 
and deepening Arendt’s conception of citizenship, and particularly the responsibility she 
believes citizens have to remember in political life. Second, the action taken by the 
Haitian revolutionaries exemplifies in several important respects the lived and embodied 
activity that Arendt associates with citizenship. Significantly, the enslaved in Saint-
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Domingue achieved their emancipation in 1794 not through a call for independence from 
France, but rather through an explicit affirmation of the spirit of the French 
revolutionary legacy, declaring their intent to become French citizens in accordance with 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Yet, despite working in concert to appropriate 
anew the traditions, institutions, and values of the French revolutionary legacy in this 
colonial context, the formerly enslaved ultimately remained subject to the previous 
forms of violence and exclusion that their status as French citizens promised to 
overcome. Hence, my third reason for turning to the Haitian Revolution is to suggest that 
it offers an important counterexample to Arendt’s conception of citizenship, indicating 
that even after citizenship is granted and affirmed, a specter of the violence and 
exclusion of the past may still remain present that has the potential to forestall the event 
of appropriation that Arendt associates with human freedom.  
As I will suggest, this event epitomizes an original failure of Enlightenment 
citizenship to make good on the promise of universal inclusion set forth by the political 
tradition of the revolutionary Enlightenment. This failure, I maintain, turns on a problem 
concerning historical memory that is specific to the modern era, which I will call “the 
paradox of remembrance.” Affirming one’s citizenship in the way that Arendt suggests 
involves not only remembering the legacy of the political tradition one has inherited, but 
also forgetting those histories of violence and exclusion that are incompatible with it. 
Yet, insofar as the Enlightenment project demands universal inclusion through the 
expansion of citizenship, these histories of violence and exclusion do not stand outside 
of or in opposition to the legacy of the tradition we have inherited, but are instead bound 
  8 
up with it. Hence, I turn to the Haitian Revolution to suggest that the very 
implementation and affirmation of Enlightenment citizenship necessitates the covering 
over of a part of the legacy that we are tasked with preserving. Moreover, I will argue 
that while these histories of violence and exclusion may fail to come into full presence as 
a part of the collective memory of the modern political community, our inability to 
remember them does not mean that they fall into oblivion when citizenship is granted, as 
Arendt suggests; on the contrary, I maintain that because they are bound up with the 
political legacy that we are tasked with preserving, they merely remain unappropriated, 
leaving their trace in the traditions, values, and institutions that hold modern political 
communities together and repeating themselves in the violence and exclusion that 
continues to keep those who were once cast out from appearing in the modern political 
arena. 
In the third part of this project, I examine the echo of this original failure of 
Enlightenment citizenship in the racialized violence and exclusion that continues to 
haunt diasporic peoples decades and centuries after becoming enfranchised. To this end, 
I turn to the philosophical concept of repetition to give contour to the political 
implications of the paradox of remembrance that I identify through my analysis of the 
Haitian Revolution. Focusing in particular on Friedrich Nietzsche’s development of this 
concept in his discourse on history and Martin Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of 
it in Being and Time, I use this idea to frame the ontological concepts of homecoming 
and belonging that orient Arendt’s notion of citizenship. I then turn to the work of 
Jacques Derrida, whose critique of the originality of the event of appropriation and the 
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homecoming it promises in his work, Specters of Marx, provides an important point of 
departure for understanding the implications of the paradox of remembrance in 
contemporary political life. Specifically, I will suggest by way of his notion of ghosts 
and specters that the concept of modern citizenship is self-effacing, as the very 
affirmation of one’s citizenship keeps a part of the legacy that we are tasked with 
preserving from coming into appearance. This, in turn, I will argue necessitates the 
repetition of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past in our political 
traditions, institutions, and values. I develop the effect of this with reference to the 
notion of “nonhistory,” which Édouard Glissant introduces in his work Caribbean 
Discourse to describe the way history is experienced by colonized peoples, along with 
the immediate presence these “nonhistories” have in the lived reality of their everyday 
experience. I then argue that addressing political exclusion today depends on going a 
step further than Arendt does in her analysis of citizenship. Beyond citizenship, I 
maintain that overcoming the forms of exclusion that Arendt introduces in her analysis 
of statelessness and deepens through her discourse on loneliness depends on developing 
a new and more expansive frame for the concept of political belonging that emphasizes 
the responsibility citizens have not only to make one another visible in political life, but 
also to make visible the specters of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past 
that are entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. On the basis of this 
expanded notion of political belonging, I propose a framework for a post-Enlightenment 
politics that provides a platform for approaching the problem of exclusion not only in 
terms of citizenship, but also in terms of our need today to develop political practices of 
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historical memory that enable the transgressions of the past and the forms of exclusion 
they continue to perpetuate to enter into contemporary political discourse. 
I.2. Two Approaches to Political Exclusion 
The problem of political exclusion created a crisis in the twentieth century, 
calling into question the viability of our modern political structures for achieving the end 
of universal emancipation set forth by the Enlightenment project. While turning back 
from this end seems untenable, the problem of exclusion that Arendt identifies in her 
analysis of the phenomenon of statelessness suggests that the means we have for 
achieving this end are woefully inadequate. While philosophical considerations of the 
problem of political exclusion are as many as they are diverse, two interrelated lines of 
inquiry may be discerned in the milieu of major thinkers of exclusion in the twentieth 
century. The first concerns the extent to which the theoretical frameworks we have 
inherited for achieving universal emancipation can be rehabilitated in such a way as to 
overcome the problem of exclusion. The second concerns the extent to which the 
problem of exclusion is itself a product of the inadequacy of these frameworks.  
From this, it is possible to distill two approaches that political philosophers have 
taken in order to address the question of exclusion. As I suggest in what follows, the 
difference between these two approaches turns on the relation that political exclusion is 
taken to have to the modern political sphere and the juridical structures that sustain it. 
Those who endorse the first approach locate exclusion outside our political communities, 
defining it as exterior to and set apart from its structures, which are themselves internally 
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unified and, if properly engaged, capable of grounding a perfectly just and inclusive 
political order. Hence, for these figures, overcoming exclusion depends on expanding 
our circles of inclusion such that those who have been cast out can be absorbed within 
the political community and granted the rights and liberties that it affords. I turn to 
Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas to illustrate this approach, both of whom attempt to 
resolve the problem of exclusion by developing frameworks for fostering inclusion, 
Rorty, through his notion of liberal solidarity and Habermas, through his theory of 
communicative action and discourse ethics.  
In contrast to the first approach, those who endorse the second approach maintain 
that exclusion does not have an exterior relation to the structures that sustain the political 
sphere, but instead entailed by these structures. Therefore, rather than emphasizing 
inclusion and the expansion of our present political structures, these figures place 
exclusion at the center of their inquiry and, in so doing, suggest that universal 
emancipation is only possible through a critique of the violence and exclusion that is 
always implicated in these structures. In order to elucidate the second approach to the 
problem of exclusion, I turn to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, along with 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben, each of whom develops a 
distinct method of critique for exposing the forms of exclusion that they believe are 
always already bound up with the political.  
Recent scholarship has emphasized those aspects of Arendt’s work that concern 
inclusion, focusing in particular on her significance for contemporary debates regarding 
liberalism, radical democracy, and human rights. Though Arendt undoubtedly has 
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decisive contributions to make to these discourses, a broader aim of this project is to 
consider the importance of her work for those who take exclusion to be the central 
category of political life in the modern age. By shifting the orientation of this discourse, 
my aim is to show that Arendt not only offers unique insights into this latter intellectual 
current in political philosophy, particularly through her analysis of statelessness, but also 
that those aspects of her work that address exclusion this way complicate and pose 
important challenges to her own conception of inclusion made manifest in her discussion 
of citizenship. 
 In his pragmatic defense of bourgeois liberalism, Rorty exemplifies the first of 
the two approaches to political exclusion, acknowledging the limitations of 
Enlightenment rationalism for justifying our present political structures, while 
nevertheless calling for the expansion of these structures in order to address the problem 
of political exclusion. Rorty believes that it is possible to overcome political exclusion 
by fostering the growth of economic justice in the private sphere and democratic 
freedom in the public sphere. In contrast to proponents of classical liberalism, however, 
he resists the idea that the legitimacy of these political structures has a basis in 
rationalistic foundations. On the contrary, Rorty maintains that the unresolved conflict 
between the private and public spheres suggests that ideas like liberal democracy have 
no rational ground, but are instead historically contingent and therefore incapable of 
being justified philosophically.2 He believes that while this does not diminish the 
                                                
2 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Stanford: Stanford University  
Press, 1989), 189.  
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pragmatic value of such ideas, it does indicate that we can only succeed in expanding 
these structures by turning to something other than rationally determined foundations to 
provide an impetus for increasing human solidarity.  
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty says, “The vocabulary of 
Enlightenment rationalism, although it was essential to the beginnings of liberal 
democracy, has become an impediment to the preservation and progress of democratic 
societies.”3 The traditional notion of human solidarity, he explains, presupposes a core 
self or a human essence that both justifies and gives transcendental status to our 
responsibility for the human community at large. Rorty argues that in the face of moral 
and political upheaval, the kind brought about by an event like Auschwitz, we find 
ourselves searching for this core self or further justification for human solidarity. He 
maintains, however, that such upheavals only expose us to the fact that no such human 
essence or nature exist, meaning the concept of solidarity is “caused by nothing deeper 
than historically contingent circumstance.”4  
Rorty thus distinguishes himself from more traditional liberal theorists, 
suggesting that the solidarity we feel towards others does not arise from something we 
share with all of humanity; instead, our sense of “we” is a function of nothing other than 
a feeling of identification with a particular group. He therefore objects to grounding the 
notion of human solidarity in universal humanism and suggests instead that we can more 
easily achieve liberal solidarity through an appeal to sentiment, encouraging greater 
                                                
3 Rorty, 44.  
4 Ibid., 189. 
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sensitivity to the suffering of others. He thus suggests that bourgeois liberalism can 
overcome political exclusion, so long as the notion of solidarity that accompanies it is 
reframed in pragmatic terms. Rorty conceives of the liberal notion of solidarity in the 
following way:  
Solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all 
human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more 
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation – the ability to think of people widely different from ourselves as 
included in the range of ‘us.’5 
By cultivating this sentiment, Rorty argues that the idea of human solidarity can retain 
its regulative force even though it is no longer grounded in reason. That is, even though 
the claim “we have an obligation to human beings as such” is, on Rorty’s view, a 
historically contingent slogan rather than a found principle, it nevertheless urges us to 
create more expansive circles of inclusion without needlessly wondering whether or not 
such solidarity is real.6 In attempting to reformulate the ground of bourgeois liberalism 
this way, Rorty ultimately locates exclusion outside the structures of the modern political 
sphere. In his suggestion that the problem of exclusion can be solved by developing a 
conception of solidarity that encourages us to reach out to those who have been excluded 
from political life, Rorty takes the structures of modern liberalism to be internally sound 
                                                
5 Ibid., 192.  
6 Ibid., 196.  
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and capable of delivering justice and freedom to those who enter into them. Hence, 
Rorty believes that the problem of political exclusion has yet to be resolved because we 
have failed to expand our circles of inclusion far enough.  
Habermas also exemplifies the first approach to the question of exclusion, 
though, in contrast to Rorty, he does this by rehabilitating the guiding principles of the 
European Enlightenment, which he believes have been marginalized in western society 
as a result of its dependence on instrumental rationality. This derivative use of reason, 
Habermas argues, has kept us from achieving the emancipatory aims of the 
Enlightenment by suppressing heterogeneity and difference instead of creating a space 
for it. Habermas thus believes that our own failure to engage the tools of the European 
Enlightenment properly has led us in the twentieth century to succumb to dangerous 
political forces such as totalitarianism. 
Habermas thus distinguishes himself from Rorty in his suggestion that there do 
exist universally valid criteria discernable through reason according to which it is 
possible to found a perfectly just and inclusive society. Such criteria, however, can only 
be justified through a process of deliberation in which all involved come to a consensus 
about which norms are in the best interest of everyone.7 Reason is therefore of utmost 
practical value on Habermas’ account, meaning our claims regarding ethics and politics 
should not, as Rorty suggests, be understood as historically contingent. Rather, 
Habermas believes that without reason we cannot hope to overcome violence and 
                                                
7 Jürgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics,” Contemporary Continental Thought, ed. 
Stephen Daniel (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education Inc., 2005), 127.  
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injustice, as it is only because we are rational that we can understand and evaluate the 
validity of another’s utterance, and, in so doing, arrive at just criteria for organizing 
society. That is, Habermas says:  
There is a sense in which any interpretation is a rational interpretation. In the act 
of understanding, which entails an evaluation of reasons as well, the interpreter 
cannot avoid appealing to standards of rationality and hence to standards that he 
himself considers binding on all parties, including the author and his 
contemporaries.8   
In light of this, Habermas argues that it is possible to determine the validity of social 
norms on the basis of reason, but this cannot be achieved by simply testing whether or 
not a particular maxim is generalizable. To the extent that social norms embody an 
interest common to everyone, they cannot be justified abstractly, but instead require a 
process of rational discourse whereby those involved actively engage in moral 
argumentation concerning the validity of these norms. Without this kind of discursive 
practice, reason runs the risk of becoming instrumental. Accordingly, a just social order 
is possible to the extent that there exists a space for “universal discourse” where 
individuals within a community are able to engage in moral argumentation and come to 
a consensus by imagining themselves in the place of the other. In this, Habermas further 
distinguishes himself from figures like John Rawls by insisting that while common 
norms can be rationally justified, this justification cannot be achieved operationally or 
                                                
8 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences,” Contemporary 
Continental Thought, ed. Stephen Daniel (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education Inc., 2005), 121.  
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monologically, but instead requires a cooperative effort whereby individuals come 
together to engage in a process of moral argumentation.9  
For Habermas, then, ruptures within the political community can always be 
repaired through communicative action that aims at restoring consensus among its 
participants. In other words, he says, “Only an intersubjective process of reaching 
understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive in nature; only it can give 
participants the knowledge that they have collectively become convinced of 
something.”10 In upholding this “transcendental-pragmatic” strategy of justification, 
Habermas thus maintains that normative claims are claims to truth, but such truth claims 
can only be justified through “real discourse.”11 From this, it follows for Habermas that 
the greater the number and diversity of voices that are included within this discursive 
process, the more just the principles, norms, and laws that guide society will be. He 
therefore suggests that this notion of rational discourse can provide a regulative ideal for 
fostering justice in society through the inclusion of those voices that have been excluded 
from the discursive practices that give rise to our principles, norms, and laws.  
 Though Rorty and Habermas undertake distinct projects, both nevertheless define 
exclusion as exterior to our present political and juridical structures. That is, for both, 
exclusion arises outside the boundaries we draw around our political communities. As it 
is in this space, exterior to and set apart from our political structures, that individuals are 
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denied rights and freedoms, both develop theoretical frameworks for expanding our 
circles of inclusion to overcome the problem of exclusion. As we have seen, this takes 
shape for Rorty in his call for human solidarity through his suggestion that we must 
expand our conception of “we” to include those we are inclined to call “they,” so as to 
increase economic justice and democratic freedom throughout the world. For Rorty, our 
failure to eradicate exclusion results not from the inadequacy of bourgeois liberalism, 
but rather from the impracticable notion of universal humanism on which we have 
attempted to ground it. Inclusion also guides Habermas’ political philosophy, as is made 
evident in his call for a rehabilitation of the model of deliberative democracy that we 
have inherited from the European Enlightenment. On his account, exclusion arises not 
from the tools that this tradition gave us and, in particular, it’s concern for rationality, 
but rather from our misuse of these tools. Consequently, he believes that by including 
those voices that have been cast out within a discursive, democratic process, it is 
possible to arrive at a set of principles, norms, and, laws grounded in reason that are 
sufficient for forming a just society. This approach stands in opposition to the second 
approach that Adorno and Horkheimer, along with Foucault, Derrida, and Agamben take 
to addressing the problem of exclusion. In contrast to Rorty and Habermas, each of these 
figures attempts to show that political exclusion is internal to the structures of our 
present political communities and develop distinct critical approaches to exposing the 
exclusion and violence that they believe is inherent to these structures.   
Adorno and Horkheimer offer a profound illustration of the second approach to 
the question of political exclusion through their critique of the Enlightenment. In 
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Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, they argue that while the notion 
of freedom in society cannot be understood apart from the Enlightenment, further 
reflection on this emancipatory project reveals that Enlightenment thinking, as well as its 
concrete historical forms and social institutions, contains within it “the regression which 
is taking place everywhere today.”12 Hence, their aim throughout this work is to 
investigate the destructive side of Enlightenment progress made manifest above all in the 
willingness of so many to submit to fascism in the twentieth century. Adorno and 
Horkheimer maintain that western civilization’s descent into irrationality and barbarism 
does not mark a departure from the project of the Enlightenment; rather, in the very 
attempt to secure a foundation for truth and freedom, Enlightenment rationality gave rise 
to the technologies that have increasingly served to nullify and enslave individuals, 
thereby producing its own decay with each progressive step it takes. In light of this, they 
argue that what is called for in the twentieth century is not the expansion of the political 
structures that we have inherited from the Enlightenment, but instead a critique of the 
Enlightenment project itself that can uncover the dialectical relation between the 
progressive rationalism that Enlightenment thinking champions and the regression of 
western civilization in the twentieth century. 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, a totalitarian impulse has been present in 
Enlightenment thinking since its birth. From the beginning, Enlightenment thinking has 
aimed at dispelling myth and fantasy, using calculative reason to provide a systematic 
account of the unity of the natural world in order to dominate nature and liberate 
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humanity from its fear of the unknown. In so doing, however, it has made technology 
and its productive capacities the essence of knowledge, thereby reducing the world and 
everything in it to its instrumental value. In its disenchantment, Enlightenment thinking 
gives rise to the notion that “anything which does not conform to the standard of 
calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion.”13 Therefore, Adorno and 
Horkheimer argue, Enlightenment rationality must be regarded as totalitarian, since only 
that which has been emptied of difference and singularity can be encompassed within the 
unity it seeks to establish.14  
Adorno and Horkheimer challenge bourgeois liberalism on these grounds, 
suggesting that the notion of justice that arises from it is based on the same 
demythologizing calculation that drives scientific positivism. They say:  
The same equations govern bourgeois justice and commodity exchange. […] 
Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable 
by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which 
cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion.15  
In other words, despite our attempts to protect ourselves from the mythology of previous 
epochs through calculative reason, the unity that we presuppose in this endeavor is itself 
a myth. For this reason, Adorno and Horkheimer would likely say of Rorty and 
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Habermas that the inclusive aims they draw on to formulate their political frameworks 
are simply a repetition of the myth of Enlightenment unity.  
This myth comes to appear in its fullest form in the social and political spheres, 
where we find that Enlightenment rationality, upon reducing people and things to 
commodities, leads to the blind domination of individuals rather than their emancipation. 
Thus, following Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer say, “With the spread of the bourgeois 
commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating 
reason, beneath those icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating.”16 This 
barbarism reveals itself in the immense thoughtlessness of the technically educated 
masses. Though reason produces machines, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that in 
western society’s quest for efficiency, these machines produce automation in all walks of 
life, culminating above all in the automation of thought. Hence, while machines mark 
the progress of the Enlightenment’s pursuit of knowledge, these machines 
simultaneously alienate us from reason and, in so doing, generate the thoughtlessness 
necessary for totalitarianism to take root.17  
Exclusion can therefore be said to arise for Adorno and Horkheimer in the 
progressive unfolding of the political structures that we have inherited from the 
Enlightenment, to the extent that these structures are built on a concern for achieving 
unity and extinguishing difference and singularity by means of calculative reason. In 
light of this, Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that what is called for is not the expansion 
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of our present political structures, but rather an immanent critique of the forms of 
exclusion that arise from the myth of Enlightenment unity.18 In so doing, they argue that 
it is possible to illuminate the role that Enlightenment rationality has played in the 
barbarism and irrationality of the twentieth century, enabling us to wrest the truth of the 
Enlightenment from the ideology that is born out of instrumental reason, while freeing 
us from blind domination.19 Adorno and Horkheimer therefore provide a framework for 
critically assessing the forms of exclusion that are contained within the political 
structures that we have inherited from the Enlightenment, so as to open up a new 
pathway for achieving universal emancipation.  
Foucault, like Adorno and Horkheimer, locates exclusion within our present 
political structures, developing a critical approach to the problem of exclusion through 
his post-structuralist analysis of power. Rather than suggesting, as Rorty and Habermas 
do, that universal emancipation can be achieved by expanding our circles of inclusion, 
Foucault argues that we must critically engage the power relations that underlie these 
circles. On Foucault’s account, there exist neither universal truths nor rational grounds 
for the laws that govern our social, political, and economic practices. Instead, these 
practices, along with the discourses and norms that justify them, are rooted in a set of 
historically contingent power relations that serve to maintain the dominance of some, 
while perpetuating the oppression of others. As he explains in his 1977 interview, “Truth 
and Power”:  
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Truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power […]. Truth is a thing of this world: 
it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces 
regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ 
of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
true.20 
Thus, on Foucault’s account, truth and knowledge are not universal; instead, they are 
produced by a set of historically contingent power relations, which take on a particularly 
insidious form in the modern age.  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault turns to the exile of the leper and the arrest of 
the plague victim to illustrate two ways in which power has historically operated. 
Whereas the power mechanisms in the case of the leper once worked to demarcate and 
exclude those who are abnormal in order to establish a pure community, the punitive 
measures used to analyze and separate the healthy from the sick in the case of plague 
victims sought to establish a disciplined society.21 Though these two forms of power 
were once distinct, Foucault explains that they came together in the nineteenth century, 
giving way to a perfectly efficient power mechanism. In his reflections on the power 
relations that underlie our existing social and political structures, he says: 
On the one hand, the lepers are treated as plague victims; the tactics of 
individualizing disciplines are imposed on the excluded; and, on the other hand, 
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the universality of disciplinary controls makes it possible to brand the leper and 
to bring into play against him the dualistic mechanism of exclusion.22 
In attributing universal value to utility, Foucault suggests that the principles of the 
Enlightenment made this synthesis possible. He takes Bentham’s panoptic prison and the 
perfect efficiency it achieves in rendering prisoners visible to their prison guards and 
guards invisible to their prisoners, to provide a blueprint of the structures of power that 
underlie the egalitarian norms of modern society. By rendering individuals perfectly 
visible, the techniques of modern power do not need to be enforced externally. Instead, 
through this method of surveillance, they not only guarantee our submission to them, but 
increase in strength and efficiency as they expand, and are thus able to contaminate 
every aspect of social existence at no cost to the apparatus itself. Therefore, as we 
expand our present social, political, and juridical structures for the sake of increasing 
justice and equality, we simultaneously increase the strength of the power relations and 
further the forms of exclusion that underlie these Enlightenment ideals. That is, he says: 
 The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were 
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday physical 
mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call disciplines. […] The real, corporal 
disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties. […] The 
‘Enlightenment,’ which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.23  
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In turning to power, Foucault intends to distance himself from the Marxist notion of 
ideology on which Adorno and Horkheimer rely in their dialectic of the Enlightenment. 
On Foucault’s account, ideology alone is insufficient for explaining the phenomenon of 
oppression, as it presupposes a universal truth that stands apart from any power 
relation.24 Nevertheless, Foucault follows Adorno and Horkheimer in attempting to 
expose the forms of exclusion that persist in spite of our enlightened social and political 
aspirations through his own call for critique. With this, Foucault argues that critique 
must become the intellectual’s primary concern. He says: 
It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in the intellectual is not 
the ‘bearer of universal values’. […] It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from 
every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) 
but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, 
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.25 
By engaging in a perpetual critique of the power relations that underlie the truths we 
ascribe to, Foucault argues that the intellectual can work to challenge the forms of 
exclusion that are always at work in our modern political structures, rather than 
perpetuating them. He thus explains in his essay, “What is Enlightenment?” that we are 
in fact indebted to and have much to learn from the Enlightenment. On Foucault’s 
account, however, appropriating this heritage depends not on endorsing it as doctrine, 
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but rather on recognizing and engaging the philosophical ethos we have inherited from 
the Enlightenment, an ethos that Foucault suggests consists in permanent critique. 
 Derrida, in much the same way as Adorno, Horkheimer, and Foucault, takes the 
second approach to political exclusion, placing fragmentation and exclusion, rather than 
unity and inclusion, at the center of his political reflections. Yet, he gives further contour 
to this approach by turning to the method of deconstruction to expose the illusory ground 
on which our traditional notions of justice and law are based. In “The Force of Law: The 
Mythical Foundation of Authority,” Derrida explains that deconstructive inquiry seeks to 
complicate traditional oppositions that provide the foundation for our conventions, 
norms, and prescriptions by exposing the ways in which these oppositions always exceed 
themselves and, in so doing, undermine the unshakable ground that they purport to 
provide. With this in mind, Derrida explains that it may appear as if deconstruction has 
no role to play in debates concerning justice, since, in its attempt to destabilize 
foundations, it also undoes the law or ground that forms the basis of our justificatory 
discourses. Through his deconstructive analysis of the law, however, Derrida insists here 
that it is precisely in its ability to expose the mythical foundation of the law’s authority 
that “deconstruction is justice.”26 
Derrida develops this claim by arguing that the law is inherently violent, and, 
therefore, justice cannot be understood as synonymous with law or right, but must 
instead be reconceived in terms of the infinite demand to expose and critically engage 
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the enduring violence of the law. Taking his point of departure from Walter Benjamin’s 
“Critique of Violence,” Derrida explains that force is always implied in the notion of law 
or right that provides the foundation for justice. In other words, the law itself can only be 
established through an originary act of violence and, upon being established, always 
requires enforcement. The distinction between the force of the law and the violence that 
is deemed unjust and punishable by law is thus obscured by the law itself, revealing that 
the essence of law or right cannot be thought apart from injustice. As such, Derrida says, 
“The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment that 
institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an interpretive force.”27 In 
this, Derrida does not merely wish to show that some laws operate in the service of force 
or violence, but rather attempts to make the more provocative claim that force is internal 
to the law. In other words, insofar as the law exists, so too does unjust violence, and, 
because of this, no amount of rational discourse can produce a perfectly just political 
order.  
In contrast to figures like Habermas, then, Derrida maintains that the discursive 
act of justifying one’s right according to the law not only stops short of achieving such 
justification but, in the communicative act itself, also repeats the unjustifiable violence 
that is always bound up with the enforcement of the law. Consequently, Derrida says, 
“One cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is 
just’ and even less ‘I am just,’ without immediately betraying justice, if not law 
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(droit).”28 Discourse reaches its limit precisely in this moment, when, in the attempt to 
provide justification for the law, violence is not only enacted, but the foundation of the 
law itself is disclosed as “a violence without ground.”29 Derrida therefore argues that the 
founding moment on which the authority of the law is predicated reveals itself as 
something that exceeds the opposition between being founded or unfounded. That is, in 
the effort to justify the law through rational discourse, the law reveals itself as lawless, 
thereby illustrating that even it, the most foundational of foundations, is subject to 
deconstruction.  
With this, Derrida argues that the notion of justice must be understood and 
approached in terms of its aporias, or the experience of the impossibility of justice, 
rather than its achievement through the justification of the law in rational discourse. He 
considers three aporias of justice, the first of which consists in the impossibility of 
satisfying the demand to perform a just act. While the principles of justice are always 
expressed as universal laws, the just act must be addressed to a singular and 
irreplaceable other. To efface the singularity of the other is to do violence or injustice to 
her. Justice therefore always addresses itself to the singular, though upon applying the 
universal principles of justice, one necessarily violates the uniqueness of the context to 
which the rule is applied in the performance of the just act.30 Consequently, it is 
impossible to act justly. That is, we can never completely fulfill our responsibility to the 
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singular other, as we always do violence to her by treating her according to the universal 
principles of justice.  
The second aporia arises in the context of the just decision. In order for one to 
make a decision that is just, it must both be made freely and according to the rule of law. 
Yet, freedom and responsibility only emerge in the undecidable, or the moment before a 
decision is made which is “foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule.”31 Once a 
decision is made, a rule has been applied and the verdict becomes a product of mere 
calculation.  
The third aporia follows closely from the second and arises from the fact that 
justice cannot wait; it always requires an immediate decision even though we lack the 
unlimited knowledge of the conditions and rules necessary in order to guarantee that a 
decision is just. As Derrida explains:  
Even if [the just decision] did have all that at its disposal […] the moment of 
decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation, 
since it must not be the consequence or the effect of this theoretical or historical 
knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it always marks the 
interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that 
precedes it, that must precede it.32  
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In its urgency, the just decision must therefore be regarded as a kind of madness, insofar 
as it can only ever be made in “the night of non-knowledge and non-rule.”33 Moreover, 
in each decision, there remains a ghost of the undecidable and, with this, a ghost of the 
unjustifiable. For this reason, Derrida says, “Justice is never exercised without a decision 
that cuts, that divides.”34 Upon deciding in accordance with the law, one affirms anew 
the unjustified violence that is always bound up with it, thereby fracturing rather than 
unifying the political community.  
In its very performance, then, justice ceases to respond to the demands of 
theoretical rationality and thus “never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some 
quality of violence.”35 He therefore believes that it is both inadequate and dangerous to 
uncritically expand our circles of inclusion, as such an approach to addressing injustice 
both repeats and covers over the unjust violence that is bound up with every 
performance of justice.  
In contrast to figures like Rorty and Habermas, Derrida maintains that it is only 
in virtue of the aporetic character of justice that we find ourselves limitlessly responsible 
to the other and certain of the infinite obligation we have to be just.36 He suggests too 
that in its urgency and inability to be completed, justice reveals itself as something that 
is always yet to come, an irreducible possibility of the future that remains open only 
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insofar as it is never completed.37 Derrida therefore wishes to challenge the mainstream 
discourse concerning justice, which he believes uncritically reaffirms the injustice that is 
always bound up with the law. He does this by demonstrating that deconstruction does 
not stand in opposition to justice. Instead, by exposing the fractures in the foundation on 
which our norms, conventions, and laws are based, it responds to the infinite demand of 
justice to remain sensitive to “a sort of essential disproportion that must inscribe excess 
and inadequation in itself and that strives to denounce not only the theoretical limits but 
also concrete injustices.”38 For Derrida, then, the political community is always fractured 
from within, as the very performance of justice, in the form of the just decision, can only 
ever repeat the violence that it seeks to contravene.  
While Agamben also takes the second approach to addressing political exclusion, 
he distinguishes himself from the figures considered to this point by offering perhaps the 
most explicit account of the relationship between exclusion and the structures of western 
politics. Agamben, like Derrida, challenges the notion that politics in the west can be 
understood in terms of its internal unity, arguing that the democratic and egalitarian 
principles of modern politics are inadequate for creating an inclusive political 
community, capable of overcoming exclusion in its entirety. Agamben turns to the figure 
of bare life to illustrate that the structures of western politics were originally constituted 
through an act of exclusion. In so doing, he maintains that this originary exclusion did 
not dissipate in the wake of the formation of these structures; on the contrary, Agamben 
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suggests that the political space itself is sustained through this original exclusion, 
meaning that a space is always preserved within it in which political exclusion is 
possible.  
In his work Homo Sacer, Agamben elucidates this by turning first to the Greek 
distinction between zoe, that is, bare life, or life that is common to all living beings and 
bios, or life conceived as a way of living, as in the good life, the contemplative life, or 
the political life.39 Framed from the outset in terms of bios, Agamben explains that the 
Greek polis served to overcome bare life, providing a space in which one was able to 
achieve a certain kind of life that exceeded mere natural existence. In this, he argues that 
the polis was first understood as a space constituted through the exclusion of zoe or bare 
life. In having as its original concern the cultivation of a certain kind of bios, the very 
activity of political life was predicated on the simultaneous exclusion of life as such. In 
other words, to be included in the polis meant to act in such a way as to exclude this 
aspect of one’s existence. Hence, the Greek polis was constituted through the inclusion 
of that which it originally sought to exclude, namely, bare life.  
For this reason, Agamben says, “The fundamental categorical pair of Western 
politics is not that of friend/enemy, but that of bare life/political existence, zoe/bios, 
exclusion/inclusion.”40 Though internal to the western concept of politics, Agamben 
argues that this originary act of exclusion has been covered over in the attempt to 
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politicize zoe in the modern age through the universal recognition of rights and liberties. 
Modern politics, he explains, attempts to vindicate and liberate zoe, “Constantly trying to 
transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoe.”41 
Agamben suggests, however, that with the rise of totalitarianism, we find that a space 
was nevertheless preserved for the exclusion of bare life despite our attempts to eradicate 
this space through enlightenment politics. In light of this, he argues that it is necessary to 
redirect our political inquiry towards the exclusion that he suggests is always already 
included within the structures of political life in the west.  
Agamben develops the modern manifestation of this inclusive exclusion, which 
he takes to be internal to the structures of western politics, through two interrelated 
forms of exclusion, the first of which consists in the sovereign power to grant a state of 
exception, and the second in homo sacer, that is, sacred man or one “who may be killed 
but not sacrificed.”42 Agamben argues that the condition for the possibility of juridical 
rule rests on the sovereign power to suspend the law through a state of exception.43 In 
having the power to suspend the rule of law, the sovereign places himself both inside 
and outside the law, thereby generating a paradox with respect to the law’s authority. On 
the one hand, the legitimacy of the law depends on the sovereign power to make an 
absolute decision unfettered by a pre-established juridical order. On the other hand, this 
order can only exist insofar as it lacks a lawful ground, as the sovereign must make 
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himself an exception to the rule in order to lend authority to it. Hence, the paradox of the 
structure of sovereignty arises from the fact that the legitimacy of the rule of law can 
only be established through an illegitimate sovereign decision. Furthermore, Agamben 
explains, the law only retains its authority in relation to the sovereign exception and can 
only sustain itself insofar as a space is held open within the political order in which the 
sovereign decision, or the suspension of the validity of the political order, can be 
enacted.  
Agamben explains that this originary exception on which the juridico-political 
order is based is as at the same time an act of exclusion, specifically of the individual 
case in favor of the rule.44 In being excluded, the individual’s relation to the law does not 
simply dissolve; rather, insofar as this exclusion takes place in the sphere of the 
sovereign decision, that which is excluded by it is persevered within the political order. 
Hence, the excluded individual does not simply become indifferent to the law through 
the sovereign decision but instead, in being trapped within the sphere of the exception, is 
held in a necessary relation to the law as that which has been abandoned by it.45   
Agamben brings the subject of this abandonment into focus through his 
discussion of homo sacer, the second figure of exclusion according to which he suggests 
the western juridico-political order takes shape. Broadly speaking, the notion of homo 
sacer or sacred man refers to the inclusion of bare life within the juridico-political order. 
In offering this analysis of sacred man, Agamben wishes to draw attention to the origin 
                                                
44 Ibid., 17. 
45 Ibid., 25. 
  35 
of the notion of the sacredness of life and its relation to the modern attempt to overcome 
the exclusion of bare life within the political sphere by deeming all life, regardless of its 
political status, sacred. While this belief in the sacredness of life in the modern era is 
taken to provide the ground for universal rights, Agamben insists that the possibility of 
exclusion always remains open, even when one is brought within fold of the political 
community.    
To illustrate this, Agamben turns to the Roman law, sacer mons, where 
sacredness is tied for the first time to human life as such in the figure of homo sacer.46 
This law defines homo sacer as one who has been judged by the people on account of a 
crime to be bad or impure. In being deemed impure, the law stipulates that homo sacer 
may not be sacrificed; yet, this mark of impurity also makes it the case that anyone may 
kill homo sacer and such killing cannot be condemned as homicide.47 When attached to 
life as such, Agamben explains that the sacred no longer demarcates the holy, as it does 
in the case of sacred things, but instead becomes a curse, whereby “homo sacer on 
whom this curse falls is an outcast, a banned man, tabooed, dangerous.”48 The 
significance of homo sacer thus consists in the originary juridico-political phenomenon 
that is presented in the sacredness that is ascribed to him by law. Homo sacer is at once 
set apart from divine law, in the ban against his sacrifice, as well as from human 
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jurisdiction to the extent that he cannot be murdered. 49 In standing apart from both the 
religious and the juridical rule, Agamben explains that homo sacer finds himself subject 
to a kind of double exclusion, which is at the same time a double capture, insofar as he is 
included within the political community as one who may be killed.50 Consequently, 
Agamben says, “What defines homo sacer is […] the peculiar character of the double 
exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed.” 51 
Such unsanctionable violence, in its inability to be classified either as sacrilege or 
homicide, opens up a limit sphere of human action. This sphere, which stands apart from 
the law, can only be sustained in relation to an exception and therefore constitutes the 
same sphere of action in which the sovereign decision takes place. As such, Agamben 
explains, “Homo sacer presents the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban 
and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the political 
dimension was constituted.”52 The sovereign and homo sacer are conjoined insofar as 
sacred life is the original victim of the sovereign ban, constituting “the originary 
exception in which human life is included in the political order in being exposed to the 
unconditional capacity to be killed.”53  
With this, Agamben explains that the modern political sphere cannot be 
understood in terms of the boundaries we draw to demarcate a space of inclusion that is 
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distinguished from that which is excluded; if this were the case, then expanding our 
circles of inclusion would indeed be a sufficient for overcoming problem of exclusion. 
We find through the figure of homo sacer, however, that inclusion within the political 
sphere is inadequate for overcoming political exclusion, as this sphere can only hold 
itself open by remaining tethered to that which has been excluded from it. Therefore, 
Agamben says, “The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely 
fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely 
both life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation 
of abandonment.”54 In other words, in our efforts in the modern era to politicize bare life 
by extending rights and liberties to all life, including that which has been stripped of its 
political status, Agamben suggests we have overlooked the figure of homo sacer, which 
contains within it the original exclusion on which the political sphere was founded and 
sustains itself.  
Agamben therefore follows Adorno and Horkheimer, along with Foucault and 
Derrida, in his analysis of bare life, locating the problem of exclusion within our present 
political structures, rather than outside of them, as Rorty and Habermas do. In so doing, 
he, like the former set of thinkers, is led to develop a critical method for exposing the 
illusory and fragmented nature of the originary foundation to which we appeal in our call 
for justice in political life. Taken together, the two approaches I have outlined give some 
contour to the landscape for understanding this complex but central problematic in 
recent political philosophy. Given the expansiveness of Arendt’s thought, as well as the 
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ambiguity she often expresses in regard to the possibility of meaningfully undertaking 
the task of politics, she does not fit easily within any part of this landscape. 
Nevertheless, I will suggest in the following section that despite the emphasis placed in 
recent scholarship on her contribution to discourses concerning the expansion of our 
liberal political structures, her critical relation to the liberal tradition must be brought 
into focus, as her insights into the dangers and limits of this tradition are crucial for 
understanding political exclusion today.  
I.3. The Place of Exclusion in Arendt’s Thought  
Recent scholars including Seyla Benhabib, Dana Villa, and Peg Birmingham 
have emphasized those aspects of Arendt’s work that concern inclusion, focusing in 
particular on her significance for contemporary debates regarding liberalism, radical 
democracy, and human rights. These scholars, of course, do not overlook Arendt’s 
career long refusal to be labeled or categorized and her tendency to leave largely 
unanswered the question of whether exclusion is something that can be overcome 
through the political or is instead contained within its structures. Even so, there is a 
tendency among these scholars to set aside those moments in which Arendt’s optimism 
regarding the legitimacy of the political sphere wanes, taking this to be a hindrance to 
her ability to contribute to mainstream debates in liberal political theory, rather than 
revelatory of her larger political project.  
Benhabib, in her work, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, develops 
the complexity of Arendt’s relationship to the modern tradition, which she argues has 
been oversimplified as a result of a preoccupation in the scholarship with Arendt’s work 
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in The Human Condition. Benhabib rereads Arendt’s approach to understanding 
modernity, turning in particular to the influence of Martin Heidegger’s Existenz 
philosophy, along with her experience as a German Jewish woman in the age of 
totalitarianism to outline the intricacies and tensions that arise in the analysis she offers 
of the modern political sphere. In light of this, Benhabib says:  
The great tensions in Arendt’s systematic reflections on politics and society, and 
the unresolved contradictions in some of her formulations, can be traced back to 
this twofold spiritual-intellectual legacy. Expressed in a somewhat stylized form: 
although Hannah Arendt, the stateless and persecuted Jew, is the philosophical 
and political modernist, Arendt, the student of Martin Heidegger, is the 
antimodernist Grecophile theorist of the polis and of its lost glory.55 
Benhabib thus gives a great deal of attention to the ambiguous relation that Arendt 
seems to have to modern politics and the Enlightenment tradition. For Arendt, Benhabib 
says, “Modernity was not a seamless historical development but a process rich in 
contradictions.” 56 On Benhabib’s view, Arendt was a brilliant thinker of these 
contradictions, identifying them in the bourgeois revolutions of the previous centuries, 
the declaration of the rights of man and citizen, and, perhaps above all, in the unfilled 
promise of universal emancipation made by the Enlightenment tradition. Yet, upon 
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developing this analysis of Arendt, Benhabib ultimately deems her political framework 
inadequate for furthering the project of liberal politics.57  
Benhabib argues that Arendt’s discovery of the banality of evil in her 1962 text 
Eichmann in Jerusalem marks a turning point for Arendt, leaving her in a melancholic 
state over the fragility of human rights and the possibility of discerning a ground for 
moral judgment.58 Rather than tarrying on this, however, Benhabib attempts to defend 
Arendt against accusations that her political philosophy is “anti-foundationalist,” turning 
to The Human Condition to show that Arendt retains an “anthropological universalism” 
in her suggestion that all human beings are conditioned by natality, plurality, labor, 
work, and action.59 Benhabib argues that while this universal claim about the human 
condition provides an important starting point for grounding a liberal political theory, it 
alone is not enough to justify the call to respect others and therefore requires something 
more in order to legitimize our obligation to act morally towards one another in the 
realm of politics. Such normative force, Benhabib insists, is necessary if we want to 
anchor Arendt’s thought in contemporary institutions. For this reason, she turns to 
Habermas to provide the supplement for what she takes to be Arendt’s shortcomings. 
Therefore, while Benhabib is well aware of the gestures Arendt makes towards a critical 
approach to the problem of exclusion, she pushes them aside for the sake of upholding 
Arendt’s contribution to more mainstream, inclusive approaches to this problem.  
                                                
57 Ibid., xl. 
58 Ibid., 193.  
59 Ibid.,195.  
  41 
Villa calls on Arendt’s readers in his work Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of 
the Political to consider the originating ways in which she understands political action in 
relation to the crisis in political life in the modern age. According to Villa, there has 
been a trend among scholars to view Arendt’s conception of political action as a mere 
repetition of Aristotle’s notion of praxis in order to bolster their own positions in 
mainline debates concerning participatory democracy, critical theory following 
Habermas, and communitarianism.60 Villa, by contrast, believes that these readings of 
Arendt overlook how radical her conception of political action is. On his view, Arendt’s 
concern for action is not simply a form of remembrance, but rather a form of invention 
that seeks to introduce meaning in an age, which, in lacking any tradition, has become 
worldless and vulnerable to the boundless instrumentality of totalitarian politics.61 Like 
Benhabib, Villa suggests that understanding Arendt’s conception of political action 
depends on understanding the formative role that Heidegger’s critique of modernity 
played in the development of Arendt’s thought. A center piece of Villa’s discussion, he 
maintains that Arendt’s appropriation of Heidegger gives rise to the unique political 
categories that she employs to address the deficiency of political life in the modern age, 
which she then uses to criticize Heidegger’s own political failings.  
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Though at odds with Benhabib on the question of political action, Villa 
nevertheless attempts in much the same way as Benhabib does to articulate the ways that 
Arendt has been oversimplified in contemporary scholarship. In this, his work sheds 
important light on those aspects of Arendt’s work in which she stands in a critical 
relation to politics in the modern age. Yet, he, like Benhabib, ultimately wishes to 
develop an account of Arendt’s political theory that remains wedded to an inclusive 
approach to the question of exclusion through his discussion of agonistic democracy. For 
instance, in his essay, “Democratizing the Agon: Nietzsche, Arendt, and the Agonistic 
Tendency in Recent Political Theory,” Villa urges us to consider the possibility of 
rethinking liberal democracy in terms of an agonistic politics and suggests that Arendt 
provides the necessary resources for doing just this. He argues that the liberal 
frameworks of figures like Rawls do not do enough to encourage active, critical thinking 
in political life.62 By contrast, an agonistic politics, in promoting constant contestation in 
the political sphere, encourages the kind of active and independent thought necessary for 
authentic engagement in democratic discourse that standard versions of liberal 
democracy are unable to accomplish.63 He turns to Arendt to develop a notion of 
democracy that is centered on conflict rather than consensus because he believes that she 
both sympathizes with the agonistic politics of figures like Nietzsche, while recognizing 
that for this to have relevance, it must be tempered by an impersonal ethos in political 
life. Villa therefore maintains that Arendt provides us with a much needed model of 
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democracy that both opens a space for independent thinking in political life, while 
securing this space in such a way that it does not fall into violence. While Villa 
undoubtedly calls for a more radical version of democratic politics than Benhabib does, 
he nevertheless follows her, first in noting the way in which Arendt engages the more 
critical approach to the question of exclusion, and second, in setting this aside to explain 
how we can use Arendt to enhance, rather than critique, our present political structures.     
   Peg Birmingham offers yet another decisive analysis of Arendt’s political 
philosophy, though she too classifies Arendt in terms of the contributions she has to 
make to the inclusive approach to the question of exclusion, turning to Arendt’s 
discussion of “the right to have rights” in order to do so. Birmingham argues in her 
work, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Responsibility, that 
Arendt provides us with a ground for asserting human rights through her conception of 
natality. She therefore wishes to challenge Benhabib, who believes that Arendt is 
ultimately unable to substantiate her belief in universal human rights, along with Villa, 
who is critical of Arendt for giving up a viable notion of rights in favor of political 
action.64 Birmingham, by contrast, wishes to show that Arendt’s primary concern from 
her work in The Origins of Totalitarianism onward is to provide “a theoretical 
foundation for a reformulation of the modern notion of human rights.”65 Birmingham 
thus considers the way Arendt goes about reformulating the ground we have for 
identifying with one another in our humanity upon witnessing the inadequacy of 
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Enlightenment humanism with the rise of totalitarianism. Birmingham suggests that for 
Arendt, providing a new ground for humanism after the holocaust depends on 
understanding humanity not simply in terms of its capacity for respect but also, and more 
importantly, in terms of its capacity for evil. On Birmingham’s account, Arendt develops 
her notion of natality for the sake of providing a new conception of human solidarity that 
is able to provide a foundation for international responsibility. Arendt’s notion of 
natality, she explains, is distinctive insofar as it acknowledges the boundlessness of 
human action. In this, it serves to undermine the metaphysical notion of human nature on 
which universal rights were originally founded, revealing instead that human beings are 
equal only insofar as they are radically distinct from one another and, with this, always 
capable of doing the unprecedented. Therefore, while Arendt recognizes the failure of 
the Enlightenment to provide a ground for human rights, she is not led to reject 
humanism altogether.66 Instead, Birmingham insists that the event of natality provides 
the source of an ontological ground for humanity, insofar as it contains within it the right 
to appear in public.67 That is, Birmingham says:  
The event of natality that carries within it the principle of publicness, when 
restated as the law of humanity (understood as the appearance of the actor among 
a plurality of actors in a public space of freedom), demands that the actor have 
the right to appear, or, as Arendt so succinctly puts it, the right to have rights. 
This right is not predicated on a metaphysical understanding of the human being 
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as having a nature; instead, it is predicated on the fundamental event of human 
existence—natality.68 
Though Birmingham acknowledges the ways in which Arendt’s understanding of the 
human condition are bound up with a critique of the Enlightenment notion of human 
rights and their failure to be guaranteed in the twentieth century, she nevertheless 
emphasizes the role Arendt has to play in rehabilitating these concepts such that they are 
able to guarantee human solidarity on a global scale. In this, Birmingham, like Benhabib 
and Villa, is led to emphasize those aspects of Arendt’s thought that further liberal, 
inclusive approaches to the question of exclusion made manifest in the discourse 
concerning human rights.   
 The contribution of each of these scholars is, without question, integral for 
deepening Arendt’s thought, particularly with regard to developing the relevance of her 
work for enhancing the structures that constitute political life today. Moreover, each 
rightly points to Arendt’s concern for developing a political framework that furthers the 
end of universal emancipation despite the fact that the viability of this end was called 
into question so dramatically with the rise of totalitarianism. In turning so often to the 
inclusive side of Arendt’s political thought, however, the contributions she has to the 
discourse that locates exclusion within the structures of modern political life has 
remained underdeveloped. This project will thus unfold along a different line of inquiry 
than figures like Benhabib, Villa, and Birmingham take, framing Arendt in terms of 
those aspects of her work in which she locates the problem of exclusion at the very heart 
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of the structures that organize modern political life rather than outside these structures. 
In so doing, my aim is to show that Arendt makes a decisive contribution to the second 
approach I outline to the problem of exclusion that has yet to be fully appreciated. 
Beyond this, I will suggest that by expanding her thought beyond the European nation-
state to a more global set of concerns raised in post-colonial theory regarding the 
memory of slavery and colonization in the African diaspora, it is possible to intensify the 
importance of her critical insights for addressing the problem of exclusion in 
contemporary political life.  
I.4. Dissertation Structure 
I will develop this project in five chapters. In Chapter Two, I provide an account 
of Arendt’s political ontology that brings her critical relation to the liberal tradition into 
focus as it unfolds in her analysis of the crisis in Enlightenment notions freedom that 
came into view with the emergence of stateless people in the period between the world 
wars. My aim in this chapter will be to show that Arendt’s critique of the concept of 
liberty as she develops it in her analysis of statelessness provides the impetus for her to 
reformulate the concept of the political sphere in terms of the phenomenological notion 
of “the space of appearance.”  I elucidate this by drawing Arendt’s discussion of 
statelessness together with her account of the development of the ideas of freedom and 
liberty in the western political tradition. In so doing, I argue that she is led to disavow 
the liberal political sentiment that freedom is an internal and pre-political property 
shared in common by all human beings, conceiving of it instead as a worldy political 
phenomenon that comes to appear when individuals enact their singularity and diversity 
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by speaking and acting with others in the space of politics in order to initiate something 
anew. 
In Chapter Three, I consider the full implications of Arendt’s critique of the 
liberal tradition, along with the prescient critical perspectives she offers on liberal 
approaches to the problem of exclusion by developing her notion of citizenship in 
relation to her account of the problem of loneliness in the modern age. By turning to 
loneliness, I will suggest that Arendt’s understanding of citizenship guides a prescient 
critique of the basic assumptions that underlie notions of citizenship within liberal 
political theory. As we shall see, Arendt believes that these forms of citizenship do not 
secure liberty, but instead reproduce the very loneliness that has made modern 
individuals susceptible to totalitarian domination. I therefore argue in this chapter that 
Arendt poses her own notion of citizenship as an antidote to loneliness and, thus, to the 
vulnerability of our liberal political structures to totalitarianism.  
In Chapter Four, I examine the scope and limits of Arendt’s conception of 
citizenship. I argue that while Arendt’s analysis of the problem of exclusion in modern 
political life offers a novel critical perspective on notions of citizenship inherited from 
the liberal tradition, an internal inconsistency arises in her account of the responsibility 
she believes citizens have to remember in political life. This, in turn, keeps her notion of 
citizenship from addressing the forms of exclusion that she believes have become 
definitive of modern political life. I develop this inconsistency in Arendt’s thought by 
considering her discussion of the political significance of remembrance as it unfolds in 
her discourse on the role of tradition and history in political life. I then develop this in 
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light of her analysis of the hidden tradition of the pariah and her account of the tacit 
exclusion of African American’s from the American political community in her essay 
“Civil Disobedience.” By considering these two texts, I show that Arendt acknowledges 
that a history of violence and exclusion gets covered over through the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship. Yet, in spite of her concern for remembrance in political life, 
I argue that she provides no means for coming to terms with this history of violence and 
exclusion in the space of politics, assuming instead that the affirmation of one’s 
citizenship in the space of politics is enough to ensure that they are forgotten and 
consigned to oblivion. 
In Chapter Five, I consider Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian 
Revolution in order to challenge and deepen Arendt’s notion of citizenship, particularly 
as it pertains to the responsibility she believes citizens have to remember in political life. 
The Haitian Revolution provides a decisive and early historical example of the way in 
which, citizenship, even after it is granted and affirmed, can fail to overcome those 
histories of violence and exclusion that preceded the implementation of Enlightenment 
citizenship. While citizenship should have been enough to ensure that the legacy of 
slavery and colonization that preceded the enfranchisement of the enslaved in Saint-
Domingue was overcome in its entirety, we find through this example that it in fact 
continued to haunt the new French citizens in the form of the threat of a return to the 
violence and exclusion of the past. In turning to the Haitian Revolution, I wish to show 
that the inconsistency in Arendt’s notion of citizenship reveals a deeper problem internal 
to the modern political tradition concerning historical memory, which I call the paradox 
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of remembrance, that keeps citizenship, even as she conceives of it, from overcoming 
the problem of exclusion today.  
 In Chapter Six, I provide an account of the echo of the original failure of 
Enlightenment citizenship that is epitomized by Haitian Revolution in the racialized 
violence and exclusion that continues to haunt diasporic peoples decades and centuries 
after becoming enfranchised. To this end, I turn to the philosophical concept of 
repetition to develop the implications of this paradox of remembrance for understanding 
political exclusion today. I turn to this idea to frame the ontological concepts of 
homecoming and belonging that orient Arendt’s notion of citizenship. I then consider 
Arendt alongside Derrida, whose critique of the originality of the event of appropriation 
and the homecoming it promises in his work, Specters of Marx, provides an important 
point of departure for understanding the implications of the paradox of remembrance in 
contemporary political life. Specifically, I will suggest by way of his notion of ghosts 
and specters that the concept of modern citizenship is self-effacing, as the very 
affirmation of one’s citizenship necessitates the covering over of those histories of 
violence and exclusion that are internal to the legacy of the modern revolutionary 
tradition. As such, I will argue that citizenship itself keeps a part of the legacy that we 
are tasked with preserving from coming into appearance, thereby necessitating the 
repetition of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past in our political 
traditions, institutions, and values. I will develop this with reference to the notion of 
“nonhistory” that Glissant associates with the way history is experienced by colonized 
peoples and the immediate presence these “nonhistories” have in the lived reality of their 
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everyday experience. I then argue that addressing political exclusion today depends on 
going a step further than Arendt does in her analysis of citizenship. Beyond citizenship, I 
will suggest that overcoming the forms of exclusion that Arendt introduces in her 
respective analyses of statelessness and loneliness depends on developing a new and 
more expansive frame for the concept of homecoming in political ontology that makes 
room in the space of politics not only for citizens, but also for the specters of the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that are necessitated by the 
implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. With this, I propose a theoretical 
framework for a post-enlightenment politics that goes beyond the Enlightenment 
concern for the universal expansion of citizenship, offering an even more inclusive 
model of political life that makes room in the public realm not just for the living present 
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CHAPTER II 
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE SPACE OF APPEARANCE: AN 
ONTOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of Arendt’s political theory that 
is keyed to the space of appearance and the central role it plays in her attempt to 
reformulate the task of politics in the twentieth century. On Arendt’s view, the public 
realm cannot be thought apart from the space of appearance. That is, she explains, the 
purpose of the public realm is to throw light on human affairs by providing a space of 
appearance in which individuals can come together to “show in deed and word who they 
are and what they can do.”69 As I suggest here, the significance Arendt attributes to the 
space of appearance can be brought into focus by considering it in relation to her 
analysis of statelessness. Through this analysis, I argue that she diagnoses a crisis in the 
epoch of the Enlightenment that comes into view after World War I. Arendt’s own 
analysis indicates that statelessness is a symptom of the contradictions internal to 
enlightened liberalism, revealing the inadequacy of the notion of private liberty for 
engendering universal emancipation. It is in virtue of this crisis, I argue, that Arendt 
comes to believe that freedom requires a space of appearance, leading her to disavow 
liberal notions of freedom rooted in the security of rights in the private sphere and turn 
instead to a concept of freedom oriented by our shared responsibility to make one 
another visible in the public realm. With this, she offers an account of political life that 
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is oriented by an ontological conception of freedom, where freedom is understood not as 
a pre-political property of the human being, but rather as an event that comes to appear 
in the world through the spontaneity of human action in the public sphere. Such 
phenomenological events of freedom, she argues, reveal that the constitution of the 
human must be understood not in terms of a fixed essence shared in common by all 
human beings, but rather in terms of the irreducible singularity and diversity that comes 
to appear in the world through the startling unexpectedness of human action. Moreover, 
as we will see, she suggests that the seeds of totalitarianism can be found in the modern 
impulse to reduce, through instrumental reason, the unpredictability of human action, 
thereby destroying human plurality and keeping the freedom inherent in action from 
making its appearance in the world. 
I develop this chapter in three parts, beginning with an analysis of Arendt’s 
critique of the idea of liberty. By considering her analysis of the concepts of liberty and 
freedom and their development throughout the history of western political thought 
alongside her discussion of statelessness in The Origins of Totalitarianism, my aim in 
this section will be to reconstruct Arendt’s critical relation to the modern political 
tradition in terms of the limitations that she believes are inherent in the concept of 
liberty. To this end, I argue that Arendt offers a robust, though largely underappreciated, 
critique of classical liberalism that grows out of her analysis of statelessness. Through 
this analysis, I suggest that Arendt comes to recognize that statelessness offers a stark 
illustration of the inadequacy of the idea of freedom that arises from the liberal tradition, 
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exposing the danger involved in divorcing the notion of freedom from the political 
sphere.  
I then argue that the limitations Arendt identifies in the modern notion of liberty 
through her analysis of statelessness leads her to develop an ontological notion of 
freedom and, with this, a notion of the political realm understood as a space of 
appearance. As Arendt’s understanding of the space of appearance has its origins in 
Martin Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, I elucidate the concept of freedom that 
she develops in texts such as “What is Freedom?” with reference to her analysis of the 
political ramifications of this Heideggerian idea. In so doing, I wish to show that Arendt 
ultimately formulates a concept of freedom that consists not in a retreat to the private 
sphere, but rather in an event of appropriation that can only be achieved when 
individuals are able to appear among one another through speech and action in the public 
sphere.  
Upon providing an account of the distinctive notion of freedom that Arendt 
develops, I conclude this chapter by suggesting that for her, the task of politics consists 
in holding open a space of appearance, or a space in which this kind of appropriative 
event is possible. In order to illustrate this, I turn to Arendt’s discussion in The Human 
Condition, emphasizing in particular her claim that human beings are conditioned most 
fundamentally by natality, or their irreducible uniqueness, and plurality, or the fact that 
they always find themselves in a world with others. In light of her discussion of natality 
and plurality, we find that for Arendt, human beings can only appear in the fullness of 
their humanity if they belong to a place in the world where they are able to actualize 
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these aspects of the human condition by speaking and acting in concert with others in the 
space of politics. By drawing this together with her analysis of the limits of the liberal 
notions of freedom and her concern for the problem of statelessness, I wish to show that 
Arendt constructs a political ontology that puts into relief the vulnerability of the 
structures of modern political life to totalitarianism. Whereas I will focus in this chapter 
on Arendt’s diagnosis of the dangers and limits of the emphasis in modern political 
theory on liberty rather than political freedom, I will suggest in subsequent chapters that 
this leads Arendt to develop a novel conception of citizenship that forms the basis to 
critique notions of citizenship inherited from the liberal tradition. Drawing my 
discussion of Arendt’s analysis of statelessness in this chapter together with her account 
of the political phenomenon of loneliness in the modern era in the following chapter, I 
will bring into focus the importance of her critical relation to the liberal tradition and the 
intervention it offers in contemporary political discourses that emphasize the global 
expansion of liberal citizenship as a method for addressing political exclusion today. 
II.1. The Ascendance of Liberty in Modern Politics 
In this section, I elucidate the critical concerns Arendt raises regarding classical 
liberalism and the central position that the concept of liberty has come to occupy in the 
modern political tradition. To illustrate this, I turn first to Arendt’s account of the 
evolution of the concepts of liberty and freedom throughout the history of western 
political thought. Arendt explains that in antiquity, freedom was understood as a 
distinctly political phenomenon, making its appearance in the world through speech and 
action in the public sphere. In the modern age, by contrast, the idea of freedom loses its 
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political relevance, bringing about a fundamental shift in both our metaphysical 
understanding of freedom and the structure of the political itself. On Arendt’s view, 
modern freedom is predicated on a Christian notion of free will. Conceived within this 
framework, freedom is achieved through a retreat from the world and the temptations 
contained therein, rather than something that is realized through one’s active 
engagement with it. Hence, with the rise of Christianity, the world becomes an 
impediment to freedom rather than the stage for its appearance, as had been the case in 
antiquity. No longer understood politically, freedom in the modern age is thus 
transformed into an internal and fixed property of the human being rather than a worldly 
phenomenon. Yet, despite losing it’s political relevance, Arendt suggests that it is 
precisely this non-political notion of freedom that is brought to bear on the sphere of 
politics in the modern age through the elevation of private liberty to the highest political 
ideal.  
Arendt has a notoriously conflicted relation to the modern tradition, rarely taking 
a definitive stance on the question of whether the political structures we have inherited 
from it can be rehabilitated in the wake of the political catastrophes of the twentieth 
century.70 Be that as it may, she nevertheless takes this transformation in the idea of 
freedom to have what she calls “fatal consequences” for political life in the modern age, 
leading her to develop a critique of enlightened liberalism that proves formative for her 
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broader theoretical framework.71 As I shall demonstrate, these consequences can be seen 
by turning to her analysis of statelessness and the crisis in freedom it exposes at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Statelessness reveals the inadequacy of enlightened 
liberalism for engendering universal emancipation, along with the modern sentiment that 
freedom begins where politics ends. Insofar as liberty proved meaningless for those who 
had been expelled from their political communities, Arendt believes we find through the 
phenomenon of statelessness that freedom is not an inalienable property of the human 
being that arises through a retreat form the world, but instead can only be enacted if a 
space exists in the world where individuals are able to appear among one another in their 
radical diversity. She identifies this space with the public realm or the sphere of politics, 
which gets covered over in the modern age through the imposition of a non-political 
concept of freedom on the political realm. Arendt’s analysis of statelessness therefore 
reveals a contradiction internal to enlightened liberalism. While this tradition promises 
universal emancipation by upholding liberty as an inalienable property of the human 
being, the emergence of stateless people indicated that the structures we have inherited 
from this tradition are based on an idea of freedom that leaves individuals in the modern 
age without a space in the world where the inherent meaningfulness of their action can 
come to appear. On the basis of this, Arendt insists that if human beings are to renew the 
meaning and significance of the modern world, a place must exist where freedom can 
make its appearance, leading her to reformulate the task of politics in terms of political 
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community and the preservation of the public realm rather than the security of liberty in 
the private sphere.  
Arendt explains that the idea of liberty has been central to the development of 
western political theory since antiquity. 72 From its inception, liberty has been defined in 
terms of the individual’s liberation from unjustified restraint, consisting above all in the 
freedom of movement, or the freedom to undertake those activities that are necessary for 
living in general.73 Hence, liberty is neither new nor distinctively modern, finding its 
original formulation in ancient Greece where the power of locomotion was taken to be 
the most important civil right, just as in the modern world.74 Yet, while securing the 
basic necessities of life has been understood throughout the tradition of western political 
thought to form a necessary condition for freedom, liberty was neither taken to be 
identical with freedom nor sufficient for engendering it until the modern age.75 
Therefore, politics in the modern age distinguishes itself not so much in the significance 
it attributes liberty, but rather in the relationship it establishes between liberty and 
freedom. 
Arendt explains that in the classical world, liberty and freedom, though 
intimately related, nevertheless pertained to two distinct realms of human affairs. Liberty 
concerned the freedom to satisfy the basic necessities of life through the maintenance of 
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one’s home (oikia) and thus pertained to the household or private realm. The life of the 
household realm stood in direct opposition to a second, higher form of life, the bios 
politikos, which came into existence with the Greek city-state and denoted the kind of 
life most proper to the human being.76 As she says, “The distinctive trait of the 
household sphere was that in it men lived together because they were driven by their 
wants and needs.”77 While having the liberty to rule as one wished in the privacy of 
one’s home was taken to be a basic condition for citizenship, liberty itself was not 
identified with freedom in antiquity, as it permitted nothing more than the fulfillment of 
those life processes that are governed by necessity. Freedom, by contrast, was believed 
to be an eruptive event that gave birth to something new to the world, thereby initiating a 
break from the necessary processes that characterizes life in general. As Arendt explains, 
“The realm of the polis […] was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship 
between these two spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities 
of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the polis.”78 Whereas the 
effects of liberty remained hidden in the private realm of everyday life, freedom required 
a public realm where individuals, having already satisfied the necessities of life, could 
come together with their fellow citizens to engage in the task of politics.  
In their capacity as citizens, individuals cast aside their concern for their 
particular existence in the household realm, joining together in the public realm for the 
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sake of preserving a common world.79 No longer concerned with satisfying their basic 
wants and desires, individuals entered into the public realm in order to engage in a 
higher kind of life, namely, political life, which was distinctively human insofar as it 
created the conditions necessary for freedom to appear. By participating in political life 
individuals worked together to preserve a space of human meaning that transcended the 
necessity of ordinary life, reminding them that their existence was not futile because 
they belonged to and were responsible for preserving a world that had existed before 
them and would outlast their lives in it.80  
In the ancient world, freedom was therefore believed to be a worldly 
phenomenon that made its appearance when individuals came together through speech 
and action in the public realm, initiating something anew for the sake of carrying a 
shared world from the past into the future. Accordingly, Arendt says, “Freedom needed, 
in addition to mere liberation, the company of other men who were in the same state, and 
it need of a common public space to meet them – a politically organized world, into 
which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed.”81 Hence, in classical 
antiquity, liberty, in pertaining only to the necessities of life in the private realm, was not 
only distinct from freedom but formed an opposition to it. Whereas one’s household life 
was taken to have little meaning beyond satisfying one’s biological needs, polis-life 
promised transcendence, enabling human beings who had liberated themselves from the 
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necessities of everyday life to actualize their freedom by working in concert with others 
to initiate something new in the world.  
Whereas the Greeks and Romans believed that freedom was a political 
phenomenon, Arendt says that in the modern age, “It has become almost axiomatic even 
in political theory to understand freedom not as a political phenomenon, but on the 
contrary, as the more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body 
politic will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it.”82 The displacement of 
freedom from the political realm has transformed the structure of politics altogether, 
making liberty the chief political ideal in the modern era and the protection of the rights 
of individuals in private life, the paramount aim of politics. Yet, while this non-political 
notion of freedom has become the centerpiece of modern political theory, Arendt 
explains that its origins are pre-modern, finding its earliest formulations in late antiquity 
and early Christianity. Arendt turns to Epictetus and Augustine to illustrate this, both of 
whom attempt to elevate “inner freedom,” or freedom of thought and the will to the 
highest kind of human freedom. In so doing, each reverses the predominant assumption 
in antiquity that “the experiences of inner freedom are derivative in that they always 
presuppose a retreat from the world.”83  
Epictetus conceives of freedom as something that is manifest neither in the 
accumulation of worldly possessions nor in one’s mastery over other men, as these sorts 
of things reside in the exterior world over which men have no control; instead, it arises 
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when we limit ourselves to what is within our control, namely, to our thoughts and 
dispositions towards the world in which we find ourselves.84 Arendt says:  
According to ancient understanding, man could liberate himself from necessity 
only through power over other men, and he could be free only if he owned a 
place, a home in the world. Epictetus transposed these worldly relationships into 
relationships within man’s own self, whereby he discovered that no power is so 
absolute as that which man yields over himself, and that inward space where man 
struggles and subdues himself is more entirely his own, namely, more securely 
shielded from outside interference, than any worldly home could ever be.85 
Hence, Epictetus introduced a notion of freedom that can only be realized through a 
retreat from the world into the internal domain of thought where we are able to master 
our desires and judgments or those states that cannot be hindered by the exterior world. 
In much the same way as Epictetus, Augustine divorces freedom from the world, 
suggesting that human beings are powerless to influence their surrounding environment 
and powerful only insofar as they are the arbiters of their will.86 Understood as free will, 
this Augustinian conception of freedom is even further removed from the world, arising 
only when one retreats into “the ‘inner dwelling’ of the soul and the dark ‘chamber of 
the heart,’” permanently protected from the coercion of bodily desire.87  
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In tying freedom to the will, the early Christian tradition places a barricade 
between freedom and the contingencies of the world, thereby transforming the idea of 
freedom in ways that prove decisive for the modern tradition. No longer a political 
concept, freedom becomes something “otherwordly,” understood not in terms of an 
individuals ability to effect change in the world, but instead in terms of the ability to 
liberate oneself from it.88 Beyond this, insofar as Christian freedom can arise only in 
solitude, it never appears in the phenomenal world, remaining hidden in the interior 
dwelling of the soul.89 Finally, in identifying freedom with free will, the early Christian 
tradition simultaneously divorces freedom from action; in suggesting that the exercise of 
free will is possible only in solitude, freedom comes to be associated with the ability to 
prohibit oneself from giving into the temptations of the exterior world. Hence, Arendt 
maintains that the Christian notion of free will has a paralyzing effect, inhibiting action 
by creating a conflict between the willing and the performing self.90 
  While this way of conceiving of freedom is undoubtedly formative for the 
tradition of metaphysics in the modern age, providing the basis for Descartes’s 
epistemology and the representational problematic it creates for thinkers from Kant to 
Husserl, it has its most dramatic consequences in the context of politics.91 Arendt 
explains that neither Epictetus nor Augustine were especially concerned with applying 
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their respective formulations of freedom to the realm of politics. Rather, working against 
the backdrop of a decaying and hostile political realm, both wished to establish a new 
ground for human freedom in a world where political freedom was in decline.92 For this 
reason, Arendt says, “Neither the philosophical conception of freedom as it first arose in 
late antiquity, when freedom became a phenomenon of thought by which man could, as 
it were, reason himself out of the world, nor the Christian and modern notion of free will 
has any ground in political experience.”93 And yet, it is precisely this notion of freedom 
that takes center stage in politics at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
transforming freedom into self-liberation and the security of liberty into the highest 
political ideal.  
In much the same way as their pre-modern counter-parts, political theorists in the 
modern age do carry on the tradition of distrusting the world around them. Yet, unlike 
Augustine and Epictetus, who take up the question of freedom without direct reference 
to the political, Arendt believes that these modern figures ultimately endeavor to 
reformulate politics in terms of this distrust. In so doing, they are led to suggest that the 
task of politics consists in guaranteeing freedom from political life, or freedom from the 
unjustified restraint of government.94 A new political infrastructure thus emerges in the 
modern age that is predicated above all on the idea that “freedom begins where politics 
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ends.”95 With this transformation in the idea of freedom, the political ceases to constitute 
a space where freedom can appear and instead becomes a mechanism for ensuring the 
security of private liberties. “Security,” she says, “made freedom possible, and the word 
‘freedom’ designated a quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political 
realm.”96  
Arendt maintains that the work of Thomas Hobbes is most emblematic of this 
turn in the modern political tradition, introducing a framework for government organized 
according to the delegation of power rather than political rights. Insofar as the purpose of 
the political is to provide conditional protection from being killed in exchange for 
absolute obedience, Hobbes conceives of the law and government in terms of security 
rather than freedom. Moreover, despite championing absolutism and monarchical 
government, Arendt suggests that Hobbes lays the theoretical foundations for bourgeois 
liberalism, giving clearer articulation to the structures of liberalism than any other 
modern political theorist. This, she explains, is because Hobbes is the only political 
theorist who does not insist that the state of nature has its basis in divine law or natural 
law and, furthermore, dismisses the idea that it provides the ground for a social contract. 
Instead, he conceives of the state of nature in such a way that the law can only be 
understood in terms of individual interests themselves. For this reason, Arendt argues 
that Hobbes, even more so than figures like Locke or Smith, is “the only great 
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philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim.”97 In 
identifying the task of politics with security rather than action, Arendt explains that 
political theory in the modern age, taking its point of departure from Hobbes, transforms 
government into “the appointed protector not so much of freedom as of the life process, 
the interests of society and its individuals.”98 Therefore, by divorcing freedom from the 
political and rebuilding the political around this non-political notion of freedom, the 
realm of politics, which had once served to contravene the automatic processes that 
characterize life in general, becomes a vehicle for upholding and guaranteeing them.  
II.2. Arendt’s Critique of Liberty: Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights 
Arendt gives concrete articulation to the way in which the internal, Christian 
notion of freedom becomes imbedded within politics in the modern age through her 
account of the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie beginning in the seventeenth 
century. She explains that in order for the bourgeoisie to obey the law of expansion 
inherent in capitalist production, it became necessary to impose this law on the structure 
of the political so as to foster economic growth beyond national borders.99 For this 
reason, national governments began transforming in the seventeenth century such that 
expansion became the principal aim of all foreign policy.100 As the capitalist interests of 
the bourgeoisie became increasingly intertwined with the affairs of national 
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governments, Arendt explains that these governments became increasingly concerned 
with exporting mechanisms of power and violence abroad for the sake of dominating 
foreign peoples and resources so as to protect their stake in the wealth that these 
enterprises generated.  
Arendt suggests that with the coalescence of business and politics, private life 
was raised to the “one publicly honored political principle.”101 Hence, the body politic 
that had once served to defend itself and its citizens against the recklessness that 
prevailed in the private sphere became a national government concerned with 
maintaining its imperial enterprises and protecting the private interests of those living 
outside its national boarders.102 The logical outcome of this imperial enterprise was “the 
destruction of all living communities, those of the conquered people as well as of the 
people at home. […] Power became the essence of political action and the center of 
political thought when it was separated from the political community which it should 
serve.”103 Through imperial expansion, the interests of the bourgeoisie generated a new 
kind of government, one that promised security but not political rights, thereby 
preserving those automatic life processes associated with the private realm.104 No longer 
guided by a concern for political freedom, the public realm where individuals “could 
show who they really and interchangeably were,” became increasingly hidden, enabling 
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national governments guided by the interests of the bourgeoisie to demand obedience 
and blind conformism with regard to political affairs.105 Arendt says: 
Deprived of political rights, the individual, to whom public and official life 
manifests itself in the guise of necessity, acquires a new and increased interest in 
private life and his personal fate. Excluded from participation in the management 
of public affairs that involve all citizens, the individual loses his rightful place in 
society and his natural connection with his fellow men.106 
She explains that the over-accumulation of capital and power reached its height at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, once local political communities had been 
transformed into states governed by unprincipled power politics. As expansion became 
an automatic and seemingly unending process, these so called “national” governments 
simultaneously produced mobs whose actions were guided not by political principles 
such as freedom and equality, but rather by blind submission to the project of 
imperialism.107 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these mobs were 
sustained by racist propaganda that served to justify expansion, which Arendt describes 
as “the main ideological weapon of imperialist politics.”108 She argues that the European 
nation-state was born under these conditions, leading her to suggest that the pretense of 
                                                
105 Arendt, The Human Condition, 141.  
106 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 141.  
107 Ibid., 143. 
108 Ibid., 160.  
  68 
universal humanism on which the nation-state is based in fact produced the conditions 
that gave rise to totalitarianism in the twentieth century.  
While the liberal tradition grounds its promise of universal emancipation in 
liberty, elevating it to the highest political ideal, this ultimately produces a political 
structure that makes freeing oneself from the automation of the life processes 
impossible. Arendt does insist that a bright line must be drawn between the period of 
imperial expansion and the era of the concentration camps; nevertheless she suggests 
that the bureaucratic political infrastructure of European imperialism, one ultimately 
built on power, obedience, and necessity, sets the stage for the political catastrophes of 
the twentieth century.109 I will return to Arendt’s account of the relationship between 
bourgeois liberalism, the European imperial experience, and the rise of totalitarianism in 
subsequent chapters. For now, it is important to note that by considering Arendt’s 
analysis of the transformation of the notion of freedom and liberty throughout the history 
of western political thought alongside her discourse on statelessness in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, we find that she discovers a contradiction internal to the tradition of 
enlightened liberalism that culminates in crisis after World War I. 
Statelessness is symptomatic of the contradiction internal to the epoch of the 
Enlightenment, revealing the inadequacy of the structure of the nation-state in its ability 
to make good on the Enlightenment promise of universal emancipation.110 This promise 
is manifest in the eighteenth century formulations of the Rights of Man, which were 
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assumed to be inalienable because they required no special law to guarantee them. That 
is, rather than being guaranteed by God or a king, the Rights of Man were taken to be 
guaranteed by man himself, who, in his sacredness, was believed to be enough to 
provide an unshakable foundation for their legitimacy, promising to protect humanity as 
a whole rather than particular individuals or groups.111 The Rights of Man presupposed 
that the individual did not need a place in the world in order for her fundamental human 
rights to be protected. More specifically, Arendt says, “The Rights of Man, after all, had 
been defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were supposed to be independent of all 
governments,” presumed to be guaranteed by nothing more than the bare fact of man’s 
existence.112  
Yet, Arendt explains that in their original formulation, these rights were not 
meant to protect individuals, but served instead to justify the sovereignty of the people 
who belonged to a particular nation-state. Hence, the rights of the abstract human being 
envisioned by the eighteenth century framers of Declaration of the Rights of Man 
collapsed into the rights of particular groups who justified their membership in their 
political communities on the basis of nationality or ethnicity. In light of this, Arendt 
says:  
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist 
on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are enjoyed only by 
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citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the 
rightless themselves.113  
In providing justification for the sovereignty of peoples, the Rights of Man provided the 
ground for the rise of European nation-states along with juridical orders that were 
oriented by the national identity of certain groups rather than the sacredness of man. 
Even those governments that derived their legitimacy directly from the Rights of Man 
discovered in the twentieth century that they had the grounds to justify denationalizing 
all those who were unfortunate enough “to be born into the wrong kind of race or the 
wrong kind of class or drafted by the wrong kind of government.”114 Upon being 
denationalized, stripped of the rights of citizenship and the protection of their own 
governments, stateless individuals found themselves living outside the pale of the law in 
a way that had not been seen before World War I.  To the extent that neither their 
country of origin nor any other country would extend legal protection to them, Arendt 
explains that stateless people became increasingly subject to the arbitrary force of the 
police. Masses of stateless people who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state, 
thus emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century whose inalienable rights could 
not be enforced.115  
The appearance of stateless people demonstrated that while one’s fundamental 
freedoms were supposed to be guaranteed by the bare fact of being human alone, these 
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fundamental freedoms proved meaningless for those who had lost the rights of 
citizenship and no longer belonged to a political community willing and able to protect 
them. Arendt says:  
The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion – 
formulas which were designed to solve problems within given communities – but 
that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever. […] There is no 
question that those who exist have more freedom of movement than a lawfully 
imprisoned criminal or that they enjoy more freedom of opinion in the 
internment camps of democratic countries than they would in any ordinary 
despotism, not to mention in a totalitarian country. But neither physical safety 
[…] nor freedom of opinion changes in the least their fundamental situation of 
rightlessness.116  
In making visible this space of rightlessness, the appearance of stateless people called 
into question the inalienability of the right to life, liberty, and happiness, or the notion 
that such rights can be said to exist without being guaranteed by a political 
community.117 As such, the worldless, internal Christian notion of freedom that becomes 
definitive of politics in the modern age proved inadequate for guaranteeing the rights of 
those who had been expelled from their communities. Moreover, the phenomenon of 
statelessness revealed the emptiness of the enlightened liberal notions of human freedom 
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contained in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, suggesting instead that “the world 
found nothing sacred in the bare fact of being human.”118 Upon losing their rights to 
belong to a political community, stateless people found themselves abandoned entirely 
by all laws, exposed to a space of rightlessness that opened up the unforeseen possibility 
of their complete dehumanization. Therefore, while the epoch of the Enlightenment had 
been guided by the assumption that universal emancipation follows naturally from the 
structure of the nation-state, we find in the twentieth century that the nation-state itself 
produced stateless people, revealing a paradox internal to notions of universal human 
rights that have their basis in the concept of the Rights of Man inherited from the 
revolutionary Enlightenment. The appearance of stateless people in the period between 
the world wars thus clarified the inadequacy of the structure of the European nation-state 
for achieving the end of universal emancipation set forth by the Enlightenment.  
Yet, Arendt’s concern for statelessness goes beyond this, providing a critical 
commentary on the history of western political thought, of which the decline of the 
nation-state is merely a chapter. By considering her analysis of statelessness in light of 
the development of the idea of freedom throughout the tradition of western political 
thought, we find that statelessness is symptomatic of a broader crisis in freedom. The 
emergence of stateless people demonstrated not only that freedom in the modern age had 
become synonymous with self-liberation in the private sphere, but also that such a 
conception of freedom proved meaningless in the face of this unprecedented 
phenomenon. Understood as an attribute of the will rather than an event brought to bear 
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on political life through speech and action, Arendt suggests that freedom has no way of 
appearing in the world. Statelessness offers a powerful illustration of the political danger 
involved in this, indicating that upon losing one’s place in the world or the context of 
meaning that makes opinions significant and actions effective, one loses the ability to 
intervene in the futility and meaninglessness of the automatic life processes. Rather than 
rising above these necessary processes by enacting of one’s freedom in the space of 
politics, human beings who have lost their place in a political community are instead left 
entirely exposed to them. As such, they become susceptible to being reduced in their 
unrepeatable uniqueness to interchangeable and expendable parts of the cyclical 
movements of nature and history.  
Through her analysis of statelessness, Arendt thus diagnoses a contradiction 
internal to the fundamental assumption of the modern political tradition, namely, that 
freedom is an essential, internal, and inalienable property of the human being that arises 
through a retreat from the world into the inner domain of thought and the will. On 
Arendt’s view, the emergence of stateless people revealed that the concept of freedom is 
meaningful only insofar as it can be actualized in a world with others. For this reason, 
she insists that freedom requires a space of appearance, calling on us to resist the modern 
emphasis on securing liberty in the private sphere and return instead to the political 
origins of the notion of freedom. Arendt’s critical insights into enlightened liberal 
notions of freedom, when taken together with her analysis of statelessness, can therefore 
be seen to provide the basis for her broader concern for developing a renewed sense of 
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political community in order to reclaim the meaning and significance of the world in the 
face of the political catastrophes of the twentieth century. 
II.3. Arendt and Heidegger on Being-in-the-World 
Arendt’s analysis of statelessness brings her critical concerns regarding the epoch 
of the Enlightenment into focus, which helps to elucidate the centrality of the space of 
appearance for her positive project. As I have tried to show, Arendt believes that the 
internal Christian notion of free will was brought to bear on the political realm in the 
modern age through the elevation of liberty and the protection of private rights to the 
highest political ideal. As a result, the infrastructure of the political underwent a 
fundamental shift in the modern age, no longer constituting a space in which individuals 
came together for the sake of rising above the necessities of private life through speech 
and action in the public realm, as had been the case in antiquity. Instead, government 
became a mechanism for ensuring the security of the private rights of individuals. The 
rise of stateless people at the beginning of the twentieth century exposes a crisis in this 
understanding of freedom, demonstrating that freedom loses its meaning when 
individuals are expelled from their political communities. We therefore find through 
statelessness that the political structures of enlightened liberalism, in having their basis 
in the contrary assumption that freedom begins where politics ends, leave no space for 
freedom to appear. Consequently, Arendt argues that in the modern age, automation 
overtakes the sphere of politics, which, as we will see in greater detail later on, provides 
a platform for totalitarian governments to come into existence in the twentieth century.  
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Through statelessness, Arendt discovers that freedom is a worldly phenomenon, 
leading her to reformulate the idea of freedom and the task of politics more generally in 
terms of the space of appearance.119 In order to elucidate this notion of the space of 
appearance, however, it is necessary to consider the influence of Martin Heidegger’s 
Existenz-philosophy on Arendt’s work. As I shall demonstrate in this section, Arendt’s 
notion of the space of appearance can perhaps best be understood as a political 
reinterpretation of the Heideggerian idea of being-in-the-world. In conceiving of the 
public sphere as a space that illuminates or shines light on human freedom, she draws on 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity, or the distinctly human capacity to transcend one’s 
finitude by disclosing the meaningfulness of the world through one’s authentic 
engagement with it. Heidegger’s notion of authenticity gives orientation to Arendt’s 
conception of freedom, which she believes consists not in a fixed and internal property 
of the human being, but rather in the ability to seize upon the possibilities that arise from 
the unique and unrepeatable existential conditions into which human beings are thrown. 
It is precisely this ontological notion of freedom as opposed to internal notions of 
freedom characteristic of the tradition of western metaphysics that Arendt imports into 
her political framework.120 Likewise, in her analysis of the automatic processes that 
characterize life in general and the oppositional relation she believes these processes 
have to the event of freedom, she takes on board aspects of Heidegger’s critique of 
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modernity, as well as his notion of inauthenticity, or the average everydayness that levels 
Dasein’s possibilities to be and the radical freedom that accompanies this.121  
Yet, while Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein and the idea of freedom that 
arises from it play a formative role in Arendt’s thought, her appropriation of this 
Heideggerian idea is by no means a mere repetition of it. Rather, as Dana Villa says, 
through her evaluation of the political ramifications of being-in-the-world, she both 
challenges and expands Heidegger’s project by “[transposing] the Heideggerian 
dynamics of transcendence and everydayness from an existential to a political 
context.”122 Upon developing Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, I consider the 
political ramifications that Arendt identifies in this way of understanding the existential 
constitution of the human being. In so doing, I argue that Arendt’s reformulation of the 
political realm as the space of appearance, or that space in which freedom comes into 
appearance through the spontaneity of human action, creates an opening in the world for 
the event of freedom that Heidegger, in his disavowal of the public, fails to envision.  
Heidegger’s existential understanding of human freedom grows out of his claim 
that the principal existential structure of the human being is  “being-in-the-world.”123 
Before considering what Heidegger means by being-in-the-world, however, it is 
necessary to clarify the broader aim of his project and the departure he makes from his 
predecessors in undertaking it. On Heidegger’s view, the history of western metaphysics, 
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beginning with Plato, has conceived of being in terms of essence. Though originally 
guided by the question of the meaning of being, the investigation of which provides the 
basis for all subsequent theoretical inquiry, this method, Heidegger thinks, has led 
philosophy astray in its pursuit of its own guiding question. He thus argues that in the 
modern age we have forgotten the meaning of being altogether, the effect of which is 
exemplified in the aimless instrumentalism of modern science and technology. 
Heidegger therefore argues that it is necessary to begin anew, calling for the destruction 
of the tradition of western metaphysics in order to recover its originary question and 
discern a new method for uncovering the meaning of being.124  
Heidegger believes that it is necessary to begin his analysis by directing the 
question of the meaning of being towards ourselves, as we are the kind of beings that 
have our own being as our concern. That is to say, we already have a vague, pre-
theoretical understanding of the kind beings that we are, and it is in virtue of having this 
sense of ourselves that we are led to pose the question of the meaning of being. Hence, 
he believes that our investigation into the question of being must begin with the human 
being, who he names Dasein or “there-being.” In offering this analysis of Dasein, 
Heidegger wishes to reverse the traditional philosophical hierarchy first articulated by 
Plato and Aristotle, both of whom suggest that being is associated with the unchanging 
essences of things rather than the transitory character of existence. He insists that Dasein 
always already finds itself standing in relation to being, which is to say, Dasein 
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understands itself in terms of its existence or its possibilities to be or not be itself.125 
Hence, what it means to be human does not consist in actualizing one’s essence by 
fulfilling one’s proper function. By contrast, the being of the human being lies in its 
potentiality, or the fact that in existing in lacks a pre-given essence. In other words, 
Heidegger says, “The ‘essence’ [‘wessen’] of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz]. The 
characteristics to be found in this being are thus not present ‘attributes’ of an objectively 
present being which has such and such an ‘outward appearance,’ but rather possible 
ways for it to be, and only this.”126 Therefore, he explains, living properly is “decided 
only by each Dasein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such 
possibilities.”127  
With this, Heidegger explains that the principal existential structure of Dasein is 
“being-in-the-world.” In characterizing Dasein this way, Heidegger wishes to show that 
the human being is not merely an intending subject, and the world, a container filled 
with objects that stand in opposition to this subject; such a conception of one’s 
surrounding environment, though pervasive throughout the tradition of western 
metaphysics, is derivative of our originary experience of the world and the ontological 
valence this experience has. Understood ontologically, the world constitutes the nexus of 
meaningful relations in which Dasein always already finds itself.128 Dasein is 
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fundamentally constituted by “being-in,” which is to say, Dasein is already involved or 
absorbed in a context of meaning. As such, Dasein is not merely objectively present in 
the world, as in the case of a stone, but instead dwells in it, experiencing the world as 
familiar or near by.129  
Heidegger explains that we dwell in the world insofar as we are familiar with it, a 
familiarity that is expressed above all in our ability to care for the beings with which we 
are involved. Heidegger uses the example of a hammer in a workshop to elucidate this 
notion of care. The hammer, he argues, comes to appear in the world as meaningful not 
in virtue of its essence or the properties it has as a hammer. On the contrary, its meaning 
emerges through my involvement with it and the usefulness it has for my projects.130 In 
other words, the hammer comes to appear as a hammer through my appropriation of it in 
my everyday dealings with it. For this reason, Heidegger argues, the world, understood 
ontologically, is not a container filled with the totality of objectively present things, but 
is instead constituted by the originary context of meaningful relations within which 
Dasein is already involved.131    
Yet, while we find ourselves already involved and familiar with the surrounding 
world, this familiarity simultaneously places us at a distance from it. Dasein does not 
choose this world, but instead inherits it. Therefore, in its involvement with things and 
others, Dasein finds itself burdened by something larger than its own making, immersed 
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in a context of relations that are neither the product of its own will nor something it 
controls. For Heidegger, this aspect of Dasein’s being-in constitutes its facticity, or the 
givenness of its existence.132 It is only from out of this givenness, which is entirely other 
to Dasein, that Dasein reaches out towards the things, others, and the objects for which it 
cares and is concerned. Heidegger thus explains that we only ever pursue our concern for 
ourselves through something outside of ourselves. In caring, Dasein reaches out in an 
effort to de-distance, or bring being nearer to it through its involvement with the world.  
The implications of this are two-fold. First, to the extent that we find ourselves 
always already involved in a world, being human cannot be thought apart from “being-
in-the-world.” In other words, to be human means to be in a world and, therefore, to 
conceive of the human being as a subject that stands over and against the world is to 
cover over the kind of being that Dasein is. Second, insofar as Dasein is ontologically 
constituted by this being-in, Dasein is only ever in the world in a concerned way. Dasein 
cares in its involvement with the world and, in so doing, “‘clears’ or opens a world, a 
space of significance, a ‘there.’”133 As “there-being,” Dasein is not a self-contained 
substance, closed off to an external world. Instead, Dasein must be understood as an 
opening for the uncovering or disclosure of being. 134 That is to say, insofar as Dasein is 
being-in, Dasein illuminates being, bringing its significance to bear on the world by 
opening up new spaces of meaning.    
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To the extent that Dasein is constituted by being-in, it is the source of its 
meaningfulness, and it is in virtue of this ability to disclose meaning in the world that 
Heidegger believes human beings achieve transcendence as “being-free.” The existential 
structures that enable Dasein to disclose being are attunement and understanding.135 
Attunement constitutes that mode of being-in where one finds oneself affected or moved 
by the world.136 This structure of Dasein’s existential constitution is revealed in its 
moods, which disclose Dasein as a being that is always already thrown into a world it 
neither chooses nor controls. Understanding, on the other hand, is that mode of being-in 
that is oriented by Dasein’s possibilities to be; to the extent that Dasein has projects and 
is always involved in taking care of the world, Dasein understands itself in terms of its 
future possibilities.137 Understanding thus discloses Dasein to itself as being-possible 
and in so doing “offers a phenomenal ground to see it all.”138  
While Dasein’s freedom arises from its disclosedness through understanding, 
Heidegger is clear that the kind of freedom to which this gives birth is not “a free-
floating potentiality of being in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference.’”139 By contrast, 
insofar as Dasein is fundamentally attuned, Dasein is already immersed in a set of 
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definite possibilities given to it by the world in which it finds itself. Hence, we only ever 
project from out of our thrownness and are free to the extent that we can decide who we 
are from out of our existential constitution as being-in-the-world. In other words, 
Heidegger explains, we are free only insofar as we choose to seize upon our own most 
possibilities to be, or decide to be who we are from out of our existential constitution.  
 Understanding can therefore occur in one of two ways. On the one hand, Dasein 
can see itself, as well as the others and objects with which it is involved, in terms of their 
average everydayness. This way of understanding, Heidegger explains, is inauthentic, 
and Dasein “initially and for the most part” understands itself this way.140 Absorbed in 
the familiarity and security of its daily routine, Dasein sees the world around it in its 
“handiness” or productive capacity. This way of seeing, Heidegger thinks, is dimmed 
down, leading everyday Dasein to “pass over not only the world, but ‘itself.’” 141 In 
comporting itself towards the world solely in terms of its familiarity with it, Dasein’s 
possibilities are leveled down or restricted to what is feasible, correct, or proper.142 
Heidegger says, “The leveling down of the possibilities of Dasein to what is initially 
available in an everyday way at the same time results in a phasing out of the possible as 
such. The average everydayness of taking care of things becomes blind to possibility and 
gets tranquilized with what is merely ‘real.’”143 When we understand ourselves 
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inauthentically, we remain hidden from ourselves, closed off to our own most 
possibilities to be; we fall prey to a kind of understanding that is determined by others, 
which he calls the “they-self” and in this condition of fallenness are unable to open up 
new spaces of significance or disclose being in new ways.  
Authentic Dasein, by contrast, has an understanding of itself that originates from 
its constitution as thrown projection. This way of being-in is authentically disclosive, 
arising first through attunement in the mood of anxiety, which enables Dasein to see 
itself as radically individuated despite being bound up with a world and free for its own 
most possibilities to be. Authentic understanding arises when Dasein no longer sees 
itself in terms of the “they-self” in its average everydayness, but instead as being-free for 
“choosing and grasping itself.”144 For Heidegger, then, freedom is an appropriative 
event, whereby authentic Dasein, upon discovering that it is determined by nothing other 
than its own most possibilities to be, seizes upon its possibilities from out of its 
thrownness. Therefore, being-free is always oriented by the world in which we find 
ourselves, and it is only because Dasein finds itself thrown into a world that it is able to 
open up new possibilities or new spaces of significance. In this way, freedom is not an 
internal disposition, but instead comes to appear in the world through Dasein’s discovery 
or uncovering of being, an event that is brought about through Dasein’s authentic 
engagement with its surrounding environment.  
Arendt follows closely from Heidegger in his attempt to rethink the constitution 
of the human being, suggesting that its constitution lies not in a pre-given essence, but 
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rather in the possibilities that arise from out of its existence. In existing, Arendt, like 
Heidegger, believes that we always already find ourselves bound up in a world or 
context of meaning that is not our own. Yet, in having one’s constitution in existence 
rather than a pre-given essence, one does not simply find oneself in this context of 
meaning as an indiscriminant being among many. Instead, for Arendt and Heidegger 
alike, “being-in” makes it the case that one is radically individuated. As we shall see, 
Arendt develops this differently and in many ways in opposition to Heidegger. For 
Heidegger, this individuation is disclosed to Dasein in the mood of anxiety through 
being-towards-death. For Arendt, by contrast, this individuation is given by the fact of 
our birth or the human condition of natality, which she believes gives rise to the 
distinctively human capacity for new beginnings that comes to appear in the world 
through the spontaneity of action in the public realm. Nevertheless, on the basis of this 
existential understanding of the human being, freedom takes shape for both as a worldly 
phenomenon, rather than an attribute of thought or the will. Whereas the latter 
conception of freedom presupposes that the human being is a self-contained worldless 
subject standing over and against the objects around it, both Heidegger and Arendt 
believe that insofar as we find ourselves in a world, our freedom arises through our 
appropriation of the world we have inherited. As Villa explains, “What matters, in short, 
is the event of authentic disclosedness, an event that, in both Arendt and Heidegger, 
signifies a wrenching free of everydayness and its illumination through the unpredictable 
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uncovering of the new. Through such disclosive spontaneity, the world is revealed in its 
worldliness.”145 
For Arendt, the political ramifications of Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-
world arise in the idea of freedom that follows from it. Heidegger’s characterization of 
the individual as thrown-projection provides a platform for Arendt’s own reformulation 
of the idea of freedom as an event of authentic disclosedness, whereby something new 
comes to appear in the world. Not surprisingly, she believes that Heidegger lacked the 
political insight to appreciate this, holding onto “the old hostility of the philosophy 
towards the polis in Heidegger’s analysis of average everyday life in terms of das Man 
(the ‘they’ or the rule of public opinion, as opposed to the ‘self’) in which the public 
realm has the function of hiding reality and preventing even the appearance of truth.”146 
Heidegger unequivocally associates the inauthenticity of the “they-self” with the public, 
suggesting that in this mode, Dasein lets others decide who it is, dimming down its own 
most possibilities to be. For Heidegger, it is only through an experience of radical 
separation from the “they” manifest in a confrontation with one’s mortality or the 
radically individuating experience of coming to terms with the fact that one’s death is 
one’s own, that the singularity of one’s existence becomes manifest. With this, 
Heidegger insists that Dasein is most fundamentally constituted by the fact that it is 
always being-toward-death, and, in this, unrepeatable unique and free, able to decide 
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from out of its own existential constitution who to be, rather than allowing this to be 
determined for it by the leveled down average everydayness of public opinion. 
While Arendt takes seriously the idea that freedom is predicated on individuals 
coming to see themselves as radically individuated, she nevertheless identifies what she 
takes to be a serious problem in Heidegger’s account. If freedom is indeed a worldly 
phenomenon or event whereby something new comes to appear in the world, then being-
free is only possible to the extent that a space exists in the world for freedom to make its 
appearance. Moreover, in order for freedom to appear, Dasein must be able to be seen by 
others in its authentic disclosedness and must be able to see others in their authentic 
disclosedness. Yet, Heidegger does not envision such a space in his account of Dasein’s 
authentic disclosedness, suggesting instead that Dasein can only decide resolutely to act 
from out of its existential constitution if it does so while standing at a distance from the 
world and others. In doing otherwise, Heidegger thinks, we run the risk of interpreting 
ourselves through the dimmed down lens of public opinion. Dasein thus decides 
authentically only to return to a world of things and others that is covered over by the 
inauthenticity of the they. While Dasein may come to stand in a more authentic relation 
to others in the world, Heidegger’s account makes it the case that Dasein’s being-free for 
its own most possibilities seems to stand in opposition to the world of others.  
Therefore, while Arendt agrees with Heidegger that freedom comes to appear in 
the world through an event of authentic disclosedness, she thinks that Heidegger fails to 
offer an account of the world that is differentiated enough to support his own existential 
reading of freedom. This, she argues, is an effect of Heidegger’s repudiation of the 
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public, which she believes ultimately leads him to develop a worldless notion of 
authenticity that can only be realized in isolation from others.147 To be sure, Heidegger’s 
existential analytic of Dasein as being-in-the-world seeks to de-center the isolated 
modern subject and therefore cannot be thought apart from Dasein’s relation to others. 
Moreover, because authenticity is a mode of being-in-the-world, Dasein’s authentic 
disclosedness is always bound up with the possibility of authentically being-with.148 Yet, 
Arendt and many others have suggested that in posing his notion of authenticity in direct 
opposition to Dasein in the mode of publicness, equating Dasein’s publicly interpreted 
self with the “they-self” or the leveled down, average everydayness of inauthentic 
Dasein, Heidegger leaves the crucial political possibilities of authentic being-with 
unfulfilled.149 Arendt, in particular, maintains that in his contempt for the public, 
Heidegger implicates himself in the philosophical prejudice against praxis central to the 
western metaphysical tradition since Plato. Hence, she argues that while Heidegger 
undertakes the destruction of this tradition by developing a “this-worldly philosophy,” 
he ultimately deprives the world of its significance in his account of authentic Dasein, 
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reifying the solitary life of thinking as the most genuine form of action and further 
contributing to the worldlessness that has become definitive of modern life.150  
Arendt insists that if freedom is indeed a worldly phenomenon, a space must 
exist where individuals are able to appear to one another in their radical uniqueness. On 
her view, freedom requires a space of appearance, which she identifies with the public 
realm. Whereas the spheres of labor and work are governed by necessity, leaving 
individuals shrouded in average everydayness, the public realm provides a space where 
individuals can come together in their diversity and appropriate the world they have 
inherited anew through political action. Hence, on her account, the public sphere does 
not hide reality; on the contrary, it illuminates human affairs, enabling individuals to 
appear to one another in such a way that they can rise above the inauthenticy of 
everyday life. In contrast to Heidegger, Arendt therefore maintains that the public realm 
creates a space where freedom can appear and is therefore necessary for an event of 
authentic disclosedness.  
II.4. The Political Realm as the Space of Appearance  
Both Arendt’s political appropriation of Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-
world and her critical insights into his formulation of authenticity prove to be formative 
for the theoretical framework she develops in response to the political catastrophes of the 
twentieth century. Insofar as Arendt, like Heidegger, understands freedom as an event of 
authentic disclosedness, she believes that it is only through the enactment of freedom 
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that meaning comes to appear in the world in a way that contravenes those automatic 
processes that ordinarily govern human existence. In other words, freedom for both 
Arendt and Heidegger is neither an attribute of the will nor a immutable property of the 
human being. Instead insofar as we are constituted above all by our existential 
possibilities to be, freedom arises when we seize upon these possibilities, opening up 
new spaces of significance and ways of seeing from out of the world in which we find 
ourselves. For both, then, freedom is not an inner disposition of the human being that 
can be realized through a retreat from the world; instead, in being bound up with the 
existential conditions of the human being as being-in-the world, freedom comes to 
appear in the world through the authentic appropriation of one’s thrownness.151   
As we have seen, however, Arendt departs from Heidegger in his disavowal of 
the public, suggesting instead that a public realm must be held open if freedom is to 
make its appearance. The public realm, she explains, illuminates the affairs of men, 
enabling them to appear as they are through speech and action. In so doing, it creates a 
space for individuals to come together in order to appropriate the world anew or disclose 
new ways of seeing. Taking her point of departure from Heidegger’s existential 
understanding of the human being, I wish to show in this section that Arendt rebuilds her 
notion of political life around the space of appearance. The public sphere thus comes to 
constitute the centerpiece of Arendt’s reflections, not just on politics, but also on the 
existential constitution of the human being. As I shall demonstrate, the public realm, in 
creating a space for political action, provides the ground for human beings to come into 
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appearance in the fullness of their humanity, allowing them to become visible to one 
another in their uniqueness in order to undertake projects that intervene in the necessity 
of the life processes. To illustrate this, it is necessary to consider Arendt’s discussion of 
natality and plurality, both of which, she argues, are fundamental conditions of human 
existence. It is in virtue of these conditions that political life is possible and, thus, Arendt 
endeavors to reformulate the existential constitution of the human being in terms of the 
political.  
The human condition of natality arises from the fact that we are each born into 
the world anew. To the extent that we find ourselves born into a world that is radically 
other to us, left without recourse to a pre-given essence, natality can be understood as 
Arendt’s interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of thrownness. While Arendt 
recognizes both birth and death, or natality and mortality, as ontological conditions of 
human existence, her openness to the political leads her to move away from Heidegger’s 
emphasis on being-toward-death and turn instead towards the existential condition of 
birth.152 In being born, Arendt argues, we are always already radically unique, appearing 
in the world as something entirely unexpected and, in this, natively capable of acting 
“against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability.”153 She thus 
argues that we are most fundamentally marked by the capacity for new beginnings, or 
the ability to introduce something to the world that has never before been seen. That is, 
Arendt says, “With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world 
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itself, which, of course, is another way of saying that the principle of freedom was 
created when man was created but not before. ”154 For Arendt, then, freedom arises from 
the infinite improbability that accompanies the character of human existence insofar as 
we find ourselves conditioned by natality.  
Natality comes to appear in the world through action, which Arendt identifies 
with the capacity to initiate something new in the world. She says, “To act, in the most 
general sense means to take initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin,’ 
‘to lead,’ and eventually ‘to rule,’ indicates), to set something in motion (which is the 
original meaning of the Latin agere).”155 It is therefore only in being conditioned by 
natality that one is able to bring something new into the world. Through action, 
individuals actualize their capacity to intervene in the necessary processes that ordinarily 
govern human existence, a capacity that arises from the fact of our birth. In other words, 
Arendt explains, “The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can 
be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this 
again is possible only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something 
uniquely new comes into the world.”156 The ability to introduce something new to the 
world is concomitant with the ability to be free, or the ability the to exceed the automatic 
processes of everyday life. For this reason, she argues that action is the political activity 
par excellence and conjectures that “natality, not mortality, may be the central category 
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of the political, as distinguished from metaphysical thought.”157 It is only in virtue of the 
singularity of our experience in the world, or the fact that every human being can 
introduce something new to it, that we can re-appropriate the world in such a way that it 
becomes meaningful. Therefore, in order for an event of authentic disclosedness to take 
place, Arendt argues that a space must exist where individuals can appear in their 
natality or radical uniqueness through action.    
Arendt explains, however, that we are only radically unique to the extent that we 
stand in relation to others. She thus turns to the human condition of plurality, arguing 
that our singularity is granted to us by the fact that we find ourselves in an already 
existing set of meaningful relations. That is, we do not experience our natality in 
isolation, but instead only ever find ourselves in our uniqueness existing among others 
who are similarly conditioned by their uniqueness. As she explains, “Plurality is the 
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way 
that nobody is every the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”158 
Whereas natality makes action possible in giving us the ability to initiate something new 
in the world, the human condition of plurality makes its appearance through speech, or 
the ability to announce to others that in our radical singularity, we are the authors of our 
action.159 She says, “If action as beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the 
actualization of the human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact of 
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distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living 
as a distinct and unique being among equals.”160 This ability to announce ourselves to 
one another in our diversity is a distinctly human capacity. For this reason, Arendt 
explains, action is only possible insofar as it is accompanied by speech. She says:  
Without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its 
revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject, as it 
were; not acting men but performing robots would achieve what, humanly 
speaking, would remain incomprehensible. Speechless action would no longer be 
action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of 
deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words.161 
Therefore, in addition to action, speech, or the ability to announce that I am the author of 
my action, is required in order for me to appear fully in my uniqueness among others. 
Taken together, then, speech and action are disclosive of the human being, allowing 
individuals to become visible in their plurality and natality. That is, Arendt says: 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique 
personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while 
their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique 
shape of the body and sound of the voice. The disclosure of ‘who’ in 
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contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is […] is implicit in everything somebody 
says and does.162 
By the same token, if one loses the ability to speak and act, the fullness of one’s 
humanity remains hidden. In contrast to the life of labor and that of work, Arendt says, 
“A life without speech and without action […]—and this is the only way of life that in 
earnest has renounced all appearance and all vanity in the biblical sense of the word—is 
literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived 
among men.”163 This, she explains, is because it is only by means of speech and action 
that we come to appear in the world in such a way that we are able to introduce 
something new to it and thereby enact our freedom. Whereas labor and work are ruled 
by necessity, Arendt explains that speech and action rise above such necessity, enabling 
individuals to initiate something new in the world in concert with others. That is, we 
insert ourselves into the world through word and deed and, in so doing, undergo a kind 
of second birth that is tantamount to the enactment of freedom.164  
To the extent that speech and action are tied to the human capacity for freedom, 
she takes them to be distinctly political. It is only in the context of political life that 
individuals come together for the sake of initiating something new in the world and, in 
so doing, transcend the finitude of their particular existence. The sphere of politics or the 
public realm thus constitutes that space in which individuals can appear together in their 
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diversity. Therefore, she says, the public realm constitutes “the space of appearance in 
the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear 
to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their 
appearance explicitly.”165 The space of appearance does not always exist, but rather 
comes into existence through speaking and acting together. This means that no 
government or formal constitution is required for the space of appearance to come into 
existence and, likewise, the existence of such a space cannot be guaranteed by these 
mechanisms.166 Arendt maintains that it is only through speech and action in the public 
realm that the reality of the world comes into full view.167 Hence, while we ordinarily 
fail to live in this space, the public realm makes possible an event of appropriation, 
creating a space for individuals to open up new meaning in the world through political 
action. On Arendt’s view, then, political life is both self- and world-disclosive, enabling 
human beings to come into appearance as who they are in their singularity, while 
bringing the meaningfulness of the world into appearance.168  
II.5. Re-inscribing Freedom in the Realm of Politics 
As we have seen, being free for Arendt is a distinctly human capacity that 
depends not simply on coming to understand oneself as a discrete individual in the 
world, but on announcing who one is to the world. This, in turn, enables one to act in 
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concert with others while remaining individuated in order to disclose new meaning in the 
world. Arendt therefore believes that any event of authentic disclosedness will depend a 
space existing in the world where individuals can appear together in their uniqueness. 
Insofar as it is only in the public realm, where individuals have the right to speak and 
act, that freedom can be enacted, she wishes to reformulate the task of politics in terms 
of holding open this space.  
In elevating liberty in the private sphere to the highest political ideal, the public 
realm gets covered over in the modern age, making speech meaningless and action 
impossible, while leaving us in the twentieth century without a means for contravening 
those automatic life processes that stand in opposition to freedom. Statelessness signals a 
crisis in the epoch of the Enlightenment, revealing that by divorcing freedom from the 
world and restructuring the sphere of politics accordingly, liberalism gives way to a 
political realm that is sustained by the automation of the masses. In response to this 
crisis, Arendt suggests that it is necessary to restore the ancient concept of political 
freedom, which, in constituting a worldly phenomenon, provides a means for 
overcoming the inadequacy of our liberal political structures.169 Yet, in making this 
appeal, she attempts at the same time to appropriate this notion of freedom in a way that 
is responsive to the Enlightenment call for universal emancipation. This creates an 
impetus for her to rethink the human being in light of the political, leading her to suggest 
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that the fullness of one’s humanity can only appear insofar as one belongs to a political 
community.  
In what follows, I will turn to turn to Arendt’s political interpretation of the 
phenomenon of loneliness in modern political life in order to clarify further the 
formative role her critical relation to the liberal political tradition plays in her analysis of 
exclusion and her concern for political belonging. We find through this concept that her 
account of statelessness is not exhaustive of the problem of exclusion in modern political 
life, but is instead symptomatic of a more endemic form of it expressed in the loneliness 
of the modern masses. By turning to her diagnosis of the problem of loneliness as it 
unfolds in her account of the susceptibility of the structures of modern political life to 
totalitarian domination, I will argue that Arendt poses her notion of citizenship as an 
antidote to this problem. As such, I wish to show that she makes a novel contribution to 
critical discourses concerning the dangers and limits of modern political life by 
developing a conception of citizenship that forms the basis to critique notions of 
citizenship inherited from the liberal tradition and approaches to exclusion that 









ANOTHER ORIGIN OF TOTALITARIANISM: ARENDT ON THE 
LONELINESS OF LIBERAL CITIZENS170 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Arendt diagnoses a crisis in the epoch of 
the Enlightenment through her analysis of statelessness. On the basis of this analysis, she 
offers a critical intervention in the tradition of classical liberalism, suggesting that the 
retreat of freedom from the realm of politics in the modern era, while taken by liberal 
thinkers to be the ground for universal emancipation, produced the conditions for 
totalitarianism to emerge in the twentieth century. We find through Arendt’s analysis of 
statelessness that freedom is meaningless for individuals who remain isolated and 
invisible to one another in their private lives. In order for freedom to become 
meaningful, it must be brought to bear on the world or the context of meaningful 
relations in which individuals find themselves. Conceived as an event of appropriation 
rather than a fixed property of the human being, Arendt thus maintains that freedom 
requires a space of appearance, or a public realm in which individuals are able to appear 
to one another in the fullness of their humanity through speech and action. By 
reformulating the concept of freedom in terms of the space of appearance, Arendt is led 
to develop a lived and embodied conception of citizenship that is oriented above all by 
170	This chapter is derived, in part, with permission from an article published in the Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology on 28 October 2015 and is available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com//10.1080/00071773.2015.1097405    © 2015 Taylor & Francis.
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the active participation of individuals in the realm of politics. The purpose of this chapter 
is to elucidate Arendt’s novel conception of citizenship in light of her critique of the 
concept of liberty and her concern for developing an ontological account of freedom that 
is keyed to the space of appearance.  
Arendt’s political philosophy has received renewed attention in recent years for 
the contribution it makes to current debate concerning the global possibilities for 
democratic citizenship. Yet, the emphasis scholars have placed on Arendt’s notion of the 
right to have rights in order to advance these debates threatens to overshadow the scope 
and depth of her critical relation to the liberal tradition. My aim in what follows will be 
to show that Arendt’s understanding of citizenship guides a prescient critique of the 
basic assumptions that underlie notions of citizenship inherited from the tradition of 
liberal political theory. My argument thereby aims to shift the orientation of current 
debate in order to bring into renewed focus the decisive role that her concerns regarding 
liberalism play in her insights into the failures and dangers of modern political life. 
To this end, I will turn to a central but underappreciated dimension of her 
theoretical framework. Whereas Arendt’s notion of citizenship and, with it, the right to 
have rights, are often cast in terms of her critique of the failings of the European nation-
state that became evident with the rise of stateless people in the period between the 
world wars, I maintain that her approach to citizenship answers not only to this, but 
also—and even more fundamentally—to her broader concern for the problem of 
loneliness in modern life. Loneliness, Arendt argues, epitomizes the experience of living 
together in the modern age. Symptomatic of the feeling of no longer belonging to a 
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world, lonely individuals are unable to see themselves or others as who they are in their 
singularity. Loneliness thus leaves human beings dominated by a sense of worldlessness 
and superfluity, prepared to surrender their capacity for thinking to the compulsory force 
of logic that drives totalitarian terror.171  
I argue that Arendt poses her notion of citizenship as an antidote to the problem 
of loneliness and, thus, to the vulnerability of modern political life to totalitarianism. In 
this, her conception of citizenship provides the basis to critique not only the problem of 
statelessness and the aporia of human rights, but also received ideas about citizenship 
that we have inherited from the liberal tradition. As I shall demonstrate, this dimension 
of Arendt’s work puts into relief her view that the emphasis in liberal citizenship on the 
expansion of rights in the private sphere does not serve to remedy political exclusion, 
but, quite to the contrary, serves to reproduce the very loneliness that has made modern 
individuals susceptible to totalitarian domination. Arendt thus insists on a notion of 
citizenship that involves more than the protection of the right to pursue individual 
interests in the isolation of private life, aiming instead at returning individuals to the 
public realm where they can appear to one another in the fullness of their humanity as 
irreducibly unique and take shared responsibility for reclaiming the significance of the 
world. In turning to Arendt’s discussion of loneliness, I wish to suggest that scholars 
who focus on Arendt’s notion of rights at the price of her critical relation to the liberal 
tradition, not only put a decisive feature of Arendt’s concerns in jeopardy of being 
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 101 
overlooked. Beyond this, they also risk misrepresenting an important critical perspective 
on assumptions of the liberal tradition that may remain operative in their work and, 
moreover, in the political structures that organize modern life.   
Arendt demonstrates through her account of loneliness that the resources of 
modern liberalism are inadequate for developing an account of citizenship that can 
overcome the problem of loneliness in the modern age. Because of this, I argue, she 
draws on a model of political life represented by the Greek polis, and the concern for 
tradition and foundation central to the Roman res publica to develop a notion of political 
belonging that she believes offers a remedy to the problem of loneliness in modern 
political life. Through her appropriation of these traditions, Arendt comes to understand 
citizenship not as a legal status that can be expanded indefinitely, but rather as political 
activity through which human beings become visible to one another by taking shared 
responsibility for carrying the world they have in common from the past into the future. 
In promising visibility, such a notion of citizenship, Arendt argues, creates the 
conditions for freedom’s appearance, enabling individuals to act in concert with others in 
order to renew the meaning of the world through an event of appropriation. By drawing 
Arendt’s concern for the problem of statelessness together with her discourse on 
loneliness, I therefore wish to show that Arendt takes this lived and embodied 
conception of citizenship to promise a solution to the alienation of modern individuals, 
ensuring that they are able to recognize themselves and others as belonging to a common 
world.  
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III.1. From Statelessness to Loneliness 
Arendt’s concern for citizenship grows out of her analysis of statelessness in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism and the danger she believes it reveals in denying individuals 
the right to belong to political community. As we have seen, Arendt maintains that the 
space of rightlessness to which stateless people were subjected at the beginning of the 
twentieth century revealed a paradox internal to the notion of human rights born out of 
the eighteenth century declarations of the Rights of Man. Whereas these rights, in their 
original eighteenth century formulations, were purported to be inalienable properties of 
every human individual, the emergence of stateless people demonstrated that such rights 
could be lost without a political community willing and able to guarantee them.172 
Hence, on the basis of her analysis of the phenomenon of statelessness, Arendt says: 
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able 
to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen 
ever-increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called 
Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as a man, his human dignity. 
Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.173 
In light of this, Arendt argues that rise of stateless people made the world aware of “the 
existence of the right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is 
judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
172 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296. 
173 Ibid., 297.  
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community.”174 She thus offers what is perhaps her most emphatic statement concerning 
the importance of citizenship in this text, calling for a new conception of human rights 
rooted in the “the right to have rights” or the right to be a citizen of some sovereign 
state.175  
In emphasizing the centrality of the right to have rights, recent scholars have 
focused on whether it is possible to provide rational or normative justification for her 
suggestion that the right to belong to political community is a universal human right. 
Arendt, for her part, remains unresolved in her assessment of the viability of the global 
institution of human rights, leading scholars to disagree about the extent to which her 
own political categories are adequate for grounding the universal right to citizenship.176 
Even so, many continue to draw on her notion of the right to have rights as part of their 
efforts to advance debate concerning the global possibilities for democratic citizenship, 
interpreting Arendt in the service of expanding the structures of liberal democracy that 
guide political practice today. Those who approach Arendt this way thus assume that the 
forms of exclusion epitomized by statelessness are external to our liberal political 
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structures and, in this, risk overlooking the critique she develops in her discourse on 
citizenship regarding the basic assumptions that underlie the liberal tradition.  
Seyla Benhabib, for instance, argues that Arendt’s account of the right to have 
rights provides a vital starting point for critically engaging the conception of universal 
rights that is attached to liberal political practice. She insists, however, that in refusing to 
embrace a unified concept of human nature, Arendt leaves us without a normative 
foundation for transforming the right to citizenship into a universal human right.177 
Moreover, Arendt’s concern regarding the decline of the public space in the modern era 
leads her to formulate a conception of politics based on the Greek notions of action and 
visibility, failing, in turn, to conceive of political life in ways that admit of a more 
enlightened theory of democratic legitimacy.178 Benhabib thus argues that significant as 
Arendt’s critical insights are, they must be supplemented by the work of liberal theorists 
if we are to find an anchor for them in present day politics. To this end, she considers 
Arendt alongside figures such as Habermas and Rawls who develop methods for 
rehabilitating the political categories of the Enlightenment in order to morally and 
rationally justify the expansion of our liberal political structures.179  
In contrast to Benhabib, both Peg Birmingham and Serena Parekh believe that it 
is possible to derive a universal ground for the right to have rights from Arendt’s own 
theoretical framework. While these scholars thereby do much to demonstrate the internal 
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consistency of Arendt’s political categories, their emphasis on the question of rights 
keeps Arendt’s critical relation to the liberal tradition from coming into full view. 
Birmingham insists that while Arendt offers a profound indictment of the Rights of Man 
in drawing attention to their failure to protect stateless people from the death camps, she 
nevertheless remains a humanist, searching throughout her career for a new principle of 
humanity to guarantee the right to have rights.180 Rather than grounding this guarantee in 
a fixed and pre-political conception of human nature, however, Birmingham argues that 
Arendt locates it in the human condition of natality.181 Birmingham explains that Arendt 
conceives of natality as the fundamental condition of human existence, marking the 
singularity of each human being that is given by the fact that we are born into the world 
anew. In capturing the boundlessness of human action, Birmingham maintains that 
Arendt’s notion of natality provides an ontological foundation for human rights that 
takes seriously the questions raised by the political disasters of the twentieth century.182 
In this, Birmingham clarifies the importance of Arendt’s work for renewing a notion of 
human rights that is based not on the presumed sacredness of the human being, but 
rather on the global political responsibility we now have to come to terms with the 
human capacity for evil.183  
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Though Parekh differs from Birmingham in her angle of approach, she too argues 
that it is possible to derive a foundation for the right to have rights from Arendt’s own 
political categories. Parekh explains, for instance, that when taken together with her 
understanding of political action as  “love of the world,” Arendt’s conception of human 
rights offers a novel means of universally grounding our responsibility to address global 
injustices such as world poverty.184 According to Parekh, Arendt achieves this by taking 
seriously the ethical demands of non-citizens without diminishing the importance of 
community as a human good, mediating between these seemingly contradictory ends 
through her account of judgment.185 By drawing attention to the intervention Arendt 
makes in the debate between communitarian and cosmopolitan visions of international 
politics, Parekh, like Birmingham, demonstrates the importance of Arendt’s work for 
rehabilitating a conception of rights that guarantees human solidarity on a global 
scale.186 
Whereas these scholars stress the contribution Arendt makes to debates 
concerning the global expansion of the right to democratic citizenship, more may 
nevertheless be done to clarify the role that Arendt believes liberal theory and practice 
play in producing political exclusion. To be sure, their formulations of Arendt do 
recognize the ways in which her critique of the nation-state and her analysis of the aporia 
of human rights can serve to challenge and reshape liberal political practice. Less 
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appreciated, however, is Arendt’s discourse on loneliness, which brings into focus the 
full depth of her critique of the structures of modern liberalism and the forms of 
citizenship that accompany it. This critique is only tacitly expressed in her analysis of 
the plight of stateless people. Moreover, Arendt’s notion of loneliness and her analysis 
of statelessness have only been developed in parallel in Arendt studies, and have yet to 
be considered as interconnected and interdependent concepts in Arendt’s thought. In 
emphasizing the right to have rights and treating it as a standalone issue unrelated to the 
theme of loneliness, I maintain that scholars like Benhabib, Birmingham, and Parekh 
effectively mistreat Arendt as a left-liberal figure, failing, in turn, to do justice to the 
radical implications of her work. Hence, by shifting the focus of this discourse to 
loneliness, my aim is to put into relief a dimension of Arendt’s political philosophy that 
has been overshadowed in recent scholarship, but that is nevertheless central for 
capturing the prescience of her insights concerning the dangers of modern political life.  
While loneliness is a persistent and orienting theme in Arendt’s work, it rarely 
receives the kind of systematic treatment that is given to her discussion of the right to 
have rights, often taken instead to be an intriguing but incidental dimension of her 
broader theoretical framework.187 I maintain, by contrast, that her account of loneliness 
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is integral for clarifying the stakes involved in the concern for citizenship and political 
belonging that she expresses in her analysis of statelessness. Arendt’s concern for 
political belonging turns on her view that it is only by working with others in the space 
of politics to enact our freedom that we renew the meaningfulness of the world, initiating 
something anew in order to save it from “its normal ‘natural’ ruin,” or the necessity that 
ordinarily governs human existence.188 Political life thus engenders an authentic sense of 
human belonging; it opens a space in which human beings become visible to one another 
in their irreducible uniqueness and brings the meaningful reality of a common world into 
appearance.  
Loneliness forms the other side of political belonging, arising when human 
beings discover that they no longer belong to a world with others who can bring the 
fullness of their humanity into relief. In this, loneliness can be understood as a symptom 
of what Arendt describes as worldlessness or world-alienation, which emerges when 
human beings have been deprived of their political existence and severed from the 
meaningful nexus of relations that constitute the common world. As I shall demonstrate 
in what follows, Arendt believes this displacement from the world is dangerous, as it 
prepares human beings to submit to totalitarian domination. In separating individuals 
from themselves and the truth of their experience, loneliness shields human beings from 
the reality of their deeds, enabling them, in turn, to step blindly into the mechanism of 
terror.  
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By turning to this aspect of Arendt’s work, we find that statelessness is not 
exhaustive of Arendt’s diagnosis of the problem of exclusion as those who emphasize 
the right to have rights suggest; on the contrary, it is symptomatic of a broader and more 
endemic form of exclusion expressed in the loneliness of modern individuals. Through 
her account of loneliness, Arendt demonstrates that totalitarianism cannot be thought 
apart from the structures of modern political life, but must instead be understood as an 
effect of the worldlessness that modernity itself has produced. This worldlessness has its 
basis in the destruction of the public realm in the modern era, a consequence, she thinks, 
of the tendency to elevate the protection of liberty in the private sphere to the highest 
aim of politics.189 To the extent that freedom has come to be understood within this 
tradition as an inner state of the human being rather than a worldly, political 
phenomenon, the structures of modern liberalism have kept the meaningfulness inherent 
in human action from coming into appearance and bringing a common world into view. 
For this reason, Arendt says, “World-alienation, and not self-alienation as Marx thought, 
has been the hallmark of the modern age.”190 Hence, rather than augmenting liberal 
political theory, I maintain that Arendt’s notion of citizenship serves as the basis to 
critique and, in turn, to remedy the loneliness that has been generated by some of the 
very principles that animate this tradition.  
 
                                                
189 See Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006), 142–69. See also Arendt’s discussion of world-alienation in The Human Condition, esp. 
248–257. 
 
190 Arendt, The Human Condition, 254.  
 
  110 
III.2. Solitude, Isolation, and Loneliness   
Arendt’s understanding of loneliness echoes the work of her mentors, Martin 
Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. Like Heidegger, Arendt intends to show through her 
account of loneliness that contemporary man is afflicted with a sense of homelessness 
and uprootedness, having been set adrift by the technical automation of the world. Yet, 
as we have already seen, she is critical of Heidegger’s disavowal of the public, which 
she believes leads him to develop a worldless notion of authenticity that can only be 
realized in isolation from others and thereby further contributes to the world-alienation 
that has become definitive of modern life.191 In this divergence from Heidegger, her 
account of loneliness also has roots in Jaspers’s concern for communication and his 
critical insights regarding the central position that solitude has come to occupy in 
western metaphysics. As she says in Men in Dark Times, “Jaspers is, as far as I know, 
the first and the only philosopher who has ever protested against solitude, to whom 
solitude has appeared ‘pernicious.’”192 Like Jaspers, Arendt remains critical throughout 
her career of the tendency in philosophy to elevate the contemplative life above practical 
life, suggesting that this tendency has kept thinking from entering into the public realm 
and intervening in the mechanization of the modern world.193 Even so, she believes that 
solitude has an important role to play in political life, enabling individuals who belong to 
a world to cultivate their capacity for thinking. Hence, in her discussion of loneliness, 
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Arendt distinguishes herself from both of her mentors, deepening these aspects of their 
thought in ways that are responsive to the specific character of totalitarian domination in 
the twentieth century.  
Arendt, for her part, then, maintains that the seeds of loneliness can be found in 
two different but interrelated concepts, namely, solitude and isolation.194 For Arendt, the 
principle according to which solitude, isolation, and loneliness are related is the human 
condition of natality, which marks our inherent capacity for new beginnings and 
constitutes the source of our freedom.195 As we have seen, Arendt wishes to show 
through her notion of natality that the distinguishing feature of our humanity resides not 
in our sameness, but rather in the irreducible uniqueness that is bestowed upon us by the 
fact of our birth.196 She says, “Each man is unique, so that with each birth something 
uniquely new comes into the world. With respect to this somebody who is unique it can 
be truly said that nobody was there before.”197 While Arendt has biological birth in 
mind, she interprets this in its existential significance as the appearance of the 
incalculable possibilities that are opened up by the uniqueness of each human being. 
This uniqueness can only be fully realized through action, or the native human 
capacity to bring something into the world that has never before been seen and could 
never have been predicted. While natality is a condition for the possibility of all human 
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activity, it comes to appear most fully through speech and action in the realm of politics 
where human beings disclose who they are in their radical singularity to the world. 
Arendt develops the relation between action and the realization of the human condition 
of natality through her discussion of the vita activa, or the fundamental activities of 
human life, which she designates as labor, work, and action.198 Whereas labor and work 
are fundamental to human existence, only action, which is free, is definitive of it. Labor, 
Arendt explains, is the endless cycle of production and consumption that human beings 
undertake to satisfy their biological needs.199 As animal laborans, she explains, we never 
rise above the necessity of the life processes. 200 For this reason, Arendt says, “When 
considered in their worldliness, [the products of labor] are the least worldly and at the 
same time the most natural of all things. Although they are man-made, they come and 
go, are produced and consumed, in accordance with the ever-recurrent cyclical 
movement of nature.”201 Labor, though necessary for human existence, it is devoid of 
meaning, generating things that go in an out of existence according to the particular 
needs of human beings.202 To the extent that labor is governed entirely by these natural 
processes, human beings in their capacity as animal laborans are indistinguishable from 
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other living things. Hence, in being bound up with necessity, Arendt explains that labor 
corresponds to the human condition of life in general.203  
In contrast to labor, which is driven entirely by the necessary movements of 
nature, work is that process by which we violently assert ourselves over nature in order 
to produce artifacts that can outlast it.204 To the extent that fabrication brings things into 
the world that can endure the cyclical movement of nature, work, rather than labor, is 
world building. In other words, Arendt says, “The work of our hands, as distinguished 
from the labor of our bodies—homo faber who makes and literally ‘works upon,’ as 
distinguished from the animal laborans which labors and ‘mixes with’—constitutes the 
human artifice.”205 The artifacts we fabricate are relatively independent of those who 
produce and use them, giving them a permanence that distinguishes them from nature. 
Insofar as work produces artifacts that can endure these processes, the products of work, 
unlike labor, are able to stand between men and be shared in common.206 In other words, 
human beings are able to create a home for themselves through work that can withstand 
the necessary movements of nature. For this reason, Arendt explains, work corresponds 
to the human condition to worldliness, insofar as it is the condition for the possibility of 
shared meaning and significance.  
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Work does distinguish human beings from other animals, giving the surrounding 
environment a permanence that exists nowhere in nature. Yet, work is not the definitive 
form of human action because it is driven by utility rather than spontaneity. Drawing on 
Aristotle’s conception of poïesis, Arendt maintains that the process of fabrication is 
purposive, guided by a fixed end that is external to the activity itself.  While man in his 
capacity as homo faber does exercise his will over nature, violently dominating it for the 
sake of producing a world, he does so only through means-end schematization. Hence, 
following both Plato and Aristotle, Arendt argues that the process of fabrication, in being 
“determined by the constant use of yardsticks, measurements, rules, and standards,” is 
too predictable to be the activity that is most proper to human life.207  
In contrast to labor and work, action, Arendt argues, is free and therefore 
definitive of human life. She says, “Action is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, 
and it is not prompted by utility, like work.”208 Instead, action is the spontaneous 
enactment of one’s inherent capacity for new beginnings. Whereas labor corresponds to 
the human condition of life, and work to the human condition of worldliness, action 
corresponds to the human condition of natality, or the fact that all human beings, simply 
in virtue of being born, come into the world as irreducibly unique and, as such, able to 
begin anew. 
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As we shall see, the experience of solitude does not diminish our irreducible 
uniqueness and, indeed, can even foster the complete realization of it by preparing us to 
engage thoughtfully in political life. When, by contrast, the political sphere of our lives 
has been destroyed and we find ourselves living in isolation, the condition of natality can 
no longer be fully realized but instead remains only partially developed in the context of 
work. Human natality is diminished even further in the context of loneliness, which 
develops when human beings have been reduced even in their productive capacities to 
laboring animals and are precluded entirely from realizing themselves in their radical 
uniqueness.   
The extent to which our natality can be realized in these respective states of 
solitude, isolation, and loneliness depends on the relation we retain in each to the world 
and others. Arendt defines solitude as a temporary retreat from the world, but a retreat 
that is nevertheless indispensable for political life. As Roger Berkowitz explains, 
solitude nurtures our capacity for thoughtfulness, bringing us into relation with ourselves 
so that we are prepared to engage authentically with others.209 Conceived as the cradle 
for thinking, solitude offers a sanctuary from what he describes as the “contagion of 
conformity” that threatens our capacity to realize our radical singularity in the context of 
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political life.210 In this, Berkowitz argues, solitude provides a vital safeguard against “the 
delusional fellowship promised by ideological and totalitarian fantasies.”211  
Yet, solitude, though a necessary aspect or moment of human existence, can only 
ever play a preparatory role in the full flourishing of human life and is never itself 
adequate for achieving this end. Because we are relational creatures, we find that while 
we may be together with ourselves in solitude, our wholeness and singularity as 
individuals remains unresolved when we are separated from others.212 Solitude, Arendt 
explains, gives rise to the feeling of being “two-in-one,” deflected from our individuality 
by the dual nature that arises when we have only our conscience to consult.213 Hence, 
while solitude provides the foundation for the activity of thinking, enabling us to stand in 
an authentic relation to ourselves and those around us, one is always plagued by duality 
and doubt in the dialogue of thought. To be sure, this duality does not diminish the 
importance of solitude for cultivating our capacity for thought; on the contrary, Arendt 
insists that the fragmentation we find in ourselves forms the basis for the reflection we 
undertake in solitude, enabling us to ask timeless metaphysical questions about “God, 
freedom, and immortality (as in Kant), or about man and world, being and nothingness, 
life and death.”214 Even so, the feeling of being “two-in-one” that arises in solitude 
prevents us from authentically appropriating ourselves in our singular and irreducible 
                                                
210 Ibid., 240.  
 
211 Ibid., 237.  
 
212 Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism,” 358. 
 
213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid., 359. 
  117 
uniqueness. For Arendt, it is only after our singularity has been illuminated by those 
around us that we can decide to be ourselves, a decision that is brought to completion 
when we announce who we are to the world. As she explains: 
We become one whole individual, in the richness as well as the limitations of 
definite characteristics, through and only through the company of others. For our 
individuality, insofar as it is one—unchangeable and unmistakable—we depend 
entirely on other people. […] The great grace of companionship is that it redeems 
the two-in-one by making it individual.215  
Solitude thus has the two-fold effect of bringing us into relation with ourselves, while at 
the same time revealing that we are always outside of ourselves when we are alone. It is 
therefore necessary for the full flourishing of human life because we are reminded in this 
confrontation with ourselves of our irrevocable interdependence, or the fact that we 
always remain incomplete in solitude and must therefore return to the world and the 
company of others in order to restore our individuality.  
If we no longer belong to a world with others who can bring our singularity into 
relief, solitude becomes vulnerable to a dangerous extreme or limit experience of 
“complete solitude,” or what Arendt describes as loneliness.216 Solitude is experienced at 
this limit, she says, “When man does not find companionship to save him from the dual 
nature of his solitude, or when man, as an individual, in constant need of others for his 
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individuality, is deserted or separated from others.”217 Hence, while solitude may be 
necessary for the full flourishing of human life, it can also become dangerous when an 
individual is severed from a world, or community of others, who are able to bring that 
individual into relief in his or her singularity. As we shall see, individuals become 
susceptible to the dangers of solitude when they find themselves living in isolation and 
increasingly more so as they drift towards loneliness.  
 Human beings become isolated, Arendt explains, “When the political sphere of 
their lives, where they act together in the pursuit of a common concern, is destroyed.”218  
Having lost the space that is most proper to human action, isolation keeps individuals 
from fully realizing themselves in their natality. She develops her account of isolation 
with reference to the distinction she finds in Montesquieu between the principles of 
action in republican and tyrannical governments. 219 On this view, as Arendt argues, 
republican law springs from the joy of belonging to a group of individuals who, though 
radically different by birth, nevertheless recognize one another as equally valuable and 
powerful. 220 The experience of belonging to a group of distinct but equally powerful 
individuals gives rise to a love of equality and, with this, the principle of virtue that 
motivates individuals to act in concert with others in the public sphere. Thus, the 
principle of action in republican government rests on the two-fold assumption that 
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human beings are both irreducibly singular and interdependent, only capable of realizing 
their singularity, along with their power and freedom, with others in the full illumination 
of the public realm.221 
The lawlessness of tyrannical government, as Arendt reads Montesquieu, 
depends by contrast on the impotence of radically isolated individuals.222 Rather than 
virtue, the motivating principle of tyrannical government is fear, which springs from the 
feeling of despair one has over the impossibility of acting in concert with others. 
Because human beings are both singular and interdependent, their power and freedom as 
individuals can only be realized with others in the public realm, or that space in which 
human beings are able to appear in their singular uniqueness. Hence, the destruction of 
the public realm gives rise to isolation, preventing individuals from recognizing one 
another as equally powerful in their singularity.  
Arendt thus defines isolation in reference to her interpretation of Montesquieu as 
the experience of living together “without sharing some visible, tangible realm of the 
world.”223 Through the destruction of the political sphere, isolation renders human 
beings incapable of fully realizing themselves through action, robbing them of the ability 
to be together in such a way that they are able to endow the world they have in common 
with meaning. Capable of seeing themselves and those around them only in their 
productive capacities, isolation thus makes human beings impotent, leading to a sense of 
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despair over the feeling of powerlessness that develops when one is unable to act in 
concert with others.224 No longer fully illuminated by the public realm, the human 
condition of natality is thus diminished in isolation, remaining only dimly lit in the 
human capacity for work. 
Loneliness is a further and more radical iteration of the feeling of despair that 
sets in when human beings are no longer able to take collective action in the sphere of 
politics. Whereas isolated individuals may still be able to contribute something of their 
own to the world through their work, Arendt argues that loneliness arises once human 
beings have been reduced even in their productive capacities to “animal laborans, whose 
necessary ‘metabolism with nature’ is of concern to no one.”225 Loneliness thus develops 
when human natality has been altogether snuffed out, and human beings have been 
leveled in their intrinsic uniqueness to indistinct parts of the necessary movement of 
nature. This experience, Arendt explains, is unbearable as it involves not only the loss of 
companionship, but also “the loss of one’s own self which can be realized in solitude but 
confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals.”226 
Because we are always outside of ourselves in solitude, we can easily lose ourselves in it 
if we no longer belong to a world with others who can bring our singularity into focus. 
Arendt thus describes loneliness as the anxiety we have over the loss of self that occurs 
upon being severed from a common world that can confirm the truth of our 
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experience.227 She explains that this anxiety causes individuals to lose trust in who they 
are and “the elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make experiences 
at all. Self and world, the capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same 
time.”228 Upon falling into despair over this loss of self and the surrounding world, we 
become disoriented; loneliness overwhelms us with doubt and uncertainty regarding the 
truth of our experience in the world, leaving us without a tangible reality in which to 
ground ourselves. For this reason, Arendt says, the feeling of loneliness is “among the 
most radical and desperate experiences of man.”229 
Arendt insists that the hallmarks of the modern epoch—namely, European 
imperialism, capital exploitation, the rise of the modern sciences and technology, and 
industrialization—have created a breeding ground for loneliness. The increasing decay 
of our political institutions and traditions in the modern era have caused the world to 
collapse, leaving behind rootless individuals who are only capable of seeing themselves 
and others in terms of their utility and functionality. This, in turn, has generated a 
widespread feeling of loneliness, or the overwhelming sense of not belonging to any 
world at all.230 Loneliness has thus come to epitomize the basic experience of living 
together in the modern world, such that individuals find themselves dominated not just 
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by isolation and powerlessness, but also by worldlessness and superfluity.231 For this 
reason, Arendt describes loneliness as “the very disease of our time,” a fact laid bare by 
the submission of the masses to totalitarian domination at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.232  
III.3. Loneliness and Totalitarianism 
Arendt suggests through her discourse on loneliness that losing one’s place in the 
world involves more than mere physical displacement; beyond this, it entails a deeper 
existential displacement, leaving individuals in exile from themselves and the radical 
singularity that is definitive of being human. The phenomenon of loneliness reveals, too, 
that such experiences of exile are not specific to the stateless, refugees, or otherwise 
marginalized individuals, but are instead widespread even among those who have 
secured a place within the borders of our modern political communities. In this, Arendt’s 
concern for loneliness indicates that the problem of exclusion epitomized in her 
discussion of statelessness is not external to the structures of modern political life, as 
those who emphasize the right to have rights suggest. On the contrary, her discussion of 
loneliness suggests that this problem is internal to our modern political structures, which 
can be seen above all in the vulnerability of modern life to totalitarian domination.  
Much has already been said of Arendt’s approach to totalitarianism; our purpose 
here will be to synthesize her principal concerns and elucidate her claim that we become 
increasingly susceptible to totalitarianism as the prevalence of loneliness within society 
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increases.233 While the sense of community promised by totalitarian movements such as 
National Socialism has been attributed to their ascendancy, Arendt’s analysis offers an 
important critical perspective on this heightened sense of togetherness, clarifying that in 
order for it to take hold, the masses must have already been atomized and isolated to the 
point of loneliness. Totalitarianism, Arendt maintains, is an unprecedented form of 
government, depending for its existence on widespread loneliness rather than fear and 
isolation alone. Unlike tyrannical rule, totalitarian government is not arbitrary and 
lawless but instead purports to be lawful in the purest sense, executing the law of nature 
or history without translating this law into the standards of right and wrong for 
individual behavior.234 In this, it defies positive law, which derives its legitimacy from a 
natural or divine authority external to human beings, erecting boundaries between a 
plurality of individuals such that they are able to retain and enact their native capacity 
for spontaneous free action. Totalitarianism, by contrast, destroys human plurality, 
pressing men together in order to create “one man” in whom the law of history or nature 
can be realized.235  
Totalitarianism accomplishes this through terror, which, Arendt says, “[Provides] 
the forces of nature or history with an incomparable instrument to accelerate their 
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movement.”236 By pressing isolated individuals together, terror ensures that the masses, 
no longer able to recognize themselves or others in their radical singularity, come to 
believe that their particular existence is meaningful only insofar as it advances the 
species as a whole. In so doing, Arendt explains, totalitarian terror destroys the very 
source of human freedom, “which is given with the fact of the birth of man and resides 
in his capacity to make a new beginning.”237 By effectively outlawing human plurality, 
totalitarian terror ensures that the stream of necessity governed by natural or historical 
processes remains uninterrupted by any unforeseeable or spontaneous human act. In 
forcing individuals to see themselves and others as superfluous and interchangeable parts 
of a larger mechanism, terror guarantees that the subjects of totalitarian rule exist only to 
propel the death sentences that nature or history have supposedly pronounced for certain 
human beings. Hence, Arendt says, “The inhabitants of a totalitarian country are thrown 
into and caught in the process of nature or history for the sake of accelerating its 
movement; as such, they can only be executioners or victims of its inherent law.” 238 
This two-sided preparation, she explains, is the basis of totalitarian ideology.  
Like its nineteenth century predecessors, totalitarian ideology seeks total 
explanation, subordinating the reality of experience to some truer reality that is 
proclaimed to be concealed behind all perceptible things.239 In striving to explain all 
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historical happenings, the very structure of ideological thinking precludes the possibility 
of experiencing anything new, as the tangible reality of an event is never understood on 
its own terms but only with reference to a greater ideological truth. That is, Arendt says, 
“Once it has established its premise, its point of departure, experience no longer 
interferes with ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by reality.”240 Ideology thus 
emancipates thought from experience such that it is able to proceed with logical 
consistency that has no basis in reality.241  
Totalitarian ideology distinguishes itself, however, in that it is driven not by an 
idea, such as dialectical materialism or racism, but instead by the coercive force of the 
logical process itself.242 That is, in addition to emancipating thought from experience by 
subordinating all perceptible reality to an ideological truth, totalitarian ideology 
transforms the stringent logicality inherent in all ideology into the principle of action that 
drives human behavior. As Arendt explains: 
The stringent logicality as an inspiration of action permeates the whole structure 
of totalitarian movements and totalitarian governments. The most pervasive 
argument, of which Hitler and Stalin were equally fond, is to insist that whoever 
says A must necessarily also say B and C and finally end with the last letter of 
the alphabet. Everything which stands in the way of this kind of reasoning—
reality, experience, and the daily network of human relationships and 
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interdependence—is overruled. […] It is no longer race […] that is the ‘ideal’ 
which appeals, nor class or the establishment of a classless society, but the 
murderous network of pure logical operations in which one is caught up once one 
accepts either of them.243 
Logical reasoning is the one capacity of the human mind that does not need the self, 
others, or the world to function properly. Hence, loneliness, as the experience of having 
been severed from all three, prepares men to submit to the coercive force of logic or, as 
Hitler put it, the “ice-cold reasoning,” that accelerates totalitarian terror.244 That is, she 
says, “Logicality is what appeals to isolated human beings, for man—in complete 
solitude, without any contact with his fellow men and therefore without any real 
possibility of experience—has nothing else he can fall back on but the most abstract 
rules of reasoning.”245 For this reason, totalitarianism can only rule over lonely 
individuals who, in their permanent solitude, have lost trust in their experience as an 
originating source of truth and cling instead to the automated processes of logical 
deduction to supply their thoughts.  
Mere logic, or reasoning without regard for facts or experience, is the inherent 
vice of solitude, a vice that “grows out of the despair of loneliness.”246 Upon being 
severed from the world and others, it is only possible to appease the despair of loneliness 
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by remaining consistent in one’s reasoning, which provides “the only reliable ‘truth’ 
human beings can fall back upon once they have lost the mutual guarantee, the common 
sense, men need in order to experience and live and know their way in a common 
world.”247 Totalitarianism rescues men from their loneliness, preying on the fear lonely 
individuals have of contradicting themselves.248 Upon accepting the first premise of the 
movement’s ideology, lonely individuals must follow through with the deduction it 
prescribes, or else risk rendering their lives meaningless.249  
For this reason, Arendt argues, totalitarianism can perhaps best be understood as 
“organized loneliness.”250 In order to transform human beings into executioners and 
victims of the inherent law of history or nature, it is not enough to destroy the external 
reality of freedom in the political sphere through isolation and fear. Beyond this, 
individuals must also be willing to surrender their inner freedom, or their capacity for 
thinking, which Arendt describes as “the freest and purest of all human activities […] the 
very opposite of the compulsory process of deduction.”251 Therefore, in addition to 
external coercion, totalitarianism depends on self-coercion, whereby lonely individuals 
who have become content to submit their capacity for thought to the on going process of 
deduction, compel themselves to step into the movement of terror.252  
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Arendt explains that the destruction of the public realm over the last two 
centuries has given rise to a society of atomized and isolated human beings who live 
together without sharing anything in common.253 In this, she is clear that the structures 
of modernity itself laid the foundation for totalitarian rulers to organize society as they 
did at the beginning of the twentieth century and, thus, she says, “Hitler was able to 
build his organization on the firm ground of an already atomized society, which he then 
artificially atomized even further.”254 The all-consuming concern with instrumentality 
and individualism in modern life has not only isolated human beings, but also left them 
desperately lonely, a fact made evident by the willing submission of so many to the logic 
of totalitarian terror.  
Through her account of loneliness we thus find that the danger involved in losing 
one’s place in the world runs deeper than her analysis of statelessness initially suggests. 
In addition to characterizing the experience of being physically displaced, it also 
encompasses the broader experience of modern individuals, who, despite living together, 
nevertheless find themselves homeless and uprooted in having lost a common world. 
Arendt’s articulation of the dehumanizing effect of statelessness may therefore be 
generalized to include the lonely masses in the modern era. Loneliness strips individuals 
of the singularity and interrelatedness that is definitive of the human condition. 
Therefore, in much the same way as statelessness, loneliness expels human beings from 
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humanity, reducing them in their unrepeatable uniqueness to interchangeable parts of a 
worldless society.  
III.4. Loneliness and Liberal Citizenship 
When considered in light of her account of loneliness, Arendt’s conception of 
citizenship poses an important challenge to notions of citizenship that grow out of the 
liberal tradition. Political membership, according to Arendt, is characteristically 
conceived within this tradition as an indefinitely expandable legal status that promises 
liberty in exchange for obedience to the law; in this, it purports to have found in the 
social contract a steadfast foundation for just society.255 Yet, in guaranteeing the right to 
pursue one’s private interests as far as possible so long as this does not preclude others 
from doing the same, the liberal tradition endorses notions of citizenship that lawfully 
promote the separation of human beings. That is, the terms of the contract itself 
presuppose a society of lonely individuals, providing rational justification for the 
atomization and isolation that has made modern individuals susceptible to totalitarian 
domination.   
Given this, we may wonder whether those discourses that emphasize the right to 
have rights do enough to capture the stakes involved in Arendt’s concern for citizenship. 
Those who focus on Arendt’s discussion of rights for the sake of developing methods for 
expanding democratic citizenship on a global scale imply in their approach to her work 
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that the forms of exclusion epitomized by statelessness stand outside the structures of 
liberal democracy. Yet, Arendt’s account of loneliness suggests that the experience of no 
longer belonging to a world may be endemic for those who live within political 
structures of liberal provenance. If political exclusion is understood as the loss of one’s 
place in the world, then overcoming this loss involves more than simply extending the 
rights of citizenship to those who exist outside our circles of inclusion; beyond this, what 
is called for is a critique of these structures and the very notion of citizenship on which 
they are based. In turning to loneliness, we therefore find that Arendt’s notion of 
citizenship forms the basis for a deeper critique of the liberal tradition that remains 
underdeveloped in her discussion of the right to have rights, but that is nevertheless 
integral to her broader insights concerning the failures and dangers of politics in the 
modern age. Arendt scholars who emphasize the right to have rights to the detriment of 
her critical relation to the liberal tradition, not only risk missing this decisive feature of 
her concerns, but also, and more importantly, threaten to overshadow an important 
critical perspective on assumptions of the liberal tradition. These are assumptions that 
may not only remain at work in their efforts to develop new ways of justifying the 
expansion of democratic citizenship but, moreover, in the structures of liberal democracy 
that organize political life today. Returning now to Arendt’s conception of citizenship, 
we can see how her discourse on loneliness shifts our understanding of the origins of her 
critique of liberalism.  
  In light of her critical insights regarding the liberal tradition, Arendt’s concern 
for political belonging and her call for the right to have rights take on new significance. 
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Her notion of citizenship not only offers a response to the loss of rights stateless people 
suffered, but also constitutes a means of contravening the broader problem of loneliness, 
which she describes as “an everyday experience of the ever growing masses of our 
century.”256 Arendt’s account of loneliness clarifies that her own call for the right to 
citizenship cannot be reduced to a call for the expansion of our present political 
structures; on the contrary, it serves as the basis for an entirely new conception of 
citizenship that is able to return lonely individuals to themselves, the world, and others.  
It therefore comes as no surprise that she derives her own conception of 
citizenship from the Greek and Roman sentiment that freedom is a political 
phenomenon, rather than from presuppositions found in the liberal tradition. As we have 
already seen, Arendt seeks to reverse the basic assumption in western metaphysics that 
freedom arises in the solitary life of contemplation by re-inscribing freedom within the 
political realm.257 In contrast to liberal theorists, who would suggest that freedom takes 
shape as a retreat from politics, Arendt insists that “men are free—as distinguished from 
their possessing the gift for freedom—as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to 
be free and to act are the same.”258 In this, Arendt understands freedom not as a pre-
political attribute of the human being, but instead as an event that must be enacted 
through speech and action with others in the public realm. As we shall see in what 
follows, Arendt’s notion of citizenship can be understood as a further iteration of her 
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effort to re-establish the relationship between freedom and politics that has been severed 
in the modern era, leading her, in turn, to develop her account of citizenship, not in terms 
of the liberal political tradition, but instead in terms of the concept of action in the Greek 
political tradition and the notion of foundation in the Roman political tradition.259 She 
thus returns to antiquity to develop a conception of citizenship oriented not by a liberal 
concern for the security of rights in the private sphere, but rather by an ontological 
conception of the human being that promises to return individuals to themselves, the 
world, and others, and, in so doing, provide an antidote to the problem of loneliness in 
the modern era. 
III.5. Finding an Antidote to Loneliness in Antiquity: Arendt’s Notion of 
Citizenship  
In returning to antiquity to develop her conception of citizenship, Arendt is one 
of many in a long heritage of German thinkers who have turned to the ancient world in 
order to critically engage and overcome the narrow rationalism of the modern era.260 For 
Arendt, as well as for those who came before her, this celebration of the ancient world 
should not be misconstrued as nostalgia. Jacques Taminiaux explains that while figures 
such as Lessing, Herder, and Goethe revered the ancient world, they neither believed 
that they lived in an age of exile, nor did they long for a return to the bygone age of 
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ancient Greece.261 Rather, they took Greek life to be continuous with modern life, 
providing modern individuals with a model to which they could aspire in order to live 
well. Taminiaux argues that while Schiller and Hölderlin were perhaps more nostalgic, 
suggesting through their work that modern man lives in irrevocable exile, they were not 
melancholic about the rupture between modernity and antiquity. Instead, both suggest 
that it is possible to overcome the nostalgia for Greece by embracing the beauty and 
freedom of human finitude to which this rupture has given birth. Arendt furthers this 
tradition through her own appropriation of the Greek and Roman political traditions, 
turning to them not out of hopeless longing, but rather for the sake of beginning anew in 
the face of the unprecedented political disasters of the twentieth century.  
The influence of the Greek political tradition on Arendt’s broader political theory 
can be seen, above all, in her account of the relationship between action and freedom, 
through which she challenges the prejudice against action that is definitive of the 
tradition of western metaphysics.262 While the relationship between freedom and action 
has been severed in the modern age, Arendt argues that it was well understood by the 
Greeks, turning, in particular, to Aristotle, who develops this in his account of the bios 
politikos. Arendt explains that Aristotle uses the term bioi to demarcate the most 
authentic and autonomous ways of life that men can choose in full independence of the 
necessities that ordinarily govern existence, which include the life of pleasure, the life of 
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the polis, and the life of contemplation.263 On the basis of this, Arendt maintains that 
neither labor nor work qualify as bios because they produce only what is necessary and 
useful, serving to satisfy the needs and wants of human beings. Bioi are elevated above 
such activity, constituting the kinds of activities that are most proper to human life and 
that can only be achieved after one has secured the necessities of life.  
Of the three types of bioi, the bios politikos, constitutes the life of action or 
praxis. According to Aristotle, Arendt explains, “The bios politikos denoted explicitly 
only the realm of human affairs, stressing the action, praxis, needed to establish and 
sustain it.”264 Praxis is superior to the productive activity of poeïsis, or fabrication, 
which is always done for the sake of an external end. Praxis, by contrast, is an activity 
specific to political or ethical life, through which human beings cultivate their capacity 
for virtue. Unlike theoria, or contemplation, praxis is only possible with others. The 
polis was thus necessary for praxis, insofar as it constituted the arena where citizens, in 
having liberated themselves from the necessities of life in the privacy of the household 
realm, could deliberate with others about issues that were not governed by necessity or 
utility.265 That is, Arendt says:  
The ‘good life,’ as Aristotle called the life of the citizen, therefore was not 
merely better, more carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether 
different quality. It was ‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered the 
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necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming 
the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer 
bound to the biological life process.266  
The polis thus made the good life possible, providing a space in which men could 
cultivate their intellectual and moral virtues through free engagement with their equals.  
Insofar as the polis is necessary for the cultivation of virtue, or a life in harmony 
with the ends that are most proper to human existence, Aristotle is clear that man is, by 
nature, a political animal. Arendt explains, however, that this definition of man cannot 
be thought apart from Aristotle’s alternative definition of man as a living being capable 
of speech.267 Arendt explains that Aristotle’s understanding of logos is political. For 
Aristotle, being deprived of the logos, as in the case of slaves and barbarians, did not 
mean being deprived of the faculty of speech, “But of a way of life in which speech and 
only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with 
each other.”268 In other words, what it means to be deprived of the logos, is to lack 
access to the space in which one can speak with others about the world they have in 
common and actualize oneself as a human being. Following Aristotle, Arendt thus 
maintains that speech, or deliberation with others about public matters, is free of the 
necessities of the life processes.269 In the context of political life, then, speech is not 
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merely the expression of one’s aversions or appetites, but is instead an activity of 
judgment, which consists in the capacity to deliberate about matters that transcend 
necessity and utility. As Villa explains, Arendt, like Aristotle, believes that “only human 
beings can articulate and share a perception of what is good and what is bad, what is 
honorable and what is blameworthy, and they can do so through speech.”270 Moreover, 
as the deliberative mode of political action, Arendt resists the notion that speech 
constitutes a means of achieving consensus, as this would imply that speech is merely 
instrumentally valuable. Rather, in drawing on an Aristotelian framework, she maintains 
that the very performance of deliberation is meaningful in itself, the inherent value of 
which is embodied by those who achieve practical wisdom, or the ability to deliberate 
well with regard to political or ethical matters.271  
  On the basis of her reading of Aristotle, Arendt arrives at a conception of action 
that is meant to reverse the assumption in western metaphysics that freedom arises in the 
solitary life of contemplation. Political action, which requires both speech and action, is 
not only the political activity par excellence, on Arendt’s view, but also the vehicle by 
which we enact our freedom. The freedom inherent in action thus arises from the fact 
that when we act in concert with others in the space of politics we bring our inherent 
capacity for new beginnings into appearance. This enactment of our capacity for new 
beginnings in the space of politics depends on speech, which enables us to announce that 
we are the authors of our action and, in so doing, bring our radical singularity into 
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appearance. Unless action is attached to a name or a “who,” Arendt argues, it becomes 
meaningless, losing both its revelatory character and its specifically human quality.272 
Action thus requires speech and, for this reason, the freedom inherent in action can only 
be actualized when we are with others in the public realm. As Arendt explains: 
This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are 
with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human 
togetherness. Although nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses 
himself in deed or word, he must be willing to risk the disclosure […]. Because 
of its inherent tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs 
for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is 
possible only in the public realm.273 
On Arendt’s view, the Greeks recognized that freedom was not a naturally occurring 
thing, but instead required an artificial space where men could stand together as equals 
and disclose who they were to one another in their radical singularity through speech and 
action. In light of this, Arendt argues that the polis served a two-fold purpose. First, it 
functioned to multiply the occasions for men to distinguish themselves through speech 
and action, which would otherwise be an extraordinary event. Second, given the frailty 
of human affairs, it provided a space in which word and deed, which are the most 
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ephemeral of man-made things, could become imperishable and be remembered by 
future generations.274  
 Arendt’s account of the polis provides the basis for her own conception of the 
space of appearance. As she explains:  
The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of speaking and acting together […]. It 
is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space 
where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like 
other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly.275  
Without this space of appearance, or a space in which men can come together and 
distinguish themselves through speech and action, Arendt says that human beings have 
no way of feeling assured of the reality of their experience. “To be deprived of it,” she 
says, “means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the 
same as appearance. To men, the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of 
others, by its appearing to all.”276 As I will explain in more detail later on, whatever fails 
to appear in this space passes in and out of existence, and while such things may be 
intimately our own, they nevertheless have no reality. Therefore, in turning to the Greek 
polis, Arendt illustrates that both freedom and reality require a space of appearance or a 
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public realm where human beings can show who they are in the fullness of their 
humanity through word and deed. 
 Arendt thus draws heavily on the Greeks to develop her own conception of action 
and the political ontology that follows from it. Yet, she is also influenced by the Roman 
political tradition, turning to it to resolve the failure of the Greeks to adequately address 
the limitlessness and unpredictably that is inherent in the freedom of human action. 
Arendt explains that freedom for both the Greeks and Romans was a political concept, 
embodied by the city-state and citizenship.277 The difference between them, Arendt 
argues, turns on the question of establishing a legitimate authority or rule that can 
command obedience without compromising the integrity of political life through 
coercive violence. While Plato and Aristotle recognized the importance of authority for 
preserving the polis and safeguarding its ruler, both believed that authority depended on 
a kind of coercion that was driven by necessity.278 Therefore, they could only conceive 
of authority as pre-political, something that had to be fabricated in advance of political 
action but that was not itself be born of political experience.279 Law in the Greek world 
thus held the secondary rank of fabrication, serving to limit the space within which 
action takes place.280  
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 The genius of the Romans, Arendt argues, was to retain the relationship between 
freedom and politics, while responding to the frailty of human affairs by conceiving of 
authority, not in terms of fabrication, but rather as a free political activity. Rather than 
creating walls between men, as in the case of the Greek polis, Roman authority 
established relationships between them.281 This was achieved through foundation and 
tradition, which enabled the words and deeds of past generations to be preserved for 
future generations without undermining the spontaneity and freedom inherent in human 
action. She says: 
In spite of the grandeur of Greek political philosophy, it may be doubted that it 
would have lost its inherent utopian character if the Romans, in the indefatigable 
search for tradition and authority, had not decided to take over and acknowledge 
as their highest authority in all matters of theory and thought. But they were able 
to accomplish this integration only because both authority and tradition had 
closely played a decisive role in the political life of the Roman republic.282  
Authority in the Roman political tradition was rooted in the notion of foundation, which 
makes an originating political action, and the spontaneity contained therein, binding for 
all future generations.283 One’s involvement in Roman politics could not be thought 
apart from the task of preserving the unrepeatable beginning of the founding of the 
Roman city. For this reason, Arendt says, “The most deeply Roman divinities were 
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Janus, the god of beginning, with whom, as it were, we still begin our year, and Minerva, 
the goddess of remembrance.”284 Whereas the founding of a new polis in Greece was an 
ordinary and repeatable occurrence, the founding of Rome was a unique event, marking 
the beginning of the Romans’ entire history and tying all Roman citizens, even in the 
imperial era, to a single, originating moment and locality.285 For the Romans, the 
authority with which Romulus was endowed to found the city of Rome had a binding 
force. Arendt explains that all authority derived from this moment of foundation 
“binding every act back to the sacred beginning of Roman history, adding, as it were, to 
every single moment the whole weight of the past. Gravitas, the ability to bear this 
weight, became the outstanding trait of the Roman character.”286 Therefore, political life 
for the Romans involved more than the spontaneous performance of speech and action; 
in addition to this, it meant to be tied to the past, obligated to the founders of the city, 
who, though no longer living, still constituted the source of Roman authority.  
The binding authority of foundation depended on tradition, which transformed 
the words and deeds of the city’s ancestors into precedents, or authoritative models for 
ethical and political behavior.287 “Tradition,” Arendt says, “preserved the past by 
handing down from one generation to the next the testimony of the ancestors, who first 
had witnessed and created the sacred founding and then augmented it by their own 
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authority throughout the centuries.”288 For this reason, the Romans believed that old age 
was the height of human life, not because one acquired wisdom, but because one had 
grown closer to the ancestors and the original source of authority. Growth, for the 
Romans, was thus directed towards the past rather than the future, a fact of Roman life 
that was embodied in the concern for tradition.289 So long as tradition remained 
uninterrupted, the authority of foundation could be preserved. For the Romans, action 
without reference to tradition or the authority of the founders, was meaningless.290 
Hence, through foundation and tradition, the Romans made the intangibility of speech 
and action tangible, so that despite its frailty, it could be carried forward by its citizens 
from the past into the future. Arendt’s appropriation of this notion of tradition will be 
central to my argument in subsequent chapters. For now, it is only worth noting that 
while the Romans retained an exclusively political conception of freedom, they achieved 
a continuity between past and future through foundation and tradition that was never 
accomplished by the Greeks.  
Taken together with the Greek polis and the conception of action on which it was 
based, these aspects of the Roman political tradition provide the basis for Arendt’s 
political ontology and her own account of citizenship. As Arendt explains, action in the 
modern era has been relegated to the realm of necessity, leading to a conception of 
politics that is entirely divorced from freedom. In this, it has left us without a space of 
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appearance where we can enact our freedom with others in the context of politics. 
Likewise, the loss of tradition in the modern era and the subsequent disavowal of all 
authority has left us without recourse to a past that can meaningfully guide us toward the 
future. The loss of a space of appearance along with the broken thread of tradition has 
led to widespread disorientation, which Arendt describes as loneliness or the feeling of 
no longer belonging to a world. This experience prepares men for totalitarian domination 
and, thus, Arendt suggests, what is called for in the wake of the political catastrophes of 
the twentieth century is a more robust sense of political belonging that can save us from 
our loneliness. She thus draws on a model of political life represented by the Greek polis 
and the Roman res publica to develop her own lived and embodied notion of citizenship 
that forms the basis to critique notions of citizenship inherited from the liberal tradition 
in offering an antidote to the problem of loneliness. Through her appropriation of these 
traditions, Arendt develops a conception of citizenship that does not consist in the ability 
to pursue one’s individual interests in the isolation of private life; by contrast, what it 
means to be a citizen for Arendt is to actualize one’s inherent capacity for freedom 
through political action, which enables individuals to appear among one another and act 
in concert for the sake of carrying the world they have in common from the past into the 
future. 
III.6. Citizenship, Freedom, and the Event of Appropriation   
While a trace of freedom is inherent in all human activity, Arendt explains that it 
can only develop fully when “action has created its own worldly space where it can 
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come out of hiding, as it were, and make its appearance.”291  For this reason, her 
conception of citizenship consists in having the right to be seen by others in the space of 
appearance. Drawing on the model of the Greek polis, Arendt argues that it is only 
through speech and action in the realm of politics that individuals reveal themselves to 
one another as human beings rather than mere physical objects.292 Through action, we 
express our native capacity for new beginnings, which is given to us by the human 
condition of natality. Through speech, we announce that we are the authors of our action, 
confirming our radical singularity in the presence of others and realizing the human 
condition of plurality. Speech and action are only possible in a world with others; hence, 
rather than a collection of private rights and liberties, Arendtian citizenship consists in 
belonging to a space of appearance, which enables individuals to see themselves and 
those around them in the fullness of their humanity. Understood this way, Arendt’s 
concern for political belonging culminates in a conception of citizenship that works 
against the isolation and atomization of modern society insofar as it is oriented by the 
illuminative power of the public realm.293  
This, alone, however is not enough for a conception of citizenship that can 
overcome the worldlessness of the modern era. Drawing on Heidegger’s conception of 
thrownness, Arendt maintains that we find ourselves born into a world or set of relations 
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that we have inherited but that are not our own.294 Because of this, we can never fully 
liberate ourselves from the conditions of our existence, meaning that our freedom will 
always be a matter of appropriating these conditions. In order to develop this in the 
context of modern political life, Arendt turns to the Roman concept of foundation, along 
with the belief within this tradition that political agency involves, in addition to freedom, 
the preservation of its legacy, which was granted to the Roman people by the city’s 
founders.295 Following this, Arendt maintains that freedom must be understood as an 
event of appropriation, whereby citizens work in concert with one another for the sake of 
carrying the world they share from the past into the future. Arendt suggests as much in 
the following passage concerning the political virtue of courage. She says: 
For this world of ours, because it existed before us and is meant to outlast our 
lives in it, simply cannot afford to give primary concern to individual lives and 
the interests connected with them […]. It requires courage to leave the protective 
security of our four walls and enter into the public realm, not because of the 
particular dangers which may lie in wait for us, but because we have arrived in a 
realm where the concern for life has lost its validity. Courage liberates men from 
their worry about life for the freedom of the world. Courage is indispensable 
because in politics, not life but the world is at stake.”296 
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In light of this, we find that what it means to be a citizen for Arendt is to have the 
courage to take responsibility for preserving and renewing the world in which one finds 
oneself. As such, Arendt’s conception of citizenship does not simply grant individuals 
the right to the protection of the law; beyond this, it requires of them that they work to 
reclaim the significance of the world they share. That is, citizenship, for Arendt, 
promises political belonging only insofar as it demands of us that we act in concert for 
the sake of holding open the realm of politics, or that space in which freedom can 
appear. Citizenship, understood in terms of our responsibility for carrying a common 
world from the past into the future, thus offers a powerful antidote to loneliness; in 
returning us to ourselves by bringing us into relation with others, it provides a means of 
reclaiming the significance of a world that has been overtaken by worldlessness and 
superfluity.  
 By drawing Arendt’s analysis of statelessness together with her conception of 
loneliness, it is therefore possible to see that her conception of citizenship forms the 
basis to critique notions of citizenship inherited from the liberal tradition. My aim in the 
following chapter will be to give further contour to the importance of Arendt’s lived and 
embodied conception citizenship, as well as her reformulation of the idea of freedom as 
a worldly political phenomenon, for challenging liberal approaches to political 
exclusion. With this, however, I will suggest that as crucial as her critical insights are, 
the notion of citizenship that she ultimately develops in light of this does not go far 
enough. Upon further developing the prescience of her critical insights into the dangers 
and limits of modern political life, I will argue in what follows that an internal conflict 
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emerges in her notion of citizenship that turns on her account of the responsibility she 
believes citizens have to remember in political life. As I will suggest, this conflict 
reveals a deeper problem with the modern concept of citizenship that keeps it from 
adequately addressing the problem of loneliness that Arendt diagnoses. This will, in turn, 
set the stage for a discussion in subsequent chapters of the need today to go beyond the 
concept of citizenship in order to begin addressing the forms of exclusion that Arendt 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LIMITS OF ARENDTIAN CITIZENSHIP: HISTORICAL MEMORY AND 
THE HIDDENNESS OF THE PARIAH TRADITION 
 
To this point, my aim has been to demonstrate the importance of Arendt’s 
thought for exposing the dangers and limits of liberal notions of citizenship for 
addressing political exclusion today. In the previous chapter, I considered Arendt’s 
critical relation to the liberal tradition as it unfolds in her discourse on loneliness and her 
account of the vulnerability of the structures of modern political life to totalitarianism. In 
so doing, I argued that Arendt poses her own notion citizenship as an antidote to the 
widespread loneliness that she believes has been produced by our modern political 
structures. On the basis of this critique, Arendt is led to develop a notion of citizenship 
that is oriented not by the liberal expansion of rights in the private sphere, but rather by 
our shared responsibility to make one another visible in the public sphere. With this, I 
maintained that her notion of citizenship provides a novel means of critically engaging 
the invisibility and worldlessness that is re-enforced by notions of citizenship that have 
their basis in the liberal tradition and that we continue to rely on to address political 
exclusion today. 
While Arendt develops a prescient account of the forms of exclusion that are 
characteristic of political life today, the purpose of this chapter will be to consider the 
scope and limits of her notion of citizenship for coming to terms with the forms of 
exclusion that she diagnoses. I begin by demonstrating that Arendt conceives of 
  149 
citizenship, in contrast to liberal political theorists, as a lived and embodied activity that 
involves the shared responsibility to care for the world in order to ensure its continuation 
from generation to generation. Such a conception of citizenship, I argue, forms the basis 
for a decisive critique of the notions of citizenship that we have inherited from the liberal 
tradition and the world-alienation they perpetuate.  
In addition to this, however, I will also argue that while Arendt clarifies the 
inadequacy of liberal forms of citizenship for addressing political exclusion today, there 
is an inconsistency internal to her own account of citizenship that keeps it from fully 
addressing the forms of exclusion that have come to epitomize the experience of living 
together in the modern world. This inconsistency turns on a tension that arises in her 
analysis of the role of remembrance in political life. By considering Arendt’s discussion 
of the transformation of the concept of history in the modern era, I will show that she 
believes remembrance has an integral role to play in rebuilding the modern world and 
contravening the loneliness that has made modern individuals susceptible to totalitarian 
domination. On Arendt’s view, citizenship involves taking responsibility for preserving 
in our collective memory the legacy of human freedom that provides the foundation for 
political communities and reminds us of the world that we have inherited. Hence, for 
Arendt, what it means to be a citizen is to take shared responsibility for appropriating the 
traditions, institutions, and values of the past such that they can be appropriated and 
carried forward from generation to generation. Realizing one’s freedom depends, for 
Arendt, on participating in this event of appropriation. Therefore, she suggests that the 
freedom promised by one’s inclusion in political community can only be enacted insofar 
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as citizens are able to recall the shared legacy of the world they have inherited so that it 
can come into appearance in the space of politics and be appropriated anew. As we shall 
see, remembrance is thus central to Arendt’s conception of political belonging, fortifying 
the shared reality of a common world, while simultaneously creating the conditions for 
the possibility of the event of appropriation that she associates with the enactment of 
human freedom.  
Yet, Arendt’s concern for the responsibility citizens have to reconcile themselves 
to the past comes into conflict with her account of those traditions and histories that get 
covered over in the very effort to construct the narrative of the modern political 
community. Upon developing Arendt’s concern for remembrance in political life, I will 
consider her discussion of the limited political freedom of the Jewish people in Europe 
in her 1944 essay, “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,” along with her account of 
the tacit exclusion of the black population from the American political community in her 
1970 essay, “Civil Disobedience.” My aim in turning to these essays is to show that 
Arendt believes a history of violence and exclusion is bound up with the legacy of the 
modern political tradition. While this history of violence and exclusion forms a central 
thread of the modern political tradition, Arendt indicates in these essays that it invariably 
gets covered over when Enlightenment citizenship is expanded and those who were once 
cast out become enfranchised. Yet, despite her own concern for remembrance in political 
life, Arendt does not develop the political stakes involved in our inability to recall in the 
space of politics the history of violence and exclusion that is entailed by the expansion of 
Enlightenment citizenship. On the contrary, Arendt suggests that so long as those who 
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were once excluded reaffirm their citizenship by working in concert to preserve the 
traditions, values, and institutions of their political communities, they will be recognized 
in the fullness of their humanity, able to overcome their previous exclusion and fully 
enact themselves by taking shared responsibility for appropriating anew the legacy of the 
world they have inherited.  
In light of this, I wish to show that an internal contradiction arises in Arendt’s 
conception of citizenship that keeps it from addressing the forms of exclusion that she 
diagnoses in modern political life. On the one hand, Arendt insists that in order for 
citizens to fully enact their freedom by participating in an event of appropriation, the 
legacy of the world they have inherited must be able to come into view in the space of 
politics. On her view, it is precisely in virtue of the loss of tradition in the modern era, or 
the inability on the part of modern individuals to recall the legacy of the world they have 
inherited, that they have found themselves untethered, worldless, and alone. On the other 
hand, her account of the hidden tradition of the pariah suggests that the implementation 
of Enlightenment citizenship itself necessitates the covering over of those histories of 
violence and exclusion that cannot be held together with the Enlightenment narrative of 
universal inclusion. While these immemorial histories of violence and exclusion may 
escape our collective memory, I will argue that they do not fall into oblivion when 
citizenship is granted, as Arendt suggests; on the contrary, because they are bound up 
with the legacy of the modern political tradition, they merely remain unappropriated, 
leaving their trace our political institutions, values, and traditions, repeating themselves 
in the violence and exclusion that continues to haunt those who were once cast out.  
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My aim in what follows will be to suggest that while Arendt develops a novel 
conception of citizenship that puts into relief the limits of notions of citizenship inherited 
from the liberal tradition, even it does not go far enough in addressing the forms of 
exclusion that she diagnoses. To the extent that these histories of violence and exclusion 
are bound up with the legacy of the modern political tradition, I wish to show that 
Arendt leaves unresolved in her own account of citizenship the question of how we take 
responsibility for the legacy of the modern political tradition if a part of it will always 
remain covered over. If citizenship, in the strongest sense, means participating in an 
event of appropriation, we find by turning to this inconsistency in Arendt’s thought that 
her notion of citizenship remains too reductive. In failing to address the political 
significance of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past for present political 
life, it only allows for what might be described in psychoanalytic terms as a melancholic 
relation to these histories of violence and exclusion.297 As such, Arendt stops short of 
developing a notion of citizenship that promises the kind of political belonging that she 
believes is necessary for bringing a common world into appearance and contravening the 
loneliness that has become definitive of modern political life.  
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By developing a preliminary account of this inconsistency in Arendt’s thought, 
my aim in this chapter is to provide a platform for a broader critique of the concept of 
modern citizenship in subsequent chapters. Ultimately, I wish to show that the 
inconsistency in Arendt’s analysis of citizenship puts into relief a broader contradiction 
internal to modern notions of citizenship that turns on a problem specific to the legacy of 
the revolutionary Enlightenment, which I will call the paradox of remembrance. 
Bringing this paradox and its political ramifications into focus, however, will depend on 
expanding Arendt’s analysis beyond the European nation-state to a global set of political 
concerns regarding the lasting impact of the legacy of slavery and colonization on 
contemporary political practice. These issues are crucial for understanding not only the 
distinctive character of political exclusion today, but also the limits of citizenship for 
addressing it. Therefore, by developing this inconsistency in Arendt’s conception of 
citizenship in this chapter, my aim in subsequent chapters will be to expand the horizon 
of our considerations of exclusion to this global context for the sake of challenging and 
deepening Arendt’s political categories in light of it. In so doing, I wish to open paths to 
resolving this inconsistency in Arendt’s thought, while suggesting that addressing the 
problem of political exclusion today depends not only on citizenship, but also on 
mechanisms in political life for coming to terms with the repetitions of the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past that I will suggest are necessitated by the legacy of the 
enlightened political tradition that we are tasked with preserving. 
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IV.1. The Scope of Arendtian Citizenship  
My aim in this section will be to draw together Arendt’s analysis of the limits of 
enlightened liberal notions of freedom and her discourse on loneliness to give further 
contour to the importance of her notion of citizenship for critiquing approaches to 
exclusion that emphasize the expansion of the structures of liberal democracy. In the last 
chapter, we saw that Arendt’s own conception of citizenship forms the basis to critique 
notions of citizenship that we have inherited from the liberal tradition, posing an 
important challenge to the liberal approaches often taken by mainstream political 
theorists to the problem of exclusion. I will now show that Arendt’s concerns for the 
dangers of loneliness are directly tied to her call for a conception of citizenship that 
emphasizes the importance of history and remembrance for preserving a common world.  
As we have seen, Arendt maintains that freedom in the modern era has come to 
be understood not as a worldly phenomenon that comes to appear in the realm of human 
affairs, but instead as a fixed and pre-political property of the human being that is least 
hindered when individuals are able to pursue their interests in the isolation of the private 
sphere. Whereas this notion of freedom has its basis in a metaphysics of substance, 
Arendt attempts to rethink freedom ontologically, conceiving of it as an event of 
appropriation that arises in the context of political life when citizens work in concert to 
renew the meaningfulness of the world.298 As we saw in Chapter One, this inner notion 
of freedom, or “the theory that ‘the appropriate region of human liberty is the ‘inward 
domain of consciousness,’” was discovered in late antiquity, when freedom became, for 
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the first time, a philosophical problem of the first order.299 Arendt explains that in Greek 
and Roman antiquity, freedom never took shape as a philosophical question precisely 
because it was a political concept, constituting the essence of the city-state and the 
highest end of the political activity of citizen. It was only in late antiquity and especially 
with the rise of Christianity, that “freedom became one of the chief problems of 
philosophy when it was experienced in the intercourse between me and myself, and 
outside of the intercourse between men.”300 Epitomized by the work of Epictetus and 
Augustine, this shift in the idea of freedom from an effect of political action to an 
attribute of thought or the will occurred against the backdrop of the decaying political 
sphere of the Roman Empire. Under these conditions, freedom was driven from the 
space of politics into the inner domain of the self that remains sheltered from the world. 
Hence, Arendt argues, the notion of freedom that ultimately guided the philosophical 
and political traditions of the modern era took shape in response to the experience of the 
decline of political life and, with this, the loss of a world that began in late antiquity.301  
Arendt thus maintains that the transformation of freedom into a metaphysical 
question was “preceded by the conscious attempt to divorce the notion of freedom from 
politics, to arrive at a formulation through which one may be a slave in the world and 
still be free.”302 In response to this loss of a world, Arendt explains, both Epictetus and 
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Augustine discovered that “no power is so absolute as that which man yields over 
himself, and that the inward space where man struggles and subdues himself is more 
entirely his own, namely, more securely shielded from outside interference, than any 
worldly home could ever be.”303 Freedom thus came to be associated with solitude, 
where, in the words of Augustine, Arendt says, “‘No man might hinder the hot 
contention wherein I had engaged with myself” in the deadly conflict which took place 
in ‘the inner dwelling’ of the soul and the dark ‘chamber of the heart.’”304 With this, 
Arendt argues, freedom was transformed into something that was believed to be 
experienced not in association with others, but rather through a retreat from the world.305  
While this experience of freedom was taken to be absolute insofar as it is 
shielded from the vices of the human world, Arendt explains that such notions of 
freedom are always derivative of the freedom that is experienced with and through 
others in the context of political life.306 She says:  
Neither freedom nor its opposite is experienced in the dialogue between me and 
myself in the course of which the great philosophic and metaphysical questions 
arise and that the philosophical tradition […] has distorted, instead of clarifying 
the very idea of freedom such as it is given in human experience by transposing it 
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from its original field, the realm of politics and human affairs in general to an 
inward domain, the will, where it would be open to self-inspection.307 
As I argued in Chapter Two, the experience of being together with oneself in the context 
of solitude is necessary for thinking, constituting a preparatory stage in the full 
flourishing of human life. Yet, we remain at odds with ourselves in the dialogue of 
thought, plagued by a duality or conflict within ourselves that cannot be resolved until 
we return to the world. Arendt explains that the experience we have of being two-in-one 
in solitude was well understood in classical antiquity, taken to be necessary for setting 
thought in motion and enabling individuals to realize their freedom through action with 
others in the realm of politics. With the rise of Christianity, however, Arendt argues that 
“free will and freedom became synonymous notions, the presence of freedom was 
experienced in complete solitude.”308 Because human beings always experience 
themselves as divided in solitude, the appropriation of oneself as a unique and free 
individual is impossible in this space. Hence, Arendt maintains that the removal of 
freedom from the political sphere culminated in a philosophical tradition that denies 
freedom, insofar as it is unable to come into appearance in the world. This, in turn, has 
given rise to a political tradition in which freedom remains hidden from sight, taken to 
be a fixed property internal to the human being that can only be realized in the isolation 
of private life.  
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By banishing freedom from the realm of politics, Arendt argues that the 
fundamental tenets of the liberal tradition have radically altered the relation of freedom 
to political life.309 Whereas the political sphere in antiquity provided a space where 
human beings could rise above the necessities of the life processes in order to realize 
their freedom by acting concert with others, the aim of politics in the modern era 
concerns, above all, the security and maintenance of these life processes. Consequently, 
Arendt argues, politics in the modern age no longer bears any relation to human freedom 
and is guided instead by “the sway of necessity.”310 This, she thinks, has had the effect 
of isolating modern individuals, rendering them powerless to realize themselves in their 
humanity through their engagement with others. As Arendt explains, “A state […] in 
which there is no communication between the citizens and where each man thinks only 
his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny.”311 Hence, rather than promising universal 
emancipation, Arendt argues that the notion of freedom that we have inherited from the 
liberal tradition has given rise to a society of powerless individuals, who, in being 
severed from the world, have lost the ability to recognize themselves and those around 
them in their humanity. This, in turn, has made modern individuals lonely. As we have 
seen, loneliness leaves human beings dominated by a sense of worldlessness and 
superfluity, willing to surrender their capacity for thought to the compulsory force of 
logic that drives totalitarianism. The susceptibility of modern individuals to totalitarian 
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domination can thus be attributed, at least in part, to the worldless notion of freedom that 
we have inherited from the liberal tradition and the forms of citizenship that accompany 
it.   
On the basis of her critique of the liberal notion of freedom, Arendt attempts to 
reverse the basic assumption of the modern political tradition, insisting that freedom is 
not a fixed property of the human being, but is instead an effect of the performing act.312 
By reestablishing the relationship between freedom and action, Arendt intends to show 
that freedom is not internal to the human being, but instead comes to appear in the space 
between men through an event of appropriation. In so doing, she insists that freedom is 
achieved not by retreating from the world, but instead by authentically embracing it. On 
her view, the freedom inherent in all action only comes to appear when human beings 
seize upon the opportunities given to them by the world. This, she thinks, is perhaps best 
illustrated by Machiavelli’s notion of virtù, or “the excellence with which man answers 
the opportunities the world opens up before him in the guise of fortuna.”313 Drawing on 
this notion of virtù, Arendt thus suggests that what it means to be free is to act, which 
consists in actualizing the possibilities that the world presents such that they become a 
part of the meaningful reality that constitutes the space between men.  
It is only through action that human freedom makes itself felt in world. Arendt 
argues that for the Greeks, action meant to set something in motion or begin something 
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anew.314 The notion of action in the Greek political tradition coincided with the idea of 
leading or ruling in political life. As she explains, “Beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the 
outstanding qualities of the free man, bears witness to an experience in which being free 
and the capacity to begin something anew coincided.”315 Having liberated themselves 
from the necessities of life, Arendt explains that those who entered into polis had freed 
themselves to engage in enterprises that were bigger than their own particular existence. 
Moreover, the Greeks understood that carrying an act through is only possible with the 
help of one’s equals. Hence, citizens of the Greek polis did not rule, but were “rulers 
among rulers, moving among their peers, whose help they enlisted as leaders in order to 
begin something new […] for only with the help of others could the […] ruler, beginner 
and leader, really act […], carry through whatever he had started to do.”316 On Arendt’s 
view, then, freedom, conceived in terms of action, consists in bringing something new 
into the world, which is only possible with and through others in the context of political 
life.  
As we have seen, however, this is only the first stage of action. Arendt turns to 
the Roman notion of freedom to show that action involves, in addition to bringing 
something new into the world, “The enduring and supporting continuation of past acts 
whose results are the res gestae, the deeds and events we call historical.”317 For the 
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Romans, action consisted not only in an event of initiation, but also in an event of 
appropriation, whereby the decedents of the forefathers of the Roman republic took 
responsibility for the legacy of their political community, “whose consequence they had 
to bear, and whose foundations they had to ‘augment.’”318 Roman freedom, then, 
consisted not just in an originary act, but also in the commemoration of its foundation, 
which enabled the legacy of freedom granted to the Roman people by the city’s founders 
to be guaranteed and carried forward from generation to generation.  
Drawing on these models of political life, Arendt thus argues that the human 
capacity for freedom that is inherent in all human activity comes to appear most fully in 
the public realm, where the affairs of human beings are not only fully illuminated, but 
can also be remembered through the concerted effort of citizens to preserve the values, 
institutions, and traditions that constitute the world they have inherited. With this, she 
insists that freedom is not a pre-political property of the human being that can be 
realized in the isolation of the private sphere, but instead comes to appear when citizens 
act by appropriating the legacy of the world they have inherited in order to endow it with 
new meaning. Understood as an event of appropriation, freedom is thus dependent upon 
remembrance, which enables individuals to manage and augment the traditions, values, 
and institutions that constitute the space between men for the sake of holding the world 
together. Our memory of the original spirit or motivating principle that forms the 
impetus for political action is thus crucial for freedom, providing an anchor in the world 
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that enables us to find new openings that can be seized upon in order to carry the world 
from the past into the future.  
By working in concert with others in the space of politics to endow the world 
with new meaning, Arendt argues that human beings can transcend their finitude and 
realize their freedom. Hence, in her divergence from the liberal tradition, Arendt insists 
that the human capacity for transcendence cannot be realized by denying the world; on 
the contrary, it involves coming to terms with the world by allowing its legacy to appear 
in the full illumination of the public realm. It is only by remaining open to the world in 
this way, she argues, that we can appropriate it and realize our capacity for freedom. For 
Arendt, then, citizenship involves having the courage to take shared responsibility for 
renewing the meaningfulness of the world in which we find ourselves. 319 Citizenship 
only promises freedom insofar as individuals who belong to a political community act or 
seize upon the opportunities presented to them by the world. Arendt thus conceives of 
citizenship as a necessary condition for freedom insofar as freedom is understood as an 
event of appropriation that is brought into appearance through political action in the 
public sphere. The possibility of such an event of appropriation, she argues, depends on 
remembrance in political life, which can be seen by turning to Arendt’s account of 
history. 
IV.2 Arendt on the Role of Remembrance in Political Life 
Arendt believes that history and remembrance, understood in terms of the 
preservation of the legacy of the world we have inherited, has a crucial role to play in 
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contravening the modern problem of loneliness, providing the mechanism by which 
political communities ensure that their world survives the emergence and eventual 
passing away of each new generation. Whereas history in the modern era has come to be 
understood in terms of process, or the progressive unfolding of mankind towards a fixed 
end, Arendt believes that history only has the ability to preserve a common world if it is 
understood as a story that glorifies the spontaneous and unpredictable events of human 
freedom. The purpose of history, Arendt argues, is to remind human beings of the world 
they have inherited. So long as we retain an authentic relation to the past, we are able to 
understand ourselves as belonging to a world that is bigger and more permanent than our 
particular finite existence. By taking responsibility for carrying this world from the past 
into the future, human beings are thus able to transcend their limited perspective and 
endow the world with meaning that can be shared in common. The possibility for such 
transcendence, however, depends on allowing the past to appear in the context of politics 
in such a way that it can be appropriated by the community as a whole and carried 
forward for future generations.  
In “The Concept of History,” Arendt argues that if we are to understand the 
political significance of remembrance, it is necessary to return to the concept of history 
that grows out of the Greek political tradition.320 For the Greeks, the purpose of history 
was to praise and assure the remembrance of the words and deeds of great men so that 
their accomplishments could continue to shine centuries after their own deaths.321 
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Words, deeds, and events owe their existence exclusively to human beings. In this, they 
are distinct from all other man-made objects, coming into the world not as a part of the 
cyclical processes of biological life, but rather as a spontaneous and unpredictable 
interruption of these processes. Yet, while words, deeds, and events owe their existence 
exclusively to the human being, born out of the distinctive human capacity to bring 
something new into the world, they are also the least permanent of all man-made objects. 
That is, Arendt explains, words, deeds, and events “can never outlast the moment of 
their realization, would never leave any trace without the help of remembrance.”322 The 
Greeks thus recognized in their concept of history that it is only through remembrance 
that human beings can preserve that which is most their own and achieve the kind of 
immortality that is otherwise reserved for the gods and nature. 
Such singular events and occurrences become history, Arendt explains, when 
they are drawn out of the actor by the historian or poet and transformed into an object for 
all to witness. According to Arendt, the earliest manifestation of this process by which 
the singular word and deed were transformed into history occurred when Ulysses first 
heard the story of his life. She says: 
History as a category of human existence is of course older than the written 
word, older than Herodotus, older even than Homer. Not historically, but 
poetically speaking its beginning lies rather in the moment when Ulysses, at the 
court of the king of the Phaeacians, listened to the story of his own deeds and 
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sufferings, to the story of his life, now a thing outside himself, an ‘object’ for all 
to see and to hear. What had been sheer occurrence now became ‘history.’323 
Through storytelling, then, the words and deeds of the actor acquire objectivity, coming 
to constitute an aspect of the reality of the common world that can outlast the finite 
existence of the actor.324 Such objectivity, however, cannot be achieved by the actor 
alone, but instead requires a storyteller who can externalize the actor’s words and deeds 
such that they can be seen and heard by the community as a whole. Arendt thus explains 
that Greek historiography relied on a distinctive notion of objectivity whereby the 
singular occurrence was confirmed in its reality insofar as it could be seen from a 
multitude of perspectives. She says: 
The Greeks discovered that the world we have in common is usually regarded 
from an infinite number of different standpoints to which correspond the most 
diverse points of view. […] The Greeks learned to understand—not to 
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understand one another as individual persons, but to look upon the same world 
from one another’s standpoint, to see the same in very different and frequently 
opposing aspects.325  
Greek historiography was based on the assumption that the objectivity of the common 
world comes into view not when its historical narrative is created in isolation from this 
diversity of perspectives, but instead when the story is told in such a way that its reality 
can be confirmed by them. In upholding human plurality, the Greeks thus believed that 
their stories could be shared by all and carried forward insofar as the objective reality of 
these stories was confirmed, rather than hindered by, the inevitable fact of human 
plurality.  
Though history played an important role in the preservation of the world as it 
comes to appear in the space of politics, Arendt explains that for the Greeks, history was 
not itself a form of political action, but rather only the “imitation of action” in the spoken 
or written word of the storyteller.326 By transforming the singular and unrepeatable event 
into a permanent feature of the common world, the historian could neither return to the 
original event, nor bring the author of the action back to life. Hence, in addition to 
glorifying the words and deeds of those who proved worthy of such praise, history, for 
the Greeks, served also to remind the community of the loss and suffering that is always 
bound up with our relation to the past and, with this, our responsibility to reconcile 
                                                
325 Ibid., 51.  
326 Ibid., 45. 
  167 
ourselves to the reality of human finitude through the unending task of remembrance. As 
Arendt explains: 
The scene where Ulysses listens to the story of his own life is paradigmatic for 
both history and poetry; the ‘reconciliation with reality,’ the catharsis, which, 
according to Aristotle, was the essence of tragedy, and, according to Hegel, was 
the ultimate purpose of history, came about through the tears of remembrance.327  
Because human beings are mortal, they are fundamentally unrepeatable, and, thus, 
Arendt explains, they will ultimately be forgotten and condemned to oblivion if their 
memory is not preserved by those who survive them. For this reason, she says, “History 
receives into remembrance those mortals who through deed and word have proved 
themselves worthy of nature, and their everlasting fame means that they, despite their 
mortality, may remain in the company of things that last forever.”328 The Greeks thus 
took history to promise immortality which, Arendt says, “is what the mortals must […] 
try to achieve if they want to live up to the world into which they are born, to live up to 
the things which surround them.”329 By giving permanence to the words and deeds of the 
past, history thus told the story of the unique and unrepeatable events of human freedom 
that came to appear in the world through political action so as to remind citizens of their 
responsibility for the world they had inherited.330   
                                                
327 Ibid., 45.  
328 Ibid., 48.  
329 Ibid., 48. 
330 Ibid., 65-6.  
  168 
Arendt maintains that in the modern era, by contrast, the concept of history has 
been transformed in accordance with a more general loss of trust in the reality of things 
as they appear. Arendt maintains that this transformation began with Christianity, when 
the immortality that had previously been associated with everlasting cyclical movements 
of nature was reversed, making human beings immortal and nature ephemeral. 
Christianity thus inaugurated a philosophical tradition that covered over the unrepeatable 
singularity of the human being. In denying the permanence of the world of appearances, 
it simultaneously laid the foundation for a metaphysics of suspicion that formed the 
ideological basis for the modern sciences.331 On Arendt’s view, the modern sciences 
deny altogether the inherent unpredictability of the human being, explaining away the 
spontaneity of the event by assigning it a place in the determinate pattern of the 
necessary processes that govern biological life.332 In much the same way, she argues, 
history in the modern era has come to be understood as a process or progressive 
development of humanity that will ultimately culminate in the realization of a 
determinate end. The intersection between the modern concept of history and nature, 
Arendt says, “Lies in the concept of process: both imply that we think and consider 
everything in terms of process and are not concerned with single entities or individual 
occurrences and their special separate causes.”333 Whereas the Greeks believed that the 
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lesson of each event was revealed in and through the event itself as it appeared in the 
world, modern individuals no longer trust the world of appearances. Hence, modern 
historiography tends to engulf the event in a process, deriving its significance not from 
its appearance, but rather from the end towards which the event is believed to be 
directed. She says: 
To our modern way of thinking nothing is meaningful in and by itself, not even 
history or nature taken each as a whole, and certainly not particular occurrences 
in the physical order or specific historical events. […] What the concept of 
process implies is that the concrete and the general, the single thing or event and 
the universal meaning, have parted company. The process, which alone makes 
meaningful whatever it happens to carry along has thus acquired a monopoly of 
universality and significance. Certainly nothing more sharply distinguishes the 
modern concept of history from that of antiquity.334 
That is, the modern concept of history, following the method of the modern sciences and 
coalescing in the development of modern technology, presupposes that nothing that 
comes to appear in the world is significant in itself, but only acquires significance 
insofar as it is thought to be a part of a larger, invisible process that lies behind the 
perceptible world.  
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 In order to understand the political significance of history for Arendt, it is 
necessary to consider the relationship between the notion of history and the concept of 
freedom in the modern era. The world, as Arendt conceives of it, only receives its 
objective reality through the concerted effort of a community to preserve in its collective 
memory the unique events of freedom that come to appear in it through political action. 
In seeking to overcome all unpredictability, this emphasis on the notion process in the 
modern era has effectively covered over human freedom. The effort to explain away the 
spontaneity of human action by carrying it into the realm of inexorable law has led to a 
denial of the human conditions of natality and plurality, or the spontaneity and diversity 
that forms the existential constitution of the human being. As such, the event of freedom 
that is born out of these conditions can never make its appearance in the world, as the 
event itself is always believed to be devoid of truth.335 This, Arendt argues, can be seen 
in the efforts of nineteenth century thinkers, especially Hegel and Marx, to develop a 
notion of freedom on the basis of the modern concern for process. By conceiving of 
history as the progressive unfolding of humanity toward the actualization freedom, both 
transform the freedom into a product of fabrication or labor. Arendt insists, however, 
that freedom only comes to appear in the world as an entirely unique and spontaneous 
event that can never be predicted or engineered. Moreover, the attempt to subsume 
freedom under a process of means-ends schematization degrades the inherent 
meaningfulness of the event as it comes to appear in the world. Therefore, this concept 
of history cannot tell the story of human freedom because the events no longer have any 
                                                
335 Ibid., 62.  
  171 
inherent meaning. Instead, history now serves to guide us towards a determinate end 
and, in so doing, “cancels out and makes unimportant whatever went before.”336  
In the ancient world, history was crucial for political life, not because it provided 
a map for achieving the end of freedom, but rather because it enabled human beings to 
preserve the meaning and significance of the common world. Arendt is clear that 
meaning only comes to appear in the world through political action, or those words and 
deeds that interrupt the necessary processes of nature. Yet, as she explains, “Human 
deeds, unless they are remembered, are the most futile and perishable things on earth.”337 
Therefore, Arendt argues that it is only by preserving these moments in history that a 
worldly space between men, or a meaningful reality that is shared in common by all, can 
be created and sustained. History, conceived as the story of human freedom, thus makes 
possible the continuity of the common world, allowing for the preservation of a space of 
appearance from generation to generation. Such a notion of history is missing from the 
modern world, which, on Arendt’s view, is why modern man suffers from world-
alienation.  
Arendt contends that the emphasis on instrumental reason in the modern era, or 
the belief that meaning can consistently be deduced, predicted, and explained has left no 
space for the spontaneity that is inherent in all human action to appear in the world. The 
effect of this has been two-fold. First, it has emptied out the inherent meaningfulness of 
human action, which comes to appear only insofar as it erupts on the scene, intervening 
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in unpredictable ways in necessary processes that govern ordinary life. Second, the 
suppression of the inherent spontaneity of human action has led to the destruction of the 
world, or the nexus of meaning that grants access to a single reality that can be shared in 
common by a plurality of human beings. As a result, Arendt says, “The modern age, 
with its growing world-alienation, has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, 
encounters only himself.”338 Having lost this shared nexus of meaning, Arendt argues 
that modern individuals have become alienated from themselves, the world, and others. 
Moreover, she explains that this loss of a world in the modern era “has left behind it a 
society of men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate 
them, either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass.”339 
As we have seen, this experience is dangerous as it produces a society of individuals 
who move among one another automatically and thoughtlessly, unable to recognize 
themselves or others as belonging to a common world. For Arendt, then, remembrance 
has an integral role to play in rebuilding the modern world. Renewing the 
meaningfulness of the world depends on holding open a space in which freedom can 
appear. As these events are, in their very unpredictability, the most perishable of all 
man-made things, the continuation of the world or the nexus of meaning that reminds us 
that we belong depends on preserving in our memory the history of these moments. 
 In failing to tell the story of human freedom, modern notions of history have had 
the paradoxical effect of producing a kind of amnesia among modern individuals who no 
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longer see themselves as belonging to a world for which they are responsible. Arendt 
thus insists that overcoming what she describes as “the predicament of meaningless” in 
the modern era and the experience of world-alienation that accompanies it depends on a 
new notion of history that intervenes in the tendency to engulf human freedom within 
the necessity of process.340 In light of this, she suggests that it is necessary to participate 
in the shared commemoration of those words and deeds that constitute the collective 
identity of a political community. 341 As Irene McMullin explains:  
Without such a shared history—and the normative stance embodied in the 
community’s decisions about what counts as memorable—the permanence of 
world necessary to shelter us from the elemental flux of nature is impossible. 
Exemplary acts serve to anchor a community around a vision of excellence; they 
provide a public model of what it means to be fully human. By choosing what 
words and deeds are worthy of remembrance, then, the community defines its 
identity.342 
In this, history, for Arendt, is crucial for political life, providing a means of reconciling 
ourselves to the past, so that we can anchor ourselves in the present for the sake of 
carrying the world we have in common into the future. Moreover, by bringing into 
presence the meaningfulness of the words and deeds of those who have come before, 
such a conception of history makes possible the sense that there exists a common world, 
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reminding us of its objective reality and the fact that we belong to it. Whereas Arendt 
describes the structure of modern totalitarian government as “organized loneliness,” she 
calls the structure of the Greek polis “organized remembrance,” conceiving of it as a 
space of collective memory that “assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and 
fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, 
and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men.”343   
On Arendt’s view, then, historical memory provides a means of returning 
individuals from the experience of loneliness and exile that has been set in motion by the 
emphasis in modern science, history, and technology on process. As such, the 
conception of citizenship that Arendt develops in order to contravene the loneliness of 
the modern age involves taking responsibility for the legacy of one’s political 
community by remembering the words and deeds of the actors of the past in the space of 
politics in order to ensure that the meaningfulness of the world and the shared reality 
between human beings remains in tact. Arendt thus believes that overcoming the forms 
of exclusion that have been produced in the modern age depends on renewing the role of 
remembrance in political life and the responsibility citizens have to care for the legacy of 
the world in which they find themselves.  
The concern for political belonging that Arendt first announces in her analysis of 
statelessness, and further develops in the context of her discussion of loneliness, thus 
brings into focus the vulnerability of our present political structures to totalitarianism. 
With this, her own conception of citizenship offers a novel alternative to liberal notions 
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of citizenship that perpetuate the forms of exclusion that have come to epitomize modern 
political life. Yet, despite the prescience of Arendt’s critical insights into the liberal 
tradition and the novel conception of political agency that she develops in light of it, 
there is an internal inconsistency in her own account of citizenship. My aim in what 
follows will be to bring this inconsistency into focus by considering a tension that arises 
in her discussion of historical memory and the role it plays in the event of appropriation 
that she associates with human freedom. 
IV.3. The Hiddenness of the Pariah Tradition  
As I have suggested, remembrance has deep political significance for Arendt, 
particularly with regard to her conception of citizenship and belonging. Yet, in 
emphasizing the importance of preserving the words and deeds of our ancestors, Arendt 
does not consider how we reconcile ourselves to those aspects of the past that may fail to 
come into appearance as part of the narrative of a political community, but that are 
nevertheless bound up with its legacy. In this section, I will argue that Arendt 
acknowledges in her account of the experience of pariah peoples over the last two 
centuries that a legacy of violence and exclusion is bound up with the modern political 
tradition. This history, she thinks, often remains concealed, incapable of being brought 
fully into presence in the space of politics. Arendt suggests, too, that in remaining 
covered over, this history of violence and exclusion has the potential to keep those who 
were once cast out from appearing fully in the modern political arena. Yet, she neither 
offers an account of why citizenship fails in the case of pariah peoples, nor does she 
provide a means for coming to terms with the hiddenness of these traditions in the space 
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of politics, presuming instead that their legacy simply fades away when citizenship is 
granted to those who were once cast out. On the basis of this, I wish to show that an 
internal inconsistency arises in Arendt’s notion of citizenship that keeps it from 
addressing the problem of loneliness that she diagnoses. As we have seen, Arendt 
believes that in order for individuals to participate fully in political life, the legacy of the 
world they have inherited must be able to appear in the context of politics so that it can 
be appropriated and carried forward into the future. Yet, the enfranchisement of those 
who were once cast out will always involve covering over those aspects of this legacy 
that are incompatible with the narrative of enlightened humanism and universal inclusion 
that forms the basis of the historical narratives of the modern political community. 
Hence, she leaves unresolved the question of how, in the modern era, we take shared 
responsibility in the public realm for the legacy of the modern political tradition if a part 
of this legacy always remains covered over. 
As I will argue in what follows, this inconsistency ultimately leads Arendt to 
develop a notion of citizenship that is too reductive, condemning us to repeat unendingly 
the immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed by the very implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship. While this history of violence and exclusion may escape our 
collective memory, I wish to show that it does not disappear when citizenship is granted; 
on the contrary, because it is bound up with legacy of the modern political tradition, it 
simply remains unappropriated, leaving its trace in the political traditions, institutions, 
and values that constitute the common world and repeating itself in the violence and 
exclusion that continues to be carried out against those who were once cast out. In this, 
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the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past is deeply relevant to the problem of 
exclusion today, having the potential to forestall the event of appropriation that Arendt 
identifies with human freedom. Hence, if, as Arendt suggests, citizenship in the strongest 
sense means participating in an event of appropriation, I wish to show in what follows 
that Arendtian citizenship alone is not enough to ensure that a common world comes into 
view. As such, it remains inadequate to the task of addressing the problem of loneliness 
and the forms of exclusion it perpetuates in the modern era.  
  In her 1944 essay, “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,” Arendt argues that 
even after emancipation, the Jewish people continued to be excluded from the life of 
nations, kept from achieving full recognition in the space of politics and enjoying 
political freedom.344 I will turn to this text to show that Arendt acknowledges the limits 
of Enlightenment citizenship for coming to terms with the history of violence and 
exclusion that keeps those who were once cast out from fully appearing in political life. I 
will then consider Arendt’s discussion in her 1970 essay, “Civil Disobedience,” to 
demonstrate that despite her praise of the American Constitution and the revolutionary 
tradition it attempts to preserve, she believes that the United States has been thrown into 
crisis by its failure to come to terms with the tacit exclusion of the black population from 
the original agreement that founded the American political community. By considering 
Arendt’s discussion of remembrance in light of these two texts, it is possible to 
complicate her account of the responsibility she believes citizens have to preserve in 
their memory the legacy of human freedom. On the one hand, Arendt insists that 
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remembrance is necessary for rebuilding the world and returning modern individuals 
from their loneliness to themselves and others. On the other hand, she provides no means 
for coming to terms with the history violence and exclusion that has been covered over 
in the construction of the modern historical narrative, emphasizing instead the 
responsibility citizens have to preserve the traditions, institutions, and values that 
constitute a political community.  
In the “Jew as Pariah” Arendt develops an account of the limited, ambiguous, 
and fleeting notion of freedom that the Jewish people in Europe have experienced since 
achieving emancipation at the end of the eighteenth century. In the wake of 
emancipation, she argues, the Jewish people in Europe became aware of the fact that 
they could never enter into the space of appearance as Jews, but would instead always 
face pressure to assimilate and, with it, the threat of alienating themselves from the 
Jewish community.345 For this reason, Arendt says, “The status of the Jews in Europe 
has been not only that of an oppressed people but also of what Max Weber has called a, 
‘pariah people.’”346 The concept of the “pariah” as a human type, she argues, is central 
for understanding political exclusion in the modern age. The pariah, she explains, is not 
merely impoverished, but also unwelcome, exiled within the community that is 
supposedly their own. With the rise of the European nation-state, the pariah tradition has 
become a central thread in the modern political tradition, which, in emphasizing the 
expansion of universal human rights, does little to guarantee the recognition of these 
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rights within particular political communities. Arendt thus explains that, “The concept of 
the pariah has become traditional, even though it be but tacit and latent, and its 
continuance automatic and unconscious.”347 She argues that while the figure of the 
pariah looms larger than ever in the thinking of assimilated Jews, it nevertheless remains 
hidden, having yet to come into full historical actuality as part of the narrative of the 
Jewish people in Europe.  
In order to explain the phenomenon of the pariah, Arendt turns to four Jewish 
figures, Heinrich Heine (1797-1856), Bernard Lazare (1865-1903), Charlie Chaplin 
(1889-1977), and Franz Kafka (1883-1924), whose works epitomize the pariah tradition 
and the various turns it takes over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In turning to each of these figures, Arendt attempts to shed light on those who 
have endeavored “to weave the strands of their Jewish genius into the general texture of 
the European life,” but whose memory has nevertheless been covered over in standard 
histories of the Jewish people.348 In offering this account of the pariah, however, she also 
shows that for pariah peoples, the kind of emancipation promised by the European 
Enlightenment is always out of reach, leading these figures to attempt to create an 
emancipation of their own on the basis of their pariah status.  
Heine, who she describes as the “lord of dreams” (Traumweltherrscher), 
attempts in his capacity as a poet to re-imagine his emancipation by “[standing] outside 
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the real word and attacking it from without.”349 Heine is distinctive insofar as he accepts 
his status as a pariah; rather than assimilating, he takes a stance of comic indifference 
towards European society for the sake of entertaining and delighting those who have 
been ostracized. In so doing, he seeks refuge in his exclusion, creating his own 
emancipation outside the common world in the realm of nature, where human beings are 
equal insofar as they are all subject to the same life processes regardless of their social 
standing. As Arendt explains:   
The bare fact that the sun shines on all alike affords [Heine] daily proof that all 
men are essentially equal. […] Confronted with the natural order of things, in 
which all is equally good, the fabricated order of society, with its manifold 
classes and ranks, must appear a comic, hopeless attempt of creation to throw 
down the gauntlet of its creator.350  
By seeking refuge in nature, Heine is able to disclose through his poetic imagination the 
absurdity of those in European society who take themselves to be superior to the Jews. 
He thus aligns himself with the pariah and upholds his political non-existence in order to 
protest against the prejudices of formal society. In so doing, Arendt argues, Heine is able 
to re-envision his emancipation from without, denying the reality of the social order by 
confronting it with a higher reality that has its basis in the experience of those who have 
been excluded. In other words, Arendt says, “[Heine] simply ignored the condition 
which had characterized emancipation everywhere in Europe—namely, that the Jew 
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might only become a man by ceasing to be a Jew.”351 Yet, despite achieving a genuine 
emancipation for himself, Arendt argues that Heine’s relation to the social order 
nevertheless appeared remote and unreal. Even if Heine was able to re-imagine his own 
emancipation from without, his approach did little to change the material conditions of 
the pariah who remains subject to the violence and exclusion that is carried out against 
those who fail to appear as human in the common world.  
Arendt thus contrasts Heine with Lazare, who embodies the figure of “the 
conscious Pariah,” taking an altogether different approach to the same experience of 
political exclusion in the modern era. Whereas Heine protests against this condition by 
adopting an attitude of superior indifference, refusing to believe in or engage the 
prejudices of European society, Lazare emphasizes the importance of the Jewish 
peoples’ awareness of their pariah status within European society and the responsibility 
they have to rebel consciously against the pressures of assimilation. Lazare, unlike 
Heine, thus attempts to bring the Jewish question openly into the arena of politics.352 
Unlike Heine, Lazare witnessed an increasing tendency on the part of the Jewish people 
to transform from pariahs into parvenus, or those, Arendt explains, who give into the 
pressures of assimilation, unconsciously abandoning all of their Jewish characteristics 
for the sake of rising in the socioeconomic ranks of European society. This, Lazare, 
thought, would ultimately lead to the destruction of the Jewish people rather than their 
emancipation. For this reason, he called on them to renounce the fantasy world of 
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Heine’s poetry and leave behind the comfort and protection of nature for the sake of 
entering into the space of appearance as representatives of the pariah. By refusing to take 
Heine’s stance of comic indifference, Lazare suggests that the Jewish people would not 
only be able to come to terms with the reality of the world in which they found 
themselves, but would also be able to take responsibility for changing it. Whereas Heine 
emphasizes the innocence of the pariah, Lazare argues that unless the Jewish people 
engage politically, they will be accomplices in their own exclusion. Yet, Arendt argues 
that Lazare’s efforts ultimately prove inadequate, demonstrating that “as soon as the 
pariah enters the arena of politics and translates his status into political terms, he 
becomes perforce a rebel.”353 As such, the “conscience pariah” can only ever appear as a 
“revolutionary in a society of others, but not in his own,” or as a Schnorrer or beggar, 
“[appraising] his poverty by the standards of those who have caused it” and demanding 
recognition from those against whom he should be fighting.354 Like Heine, then, 
Lazare’s approach proves inadequate for navigating the pressures of assimilation and the 
forgetfulness that accompanies the transformation of the pariah into parvenu.  
In contrast to both Heine and Lazare, Chaplin transforms the pariah into “the 
suspect,” portraying “the chronic plight of the little man who is incessantly harried and 
hectored by the guardians of law and order—the representatives of society.”355 Like 
Lazare, Chaplin attempts to bring the pariah into the space of appearance. Yet, rather 
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than pointing to the injustice of his situation, Chaplin tries to shed light on the 
triumphant possibilities that emerge for the outcast within society. Because Chaplin’s 
“little man” is always suspect, this portrayal of the pariah involves a tragic dimension, 
demonstrating that those standing at the margins of society will always be guilty even if 
they have committed no crime.356 Yet, Chaplin’s “little man” also embodies what Arendt 
describes as the “time-honored Jewish truth” that the sheer resolve and human ingenuity 
of a David can sometimes prevail over the brute animal strength of a Goliath.357  She 
says, “Because [the little man] is suspect, he is called upon to bear the brunt of much that 
he has not done. Yet at the same time, because he is beyond the pale, unhampered by the 
trammels of society, he is able to get away with a great deal.”358 Chaplin thus suggests, 
in contrast to Lazare, that arguing for right and wrong from the standpoint of pariah will 
lead nowhere. He thus re-invents the figure of the pariah as one who, even in his bare 
existence, has the ability to triumph periodically over the injustice of his situation. In 
this, Chaplin’s pariah is innocent like Heine’s, but the pariah’s divine indifference has 
been transformed into careworn insolence.359  
For a time, Arendt explains, this image had widespread appeal among the 
masses, enabling the pariah to appear in society as a member of the common world. She 
says, “Standing outside the pale, suspected by all the world, the pariah—as Chaplin 
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portrays him—could not fail to arouse the sympathy of the common people, who 
recognized in him the image of what society had done to them.”360 By the thirties, 
however, Arendt explains that Chaplin’s “suspect” lost its allure. As unemployment 
increased, the masses no longer found the poverty of the “little man” humorous, coming 
instead to admire the ideal character of Superman. “Today,” Arendt says, “it is not 
Chaplin, but Superman. When, in The Great Dictator, the comedian tried by the 
ingenious device of doubling his role, to point up the contrast between the ‘little man’ 
and the ‘big shot,’ and to show the almost brutal character of the Superman ideal, he was 
barely understood.”361 Chaplin’s pariah was thus able to appear in the world as human in 
a way that had not been possible for Heine or Lazare. Yet, the pariah’s appearance 
proved temporary and inadequate for guaranteeing a place in the world for the Jew.  
Whereas Heine, Lazare, and Chaplin are all concerned with whether or not the 
pariah is treated properly, Arendt argues that only Kafka captures the true question of the 
pariah today. This question, Arendt thinks, concerns whether those who live beyond the 
pale have any real existence at all.362 On Arendt’s view, Kafka recognized that the 
experience of being a pariah makes one doubt the reality and validity of one’s existence, 
which, she says is “the greatest injury society can inflict.”363 Kafka’s The Castle, she 
argues, captures this experience which, she believes is now well understood by the 
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modern assimilated Jew. K., she thinks embodies the modern image of the Jewish pariah 
who desires complete assimilation for the sake of being recognized as a rights bearing 
human being. Yet, neither the common people of the town nor its rulers are prepared to 
recognize him even after he has assimilated.364 As such, Arendt explains, K. became 
superfluous, continually charged with being ‘unwanted and in everyone’s way.’”365 As 
she explains, “In the eyes of the minor bureaucratic officials his very existence was due 
merely to a bureaucratic ‘error,’ while his status as citizen was a paper one, buried ‘in 
piles of documents forever rising and crashing’ around him.” 366 In his efforts to lay 
claim to his rights, K. thus finds himself ‘completely and desperately alone.’”367  For 
Kafka, then, loneliness characterizes the experience of the Jew who only wishes to be 
recognized as a human being.  That is, K.’s very attempt to assert his “basic human 
rights” does not lead him to become a unique member of a community, but rather 
perpetuates his superfluity, rendering him indistinguishable from the other villagers, 
while severing him from his relation to his pariah people. 
Arendt turns to Kafka to show that in the present age, the dilemma of the pariah 
no longer consists in asserting oneself as a Jew, but rather in asserting oneself as a 
human being.368 Consequently, Arendt argues, we learn from K. that it is no longer 
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possible for the Jew to retreat from the world as a pariah or to assimilate as parvenu, as 
both are now marked by the status of the outlaw. As she explains:  
Today the bottom has dropped out of the old ideology. The pariah Jew and the 
parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the same angry sea. […] 
Today the truth has come home: there is no protection in heaven or in earth 
against bare murder, and a man can be driven at any moment from the streets and 
broad places open to all. At long last, it has become clear that the ‘senseless 
freedom’ of the individual merely paves the way for the senseless suffering of his 
entire people.369  
Kafka’s portrayal of the pariah thus demonstrates that despite being emancipated, the 
Jew remains excluded, not because he is a Jew, but rather because he desires to be 
human in a world populated by individuals who have surrendered their humanity to the 
bureaucratic mechanisms of the modern world. Arendt thus explains that, for Kafka, 
“thinking is the new weapon—the only one with which the pariah is endowed at birth in 
his vital struggle against society.”370 On Arendt’s reading of Kafka, the pariah’s only 
recourse in the present age lies in his ability to think, exercising his inner freedom over 
and against the compulsory force of logic that drives mass society.  
Arendt’s account of the pariah tradition is significant for two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates that for Arendt, the figure of the pariah is integral for understanding the 
modern political tradition. The very structure of the European nation-state has left 
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certain individuals living beyond the pale of the law even if they have assimilated. Taken 
together with her critique of the nation-state in The Origins of Totalitarianism, she 
indicates this in her discussion of Kafka’s account of the way in which the bureaucratic 
political apparatuses of Europe have called into question the validity of the existence of 
both the pariah and the parvenu, neither of whom are protected any longer from bare 
murder.371 With this, she describes stateless people in this essay as “the living symbol of 
the pariah,” whose rightlessness she will ultimately attribute to the structure of nation-
state and the abstract, pre-political notion of human rights on which it is based.372 
Second, Arendt suggests that because the pariah has no way of fully appearing in the 
political arena, the pariah tradition has been covered over, unable to appear as a part of 
the history of the European political tradition. Yet, while Arendt gestures towards the 
implications of failing to remember the pariah tradition, she does not develop this in 
relation to her account of the responsibility citizens have to preserve the common 
heritage of their political communities. On the contrary, in her concluding remarks 
regarding Kafka, she argues that in order for the Jewish people to overcome their 
exclusion, they must assert themselves not as Jews but as human beings by exercising 
their inner capacity to think and distinguish themselves in their radical singularity in the 
presence of others. Given the radical way in which the humanity of the Jewish people 
was called into question by the unthinking totalitarian masses at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it is not surprising that Arendt comes to this conclusion. Even so, her 
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own concern for the political significance of remembrance suggests that such an 
approach would ultimately fail to ensure that the pariah people found a place in the 
world as the history on which their exclusion is based would ultimately remain 
unappropriated.  
Arendt makes a similar gesture in “Civil Disobedience,” a much later essay that 
concerns the American practice of civil disobedience and its importance for renewing 
the American revolutionary spirit without the undermining the stability of its political 
and juridical structures. She develops this essay in response to the student movements 
and Civil Rights protests of the 1960s and 1970s, which she argues had thrown the 
American republic into crisis. Drawing on the images of Thoreau and Socrates, Arendt 
distinguishes civil disobedience from revolution or rebellion, defining it as the decision 
to set aside one’s obligation as a citizen to obey the law in order to act in accordance 
with the individual demands of one’s conscience.373 This practice, Arendt argues, is 
distinctively American, and while acts of civil disobedience may not accord with the 
statutes of American law, they are nevertheless consistent with its spirit.  
She maintains in this essay that the obligation citizens have to obey the law is 
assumed to be the result of common consent on the part of its citizens to enter into a 
social contract. In its legal and historical manifestation, Arendt argues, the traditional 
concept of the social contract and the notion of consent that is imbedded within it may 
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easily be disavowed as a fiction.374  Yet, the importance of the consent of citizens to be 
members of a community has existential and theoretical importance that Arendt believes 
has been overlooked. She says:  
Every man is born a member of a particular community and can survive only if 
he is welcomed and made at home within it. A kind of consent is implied in 
every newborn’s factual situation; namely, a kind of conformity to the rules 
under which the great game of the world is played in the particular group to 
which he belongs by birth. We all live and survive by a kind of tacit consent.375  
In the American context, however, this tacit consent contains within it the de-facto right 
to dissent which confirms and renews the revolutionary spirit that forms the foundation 
of the American political tradition. Arendt thus says: 
Consent as it is implied in the right to dissent—the spirit of American law and 
the quintessence of American government—spells out and articulates the tacit 
consent given in exchange for the community’s tacit welcome of new arrivals, of 
the inner migration through which it constantly renews itself. […] Seen from this 
perspective, tacit consent is not a fiction: it is inherent in the human condition.376   
While this notion of consent, she explains, is bound up with the foundation of the 
American revolutionary tradition, the turn in American politics towards representative 
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government has led the American people to forget this about themselves.377 In having 
lost all institutions that once allowed the actual participation of citizens in political life, 
consent has instead come to be understood as consensus universalis, whereby one’s 
citizenship is thought to imply consent not only to the Constitution, but to statutory laws 
as well.378  
Such a conception of consent, Arendt argues, is unsustainable given the history 
of the United States. On her view, both the student movements and the Civil Rights 
Movement had created a constitutional crisis, not because those who participated in them 
challenged particular laws and political establishments, but because they expressed a 
simultaneous intent to withdrawal consent by refusing to recognize the consensus 
universalis. The difficulty involved in conceiving of consent this way, Arendt argues, 
can be seen by returning to the original agreement on which American political 
membership is based. This agreement, she argues, included the tacit consent by those 
who entered into it to tacitly exclude African descended people from the American 
political community:  
Tocqueville predicted almost a hundred and fifty years ago that ‘the most 
formidable of all the ills that threaten the future of the Union arises,’ not from 
slavery whose abolition he foresaw, but ‘from the presence of a black population 
of its territory.’ And the reason he could predict the future of Negroes and 
Indians for more than a century ahead lies in the simple and frightening fact that 
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these people have never been included in the original consensus universalis of 
the American republic.379  
Arendt explains that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which were adopted 
immediately after slavery was abolished, attempted to remedy this original crime by 
extending the rights of citizenship to all those in the United States and the right to vote to 
all male citizens. She argues, however, that these amendments ultimately failed to 
overcome the tacit exclusion of the black population from the original consensus 
universalis of the American republic. Indeed, Arendt explains that after these 
amendments were adopted, “this tacit exclusion from the tacit consensus” only becomes 
more pronounced with the repeated failures of the federal government to enforce its own 
laws.380 She says:  
As time went by, and wave after wave of immigrants came to the country, it was 
even more obvious that blacks, now free, and born and bred in the country, were 
the only ones for whom it was not true that, in Bancroft’s words, ‘The welcome 
of the Common Wealth was as wide as sorrow.’ We know the result, and we 
need not be surprised that the present belated attempts to welcome the Negro 
population explicitly into the otherwise tacit consensus universalis of the nation 
are not trusted.381   
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Important for our purposes is a parenthetical remark Arendt makes in light of this. It is 
striking, she thinks, that Congress failed to use any language in these amendments that 
acknowledged the former slaves, who only five years earlier, had been counted by the 
Constitution as three-fifths of a person. As this original exclusion is written into the 
legacy of the foundation of the United States, Arendt says, “An explicit constitutional 
amendment, addressed specifically to the Negro people of America, might have 
underlined the great change more dramatically for these people who had never been 
welcome, assuring them of its finality.”382 Because no such amendment was ever 
adopted, however, she argues that we should not be surprised that the black community 
continues to find that they are unwelcome in the political community that is supposed to 
be their own.   
 Arendt does not develop this parenthetical remark any further. Rather than 
tarrying on the decision of Congress not to address the black population explicitly in the 
reconstruction amendments, Arendt goes on to criticize black organizations whose 
leaders rebuff attempts at integration because, she says, they “care little about the rules 
of non-violence for civil disobedience and, often, just as little about the issues at stake 
[…] because they are in open rebellion against them all.”383 She then insists that this 
tendency towards rebellion reveals that we no longer appreciate the nature of the right to 
dissent implicit in the original contract that forms the basis for American citizenship. 
Arendt maintains that those protesting against injustices in American society must do so 
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not by means of rebellion, but instead through acts of civil disobedience. While one’s 
right to disobedience is not explicitly written into the Constitution, she argues that such 
acts nevertheless renew the spirit of the American laws and, in this, reaffirm one’s 
membership within the American political community. For Arendt, one’s ability to 
appear in the fullness of one’s humanity depends on being a citizen of some political 
community. Hence, she argues that the appearance of those who were once excluded 
depends not on withdrawing consent from the American consensus universalis and 
denying their membership within community, but instead on affirming it positively 
through acts of dissent. Such acts, she thinks, must be non-violent, as violence, by its 
very nature, is coercive and antithetical to freedom. Moreover, she believes that such 
acts must be oriented by goals that are directed towards preserving the common world or 
a space of appearance, rather than the interests of particular groups or individuals, which 
are governed by necessity and most appropriate to the private and social realms. By 
engaging in civil disobedience, Arendt thus believes that the formerly excluded can 
bring themselves into appearance fully as citizens, participating in the kind of 
appropriative event that is definitive of human freedom and able to contravene the forms 
of exclusion and world-alienation that are definitive of modern political life.   
Arendt’s emphasis on reaffirming one’s citizenship within one’s political 
community, rather than withdrawing membership from it, is no doubt compelling given 
her own analysis of the problem of statelessness and the space of rightlessness to which 
those who lack citizenship are exposed. Yet, Arendt’s parenthetical remarks concerning 
the failure of Congress to confront the black population in the reconstruction 
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amendments warrant greater attention. Whereas Arendt treats this omission as a 
surprising oversight on the part of Congress, it seems to represent a far more significant 
moment of repression in the collective memory of the United States. Conceived as a 
moment of repression, rather than a mere oversight, the language of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments indicates that this history of violence and exclusion is unable to 
be held together with the historical narrative of the American political community; as 
such, it remains concealed, unable to come into presence in such a way that it can be 
appropriated and carried forward in the space of politics. Though Arendt draws her 
account of the figure of the pariah from the experiences of the Jewish people in Europe, 
the concept is broadly applicable to those who have been granted the rights of 
citizenship in the modern era, but who nevertheless find themselves subject to the forms 
of violence and exclusion that their enfranchisement promised to overcome. In the 
context of her discussion of the United States, then, the African descended population 
may be considered America’s pariah people, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, a further covering over of the pariah tradition that is bound up with the 
American legacy of foundation.   
As we have seen, Arendt believes that remembrance plays a crucial role in 
political life, enabling us to reconcile ourselves to the past so that we can carry the world 
we have in common into the future. Yet, she neglects the role that the immemorial past, 
or the history of violence and exclusion that fails to come into appearance as part of the 
historical narrative of the modern political community, plays in perpetuating the 
exclusion of pariah peoples. Arendt’s own insistence on the importance of remembrance 
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for rebuilding a common world thus comes into conflict with her account of the pariah 
tradition in the modern era. This tradition is, by its very nature, “hidden,” incompatible 
with the legacy of freedom that Arendt believes we must preserve in our collective 
memory if we are to ensure the continuation of the common world from generation to 
generation. As such, becoming a citizen, for Arendt, seems to demand of those who were 
once cast out that they leave behind the history of violence and exclusion that is bound 
up with the modern political tradition. Without reconciling ourselves to this history, 
however, it is not clear how citizens of modern political communities come to terms with 
the reality of the world in which they find themselves so as to move forward in light of 
it. Therefore, despite Arendt’s own concern for the pariah tradition and the role of 
remembrance in political life, she does not do enough to develop a method for coming to 
terms with the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past. Without developing a 
method for coming to terms in the space of politics with this immemorial past, it is 
unclear how those who were once excluded can find a home in their political 
communities and see themselves as part of a common world that is bound together by a 
shared legacy. 
IV.4. An Internal Inconsistency in Arendt’s Notion of Citizenship 
As I have tried to show, Arendt offers a powerful account of the way in which 
the forms of citizenship that we have inherited from the liberal tradition perpetuate the 
loneliness and world-alienation that make modern individuals susceptible to totalitarian 
domination. Yet, I have also argued that her own account of citizenship is inadequate for 
overcoming the forms of exclusion that have become pervasive in the modern world. 
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Arendt recognizes that a legacy of violence and exclusion is entailed by the 
implementation of Enlightenment citizenship, keeping those who were once excluded 
from fully appearing in the space of politics. Yet, she fails to provide a means of coming 
to terms with this history of violence and exclusion in the context of politics. As such, 
her notion of citizenship does not go far enough, condemning us to a melancholic 
relation to the past that keeps those who were once cast out from appearing and 
participating in the event of appropriation that she associates with human freedom.  
In the following chapter, I will suggest that the implications of this inconsistency 
in Arendt’s notion of citizenship can be developed by considering her political 
framework within a broader set of political concerns raised in colonial and post-colonial 
theory regarding the memory of slavery and colonization in the African Diaspora. By 
considering both the scope and limits of Arendt’s thought within this context, it is 
possible to give further contour to the critical insights she offers into the limits of 
Enlightenment citizenship and liberal inclusion. Moreover, by expanding Arendt this 
way, we find that there remains a pressing need in contemporary political life to make 
visible those legacies of violence and exclusion that continue to prohibit the complete 
enfranchisement of those who were once cast out.  
Hence, my aim in what follows will be to expand the horizon of our concerns to 
this global context in order to challenge and deepen Arendt’s political categories in light 
of it. To this end, I will consider Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution, 
which began in 1791 on the heels of the French Revolution. During this revolution, half 
a million enslaved Africans in the French colony of Saint-Domingue rose up in order to 
  197 
realize the promise of universal freedom set forth by the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen. As I will suggest, the Haitian Revolution has an integral role to play in 
understanding what Arendt describes as the revolutionary tradition of the of the modern 
age, putting into relief the limits of Enlightenment citizenship for achieving its promised 
end of universal emancipation. Beyond this, it is a forgotten revolution, one that is 
decidedly important, but that has nevertheless been left out of the historical narrative, not 
only by Arendt, but by many European thinkers who take this era to be significant for 
understanding political life today. As such, it provides a unique point of departure for 
challenging and deepening Arendt’s notion citizenship, and particularly the 
responsibility she believes citizens have to remember and appropriate the history of their 
political communities for the sake of preserving a common world. My aim in turning to 
this revolution will be to bring into focus the paradox of remembrance that I will suggest 
is internal to the legacy of the modern political tradition. In so doing, I will argue that the 
inconsistency that arises in Arendt’s notion of citizenship points to a broader 
contradiction in the notion of modern citizenship. This contradiction indicates, in turn, 
that addressing political exclusion and the problem of loneliness in modern political life 
will depend on developing concepts that exceed citizenship in order to make room in the 
space of politics for the immemorial violence and exclusion that has been covered over, 
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CHAPTER V 
SPECTERS OF EXCLUSION: THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION AND THE 
PARADOX OF REMEMBRANCE IN MODERN POLITICS 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that while Arendt’s analysis of citizenship forms 
the basis for a novel critique of the liberal tradition, an inconsistency arises in her notion 
of citizenship that centers on her account of historical memory. On the one hand, Arendt 
insists that remembrance in political life is necessary for rebuilding the modern world 
and returning individuals from their loneliness to themselves and others. On the other 
hand, she provides no means for coming to terms with the history of violence and 
exclusion that gets covered over in the construction of the modern historical narrative, 
emphasizing instead the importance of preserving the traditions, institutions, and values 
of one’s political community. With this, Arendt’s concern for the responsibility citizens 
have to reconcile themselves to the past comes into conflict with her discussion of the 
hidden tradition of the pariah in the modern age. On Arendt’s view, citizens can only 
participate fully in the event of appropriation that she associates with human freedom if 
the past is be able to appear in the context of politics as a part of the shared reality 
between men. Yet, she does not develop a method for coming to terms with the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that is entailed by the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship, presuming instead that its legacy simply fades away when 
citizenship is granted to those who were once cast out. Hence, in emphasizing the 
memorial past alone, Arendt leaves unanswered the question of how citizens in the 
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modern era take responsibility for the world they have inherited, given that the legacy of 
this world is bound up with a history of violence and exclusion that remains covered 
over, failing, in turn, to come into presence in the space of politics such that it can be 
appropriated anew. 
As I have suggested, this inconsistency in Arendt’s thought leads her to develop 
a conception of citizenship that is too reductive. If citizenship in the strongest sense 
means participating in an event of appropriation, and if such an event is possible only 
insofar as the legacy of the world one has inherited is able to come into view in the space 
of politics, then it is not clear how, on Arendt’s account, citizens in the modern era 
participate in such an event if a part of the legacy of the modern political tradition 
remains concealed. As such, it is not clear how her account of citizenship accomplishes 
the end of bringing a common world into view, as it fails to provide a means of 
achieving an appropriative relation in the space of politics to those histories of violence 
and exclusion that have been covered over but that are nevertheless bound up with the 
legacy of the world we have inherited.  
In this chapter, I will develop the broader significance of this inconsistency in 
Arendt’s notion of citizenship for understanding the problem of exclusion today. Rather 
than dismissing Arendt on the basis of this inconsistency, I will suggest that her insights 
into the political significance of remembrance reveal a deeper problem regarding 
historical memory that is specific to the modern political tradition. This problem, which I 
will call the paradox of remembrance, turns on the tension between our need to preserve 
in our memory the legacy of the modern political tradition and the fact that this legacy 
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will always contain within it a history of violence and exclusion that is unable to be 
recalled in its entirety because it is incompatible with the Enlightenment narrative of 
universal inclusion that forms the basis of the modern political community. As I will 
demonstrate, this paradox of remembrance is crucial for understanding the character of 
exclusion today, clarifying the significance of the immemorial past for contemporary 
political practice and the role it can play in perpetuating the experience of loneliness and 
world-alienation in modern life.  
In order to demonstrate this, however, I maintain that it is necessary to expand 
the horizon of our concerns beyond the European nation-state to a more global set of 
political issues raised in colonial and post-colonial theory regarding the memory of 
slavery and colonization in the African Diaspora. To this end, I will consider Arendt in 
light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), which provides a unique 
point of departure for challenging and deepening her notion citizenship and, especially, 
the responsibility she believes citizens have to remember and appropriate the history of 
their political communities. By developing Arendt’s thought this way, we find that while 
the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past may fail to come into appearance as a 
part of our collective memory, it does not disappear when citizenship is granted, but 
instead repeats itself in the violence and exclusion that continues to be carried out 
against those who become enfranchised after having been cast out. While there may be 
many ways to expand Arendt’s thought within this global context, I turn to the Haitian 
Revolution for three reasons.  
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First, given Arendt’s interest in the French and American Revolutions, the 
Haitian Revolution is deeply relevant to her own concerns regarding the revolutionary 
spirit of the modern age. The Haitian Revolution began in 1791 on the heels of the 
French revolution when half a million enslaved Africans in the French colony of Saint-
Domingue rose up in response to the promise of universal freedom set forth by the 1789 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. This decisive event in the colonial 
world gave birth in 1794 to the first instance of emancipation in the western hemisphere 
and set the stage for a series of colonial revolutions that would take place throughout the 
Caribbean and Latin American over the course of the nineteenth century. It thus 
constitutes a centerpiece of the revolutionary heritage with which Arendt is concerned. 
Beyond this, however, it is also a forgotten revolution, one that is decidedly important, 
but that has nevertheless been left out of the historical narrative of the revolutionary 
period, by many European thinkers, including Arendt, who take this era to be significant 
for understanding political life today. As such, it may be understood as offering an early 
and distinctive example of the hidden tradition of the pariah that Arendt believes is 
bound up with the legacy of the modern era. 
Second, the action taken by the Haitian revolutionaries exemplifies in several 
important respects the lived and embodied activity that Arendt associates with 
citizenship. Significantly, the enslaved in Saint-Domingue achieved their emancipation 
not through a call for independence from France, but rather through an explicit 
affirmation of the spirit of the French revolutionary legacy, declaring their intent to 
become French citizens in accordance with the Declaration of the Rights of Man. As 
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such, the efforts of the Haitian revolutionaries offer an important illustration of the 
collective action that Arendt believes is necessary in order to renew the traditions, 
institutions, and values of one’s political community for the sake of carrying a common 
world into the future. Moreover, it offers an important example of what it means for 
those who were once cast out to assert themselves as citizens in order to appear in the 
space of politics and participate in an event of appropriation.   
Yet, despite achieving the rights of French citizenship, the formerly enslaved 
ultimately remained subject to the violence and exclusion that their enfranchisement 
promised to overcome. In the wake of the betrayal of the revolutionary leader Toussaint 
L’Ouverture in 1801 and Napoleon Bonaparte’s attempt to reinstate slavery throughout 
the French Antilles in 1802, the leaders of the revolution were ultimately led to call for 
independence from France and establish the new nation of Haiti in 1804. In light of this, 
my third aim in turning to the Haitian Revolution is to suggest that even after citizenship 
is granted, a specter of the threat of a return to the violence and exclusion of the past still 
remains present that has the potential to forestall the event of appropriation that Arendt 
associates with human freedom. I thus turn to this revolution because it constitutes an 
original failure of Enlightenment citizenship to overcome the history of violence and 
exclusion that preceded its implementation.  
The echo of this original failure of Enlightenment citizenship can still be heard in 
the racialized violence and exclusion that continues to haunt diasporic peoples decades 
and centuries after becoming enfranchised. Hence, rather than falling into oblivion, as 
Arendt suggests, I turn to this event to suggest that the immemorial past leaves its trace 
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in the traditions, values, and institutions that hold modern political communities 
together, keeping those who were once cast out from appearing and participating in the 
event of appropriation that she believes is necessary for human freedom. This repetition, 
I maintain, can be explained in terms of the nature of the legacy of the political tradition 
that we are tasked with preserving and the immemorial violence and exclusion that is 
necessitated by very implementation of Enlightenment citizenship.   
This chapter will take shape in three parts. I will begin by considering the ways 
in which Arendt’s approach to the question of race and racism in the African Diaspora 
has been critically received in recent scholarship. Many have been inclined to dismiss 
the importance of Arendt’s thought for addressing these issues because of her lack of 
sensitivity to the particular experience of exclusion in the African Diaspora. My aim, by 
contrast, is to rehabilitate her political categories within this context and, in so doing, 
open new paths to resolving the inconsistency that arises in her notion of citizenship. 
Moreover, I will argue that by expanding Arendt’s theoretical framework this way, we 
find that she has a novel contribution to make to the discourse concerning the legacy of 
European slavery and colonization through her analysis of remembrance that has yet to 
be fully appreciated. 
I will then develop Arendt’s notion of citizenship in light of an analysis of the 
Haitian Revolution, focusing in particular on the relationship between the French and 
Haitian Revolutions, the abolition of slavery in 1794, and the Leclerc Expedition (1801-
1803), which set the stage for Haitian independence in 1804. There are, to be sure, a 
diversity of historical interpretations of the Haitian Revolution that have been offered 
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that help to situate this event within the broader landscape of the revolutionary period. 
While my reading of the Haitian Revolution will be guided by the historical literature, 
my aim is not to further this discourse, but rather to consider the philosophical stakes of 
the Haitian Revolution for understanding the implications of the immemorial past on 
political practice today. 
My aim in the final section of the chapter will be to offer an interpretation of this 
event in light of Arendt’s political categories. While Arendt does not recognize the 
political significance of the immemorial past, I will argue in this section that her own 
analysis demands greater consideration of it. By expanding Arendt within this context, 
we find that her analysis clarifies the need in modern political life to pay tribute to the 
hiddenness of the pariah tradition, which, despite being covered over, forms a central 
thread of the legacy of the modern era. Without developing a means of coming to terms 
with the hiddenness of this tradition, it is not clear how individuals in the modern world 
can come to see themselves as belonging to a common world held together by a shared 
legacy. On the basis of my analysis of Arendt and the Haitian Revolution, I therefore 
wish to show that the paradox of remembrance internal to the legacy of the modern 
political tradition makes it the case that citizenship, even as Arendt conceives of it, is 
inadequate to the task of overcoming exclusion and contravening the problem of 
loneliness in modern political life. With this, I will argue in Chapter Five that taking 
responsibility for the legacy of the modern political tradition depends on developing a 
new frame for the concept of belonging in political ontology that goes beyond 
citizenship in order to make room in the space of politics for the specters of the 
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immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that are necessitated by its 
implementation. 
V.1. The Boomerang Thesis and the African in Arendt’s Political Philosophy 
Arendt’s relation to questions concerning the history of European slavery, 
colonization, imperialism, and the experience of exclusion in the African Diaspora is 
complex. On the one hand, Arendt was among the first of her generation in Europe to 
suggest that the European imperial experience, and the racist, proto-genocidal political 
strategies that drove it, played a decisive role in producing the political culture that 
created the conditions for the rise of totalitarianism after World War I.384 In her efforts to 
expose this relation, particularly in The Origins of Totalitarianism, her political project 
bears greater resemblance to the work of black intellectuals such as W.E.B. Dubois, 
Aimé Césaire, and Frantz Fanon than it does to many of her European contemporaries. 
For this reason, several scholars, including Christopher Lee and Richard King, have 
suggested that her work makes important contributions to post-colonial and African 
studies that have yet to be fully appreciated within these fields.  
On the other hand, Arendt demonstrates throughout much of her work a 
remarkable insensitivity to the particular experience of exclusion in the African 
Diaspora, at times employing a rhetoric in her characterization of Africans and African 
descended people that appears to reaffirm the very racism that she attempts to challenge 
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  206 
in her discussion of imperialism and totalitarianism.385 On the basis of this, scholars 
including Shiraz Dossa, Kathyrn Gines, and Robert Bernasconi have raised the question 
of whether racist assumptions are at work in Arendt’s thought that undermine the 
emphasis she places in her political discourse on the human condition of plurality and 
the importance of political belonging. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
examine the entire range of concerns her work has raised in regard to these questions, 
my aim in what follows will be to consider several dimensions of her thought that have 
been of particular interest to scholars for examining the merits and limitations of her 
theoretical framework for addressing questions of exclusion in the context of the 
European legacy of slavery and colonization. This, in turn, will give orientation to the 
approach I plan to take to the Haitian Revolution in order to expand the implications of 
Arendt’s notion of citizenship within this context.   
Arendt only directly addresses the experience of exclusion in the African 
Diaspora a handful of times over the course of her career. Yet, themes that remain 
central to her work, such as her concern for capturing the precise character of the kind of 
racism that became pervasive throughout Europe in the early twentieth century, as well 
as her account of the phenomenon of stateless people, has deep resonances with 
questions that arise in colonial, anti-colonial, and post-colonial thought concerning the 
experience of exclusion among diasporic peoples. Moreover, when Arendt does address 
these questions directly, her approach has often proven to be highly controversial, 
                                                
385 Kathryn T. Gines, “Race Thinking and Racism in Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
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prompting much criticism regarding the adequacy of her theoretical framework for 
addressing questions of exclusion in this context. Those aspects of her work that have 
received the most attention in this regard include her analysis of imperialism in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, her discussion of school integration in the United States in 
her 1959 essay, “Reflections on Little Rock,” and her critique of the student movements 
in her 1970 essay, “On Violence.” While scholars have challenged Arendt’s work in 
these texts from a variety of angles, the nature of their criticisms typically fall into one of 
two categories.  
The first type of criticism concerns the viability of Arendt’s “boomerang thesis,” 
which she introduces in The Origins of Totalitarianism to describe the dynamic link she 
suggests exists between the European imperial experience in Africa and Asia between 
1870 and 1914 and the rise of totalitarianism on the continent after World War I.386 On 
Arendt’s view, it was through Europe’s imperial endeavors in Asia and Africa that “the 
race principle” became a fully functioning mechanism for transforming “stranger and 
alien others” into superfluous, nonhuman entities for the sake of justifying their 
domination, exploitation, and extermination.387 Such justification depended on the 
development of a structure of government that could reinforce and reproduce this 
superfluity. Hence, Arendt suggests that imperialism in African and Asia led to the 
discovery of bureaucratic government. Taken together, Arendt says, “Race […] was an 
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escape into an irresponsibility where nothing human could any longer exist, and 
bureaucracy was the result of a responsibility that no man can bear for his fellow man 
and no people for another people.”388 On the basis of this, Arendt argues that colonialism 
and imperialism in the late nineteenth centuries, particularly in the context of Africa, had 
real and immediate “boomerang effects” on the behaviors of European peoples.389 She 
explains:  
The full impact of the African experience was first realized by leaders of the mob 
like Carl Peters, who decided that they too had to belong to a master race. 
African colonial possessions became the most fertile soil for the flowering of 
what later was to become the Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes 
how peoples could be converted into races and how, simply by taking the 
initiative in the process, one might push one’s own people into the position of the 
master race.390  
Arendt thus makes the provocative suggestion in The Origin of Totalitarianism that 
Europe’s imperial and colonial practices abroad played a crucial role in setting the stage 
for the rise of totalitarianism in Europe.391 While such a connection had already been 
established by a myriad of non-European thinkers, Arendt was among the first in Europe 
                                                
388 Ibid., 207.  
389 Ibid., 206.  
390 Ibid.  
391 King, “Introduction,” 3.  
  209 
to establish this link, doing so through her novel insight into the relationship between the 
racism and bureaucracy that was established during the era of European imperial rule.392  
 Despite the novelty of Arendt’s boomerang thesis, many have suggested that the 
link she attempts to establish between European imperial practices in the colonies and 
the rise of totalitarianism on the continent lacks explanatory power. Margaret Canovan 
set the trajectory for this line of criticism in her 1974 work, The Political Thought of 
Hannah Arendt. Here, Canovan argues that while Arendt offers some of her most 
brilliant insights in this part of The Origins of Totalitarianism, she only succeeds in 
establishing a “quasi-link” between imperial ideologies such as pan-Germanism and 
pan-Slavism and the rise of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.393 
While this link is clearer in the case of Germany, Canovan argues that even here, the 
boomerang thesis is neither obvious nor necessary to explain the rise totalitarianism.394 
Canovan argues, too, that if the racism and bureaucracy of imperialism had such a 
devastating effect on the political and cultural practices of Europe, it is not clear why 
former imperial powers such as Britain and France were able to sustain their democratic 
institutions and political cultures during and after the age of imperialism.395  
L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan have criticized Arendt on similar grounds, calling 
into question the adequacy of Arendt’s historical analysis in her discussion of European 
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imperialism, particularly as it unfolds in her discussion of Germany. In The Rulers of 
German Africa, 1884-1914, they argue that the German colonial experience abroad was 
too short lived to have a significant impact on the political or intellectual climate of 
Germany. On their view, it was World War I that gave rise to totalitarianism, not 
colonialism, and while Germany’s involvement in the scramble for Africa might have 
played some role in the formation of the totalitarian ideologies of Nazi Germany, the 
leaders of National Socialism had little interest in overseas colonialism.396  More 
recently, Seyla Benhabib and others have reiterated Canovan’s claim that Arendt fails to 
provide adequate support for her boomerang thesis and the implications she suggests it 
has for democratic liberalism.397 Like Canovan, Benhabib calls into question Arendt’s 
view that imperial racism and bureaucracy had a destructive impact on the political and 
cultural values of Europe, suggesting that Arendt’s discussion is based on hunches and 
intuitions, rather than sound historical evidence.398 Hence, while these scholars agree 
that Arendt’s boomerang thesis is intriguing, they nevertheless believe that Arendt stops 
short of transforming this insight into a theory that has explanatory power, failing in turn 
to demonstrate the ways in which European imperialism and colonialism corrupted the 
liberal democratic structures and cultural values of the west.399  
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A second line of criticism has arisen in Arendt studies that has shifted the focus 
of this debate from Arendt’s discussion of the impact of imperial politics on 
totalitarianism to her problematic characterization of indigenous populations, and, 
especially, of sub-Saharan Africans.400 Shiraz Dossa initiated this line of criticism in his 
1980 essay, “Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust.” Here, Dossa 
argues that Arendt employs a notion of the human being throughout her work that is 
ethnocentric, privileging the values and traditions of the European over and against the 
colonized other, and especially the sub-Sarharan African.401 Dossa explains that Arendt 
acknowledges throughout much of her work that since antiquity, the political practices of 
the west have been accompanied by genocidal massacre and the violent domination of 
foreign peoples.402 In spite of this, however, Arendt believes that the Holocaust, in 
particular, was a novel and unprecedented moment in the history of the west, revealing, 
for the first time, the way in which this violence can be thrown back on itself, resulting 
not only in mass murder, but also in an assault on the culture and civilization that gave 
birth to the idea of human freedom. It is in this that Dossa locates Arendt’s 
ethnocentrism. As Dossa suggests, Arendt believes that the rise of totalitarianism in the 
period between the world wars led to the discovery that “freedom can be used to 
eliminate its own conditions of existence: plurality and individuality. Totalitarianism is 
an exercise in the liquidation of freedom and restraint, and the arbitrary mastery of 
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men.”403 On Dossa’s view, Arendt’s assumption seems to be that those colonized others 
whose fate had been similar to the Jews in Nazi Germany, lacked the culture, history, 
and civilization that Arendt believes is expressly human. Hence, he suggests that for 
Arendt, similar events of extermination in the colonies did not reveal the same horrifying 
possibility of human freedom. This, Dossa thinks, comes out most clearly in Arendt’s 
characterization of the sub-Saharan African in The Origins of Totalitarianism. He says: 
Inability to master nature sufficiently, to fabricate an artifice beyond the one 
naturally given, to establish public bodies—that is the combined political human 
failure of the Africans. In broader and related terms the blacks testify, in Arendt's 
view, to a general lack of human culture and morality: people who had ‘escaped 
the reality of civilization.’ For Arendt, although their murder is clearly unjust it is 
somehow not immoral.404 
On the basis of this, Dossa argues that the European moral and cultural context in which 
Arendt was writing produced an ethnocentric strain in her thought that framed her claims 
regarding the uniqueness of the Holocaust. This ethnocentric strain, Dossa says, is 
explicit in Arendt’s characterization of sub-Saharan Africans in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism and implicit in her broader political philosophy.405 He argues that Arendt 
repeats this characterization of non-European peoples in subsequent works concerning 
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race and racism in the African Diaspora and thus calls for a further interrogation of 
Arendt’s racial attitudes and the role they play in her broader political assumptions.406  
 Recent scholars including Robert Bernasconi and Kathyrn Gines have given 
further contour to this criticism, drawing attention to Arendt’s blindness to non-
European peoples in The Origins of Totalitarianism, as well as in her later works, 
particularly those concerning the question of race and racism in the United States. In so 
doing, both have attempted to show that Arendt was led astray by her failure to engage 
non-European political discourses that have significant bearing on her own interests in 
the problem of statelessness and exclusion in contemporary political life. Because of 
this, they suggest that while Arendt may be a relatively enlightened European thinker 
who has important insights to offer into questions concerning contemporary political 
community, she nevertheless remains too deeply entrenched in the western tradition. 407 
This, in turn, they suggest, keeps her from addressing the forms of racial violence and 
exclusion that have their basis in the global legacy of European slavery and colonization.  
Bernasconi, for instance, argues that Arendt’s appeal to the distinction between 
the social and political realms in her analysis of the United States blinds her to the 
distinctive forms of exclusion that have been produced by anti-black racism in this 
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context.408 According to Bernasconi, this distinction grows out of Arendt’s analysis of 
the Greek division between the necessity of the private realm and the liberation from 
such necessity in the public realm. The birth of the social in the modern era clarifies that 
this distinction has collapsed, causing the necessities of life to bleed into the political and 
foreclose the possibility of the appearance of freedom. As Bernasconi explains, this 
distinction forms the basis for Arendt’s praise of the American Revolution in On 
Revolution, which she believes was guided, in contrast to the French Revolution, by 
political goals rather than social interests.409 Yet, on Bernasconi’s view, this account of 
American history is based on a myth. As he explains: 
[Arendt’s] subsequent claim in On Revolution that the United States of America 
had succeeded better than the European states at securing the political realm from 
the encroachment of the social, ignored the fact that this was accomplished by 
absolutizing certain racial divisions through the insistence on a system of 
classifications.410  
Bernasconi notes that Arendt acknowledges in On Revolution as well as in “Civil 
Disobedience,” that the American Republic was founded on the original crime of slavery 
and the tacit exclusion of African descended people from the Constitution. In spite of 
this, however, he argues that she nevertheless favors a mythical reading of the original 
spirit of the American Revolution in her criticism of the Civil Rights Movement in her 
                                                
408 Robert Bernasconi, “The Double Face of the Political and the Social: Hannah Arendt and 
America’s Racial Divisions, Research in Phenomenology, 26.1 (1996): 3–24, 4. 
  
409 Ibid., 11.  
410 Ibid., 22.  
  215 
1959 essay, “Reflections on Little Rock.” This essay, Bernasconi says, was guided by 
Arendt’s criticism of NAACP leaders for focusing on social issues concerning 
discrimination in employment, housing, and education, that aimed at securing the 
necessities of life, rather than political goals that sought to open a space of freedom.411 
According to Bernasconi, Arendt fails to appreciate in her criticism of school 
desegregation that a white racial hierarchy is bound up with the American political 
tradition, creating conditions in American social life that keep non-white people from 
appearing in the space of politics. He argues that Arendt’s insistence on preserving a 
strict division between the social and political serves the interests of the white population 
in the United States at the expense of the political goals of the black population.412 For 
this reason, Bernasconi says, “She has provided an account of political community that 
lacks the resources necessary to address the divisions sustained by racism.”413 Moreover, 
he suggests that her attachment to the western tradition keeps her from remaining 
attuned to the distinctive forms of exclusion that have been produced by the global 
impact of the legacy of slavery and colonization, especially in the United States, and, as 
a result, her political philosophy has the potential to perpetuate the racist assumptions 
that he believes are bound up with the western political tradition.414 
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  Similarly, Gines has argued in her recent work, Hannah Arendt and the Negro 
Question, that Arendt has a fundamentally flawed orientation to what Gines calls “the 
Negro question.” Specifically, Gines maintains that Arendt frames issues of slavery, 
colonialism, imperialism, and segregation in ways that neglect the role white institutions 
and political practices play in perpetuating anti-black racism, approaching these issues 
by presenting black individuals as the problem. Gines argues, too, that Arendt’s 
discourse on the Jewish question has direct bearing on the Negro question, but Arendt 
remains blind to these implications of her analysis. For instance, she argues that Arendt 
fails to connect her own childhood experience of anti-Semitism to the experience of anti-
black racism and the challenges it poses for black parents attempting to raise their 
children to be political agents in a world that refuses to allow them to appear. 415 
Moreover, Gines maintains that while Arendt advocates for the political importance of a 
Jewish army in the context of the Warsaw ghetto and is keenly aware of analogous forms 
of violent oppression that have been carried out against African descended people 
through the colonial system, she nevertheless arrives at the opposite conclusion in her 
analysis of the violence that figures like Sartre and Fanon call for in response to colonial 
oppression. With this, Gines suggests that while Arendt is able to see the Jewish 
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experience of exclusion as a political phenomenon, she is unable to do the same in the 
case of anti-black racism and the forms of exclusion it perpetuates. Following 
Bernasconi, Gines therefore argues that Arendt’s blindness to the Negro question raises 
serious doubts about the viability of her criteria for distinguishing between the private, 
social, and political spheres.416 Gines says:  
Her theoretical framework dividing up the political, the private, and the social 
guides her analysis of the Negro question in a way that undermines her judgment 
of it. Consequently, Arendt’s approach to the Negro question as a private or 
social issue prevents her from recognizing that anti-Black racism (like Jew 
hatred) is a political phenomenon.417 
On the basis of this, Gines concludes her discussion by suggesting that Arendt’s Kantian 
notion of judgment and representational thinking only allows her to see from the 
perspective of those who are able to appear in the space of politics. For this reason, she 
argues, Arendt is neither able to appreciate the experience of those who have been 
denied access to this space, nor critically engage the exclusionary practices that keep this 
space closed off to all but an elite few.418  
In relying on a conception of judgment that grows out of a Eurocentric heritage, 
Gines thus maintains that Arendt is led to represent African descended people in a 
severely distorted manner throughout her work. On her view, Arendt demonstrates this 
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not only in text such as “Reflections of Little Rock,” and “On Violence,” but also in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, where she recognizes the implications of European 
imperialism and colonialism on European culture but nevertheless takes the perspective 
of the European with great ease in her representation of Africans. Gines says, “To 
Arendt, it is was obvious that Africans lacked civilization, reason, culture, history, and 
political institutions.”419 Gines argues that Arendt correctly identifies racism as a tool 
used by Europeans to exploit and oppress non-Europeans; yet, in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, for instance, she focuses solely on the imperial period between 1870 
and 1914 in her boomerang thesis, refusing, in turn, to acknowledge the forms of 
institutionalized racism that arose as early as the seventeenth century in the context of 
slavery and colonization, especially in the Americas.420 In so doing, Gines argues, 
Arendt fails to see the broader impact of the European legacy of slavery and colonization 
on European political and intellectual culture, leading Arendt to overlook the racist 
assumptions that might have been at work in her own representation of African 
descended people. Turning in particular to Arendt’s reliance on Joseph Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness to characterize European encounters with Africans in her discussion of the 
Boers and the British in South Africa, Gines says: 
Heart of Darkness is a thoroughly racist text, even if it also functions to expose 
and possibly condemn imperialism. Conrad’s Heart of Darkness like Arendt’s 
Origins, (re)presents the ravaging effects of imperialism, yet without satisfactory 
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reprimand or reproach. The fact that Arendt accepts and embraces this racist 
image of Africa undermines her efforts to position herself against racism.421 
Gines thus argues that Arendt fails to liberate herself from her own idiosyncrasies in the 
way promised by her Kantian notion of judgment. On the basis of this, Gines suggests 
that Arendt’s blindness to her own Eurocentric assumptions ultimately undermines the 
political project she seeks to advance. As a result, Gines argues, Arendt is led to develop 
a conception of political life that sustains, rather than challenges, the racialized violence 
and exclusion that keeps African descended people from appearing in the space of 
politics.422 Hence, while Gines maintains that she is “not attempting to dismiss Arendt’s 
thought altogether and label her as a racists” she nevertheless insists that we cannot not 
ignore or bracket these idiosyncrasies in her thought, as we may risk missing the role 
Arendt’s broader political philosophy plays in perpetuating Eurocentric assumptions and 
anti-black racism in political thought today.423 
 Arendt’s treatment of the European legacy of imperialism and colonization has 
therefore received much critical attention. As we have seen, criticisms of this aspect of 
her work range from those who believe she goes too far with her boomerang thesis in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism to those who believe that she fails to go far enough, 
remaining too deeply entrenched in the European tradition to free herself from the racist 
assumptions that are believed to be inherent in it. To be sure, these methods of engaging 
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Arendt’s work are important for shedding light on significant problems in Arendt’s 
theoretical analysis that keep it from adequately addressing the impact of European 
imperialism and colonization on the political existence of non-European peoples. Yet, 
neither allows for the further development of Arendt’s thought within this context. 
Whereas those who pursue the first line of criticism deny altogether the plausibility of 
the relationship Arendt establishes between the European imperial experience in Africa 
and the rise of totalitarianism on the continent, those who take the second approach 
suggest that Arendt’s racist assumptions render even those insights that may have 
significance for this discourse worthy of suspicion.  
 In light of this, I wish to take an alternative approach to developing Arendt’s 
thought within the global discourse concerning the memory of slavery and colonization 
in the African Diaspora. Those who follow the second approach to this problem are right 
to point out Arendt’s blindness to the experience of race and racism in the African 
Diaspora. Yet, I wish to show that this blindness does not foreclose the possibility of 
learning from Arendt within this context. Rather, it suggests that the context itself is too 
significant to be neglected in our consideration of Arendt’s thought even if she failed to 
appreciate it. Moreover, while Arendt may have been blind to the experience of 
exclusion in the African Diaspora, I maintain that merely dismissing Arendt’s thought on 
the basis of this blindness is not enough challenge or undermine the problematic 
assumptions that arise in her work. On the contrary, truly undermining these problematic 
assumptions depends on expanding Arendt’s thought within this context, not only to put 
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into relief its limitations, but also to find ways of rehabilitating her political concepts in 
light of it for the sake of thickening this discourse.  
With this in mind, my aim in what follows will be to consider Arendt in light of 
an analysis of the Haitian Revolution. Arendt’s omission of the Haitian Revolution from 
her analysis of revolution in her 1963 text On Revolution has received a notable amount 
of scholarly attention in recent years, particularly from those who take the second 
approach to criticizing Arendt’s analysis of the European legacy of imperialism and 
colonization. Gines, for instance, says that while Arendt erases this revolution, along 
with the European legacy of slavery and colonization that accompanies it, from her own 
account of revolution: 
The significance of the Haitian Revolution cannot be overstated even on Arendt’s 
own terms. […] The Haitian Revolution sought not only liberation from slavery 
and from the French colonial order but also the foundation of freedom for 
political participation and most certainly new beginnings and the unfolding of a 
story never told before—the establishment of an independent Black state by 
former slaves and their free allies.424  
Gines thus cites this omission as further evidence of Arendt’s failure to view anti-black 
racism and the role that the history of slavery and colonization has to play in it as a 
political phenomenon.  
Likewise, Sybille Fischer notes that Arendt places paradigmatic emphasis on the 
French and American Revolutions in On Revolution, while altogether silencing the 
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Haitian Revolution in her historical analysis. This omission, Fischer thinks, is 
symptomatic of Arendt’s inability to conceptualize slavery as a political issue, relegating 
it instead to the realm of the social. Because Arendt is unable to understand slavery as 
something that exceeds these distinctions, Fischer argues that the Haitian revolution 
disappears from her analysis. As Fischer explains:  
Slavery shows that we cannot neatly separate the social from the political, and 
that we cannot theorize liberty without thinking about liberation and what kind of 
liberty ensues from liberation. Revolutionary anti-slavery combines what in 
Arendt’s language would be the social and the political in ways that make it 
intractable to her. Considering slavery as a political issue makes her recoil […] 
Revolutionary anti-slavery is a contradiction in terms [for Arendt]. Haiti becomes 
unthinkable.425 
On Fischer’s view, Arendt’s omission of this revolution from her larger narrative of the 
Age of Revolution is symptomatic of a deeply ingrained Eurocentrism that has caused 
Arendt, and western political thinkers more generally, to refuse to see slavery as a 
central thread of the modern tradition, treating it instead as an anomaly that has no place 
in the history of the west.426   
 Other scholars including David Scott, Richard King, and Nick Nesbitt, whose 
work I will return to later on, have also noted Arendt’s omission of the Haitian 
Revolution from her discussion in On Revolution. While all three suggest that this 
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omission is striking and disappointing given Arendt’s concern for developing a political 
framework that promises plurality and visibility in the space of politics, they suggest, in 
contrast to Gines and Fischer, that it provides an important starting point for further 
inquiry into the importance of the Haitian Revolution for understanding the 
revolutionary tradition of the modern age and its implications for thinking about 
contemporary forms of political exclusion. In what follows, I will approach my analysis 
of the Haitian Revolution this way, taking this omission on Arendt’s part to provide an 
important point of departure for rethinking the implications of the legacy of slavery and 
colonization for questions concerning citizenship and the role of remembrance in 
contemporary political life. 
V.2. The Place of the Haitian Revolution in the Revolutionary Tradition of the 
Modern Age  
In On Revolution, Arendt develops an account of the distinctively modern spirit 
of revolution. While Arendt believes that this revolutionary spirit has been forgotten, 
either because it has been overshadowed by the violent pursuit of the social interests of 
the masses, or confused with the drive to secure liberty in the private realm, she 
nevertheless argues that it lies at the heart of the modern political tradition and tells a 
story about this tradition that must be renewed. On Arendt’s view, revolution is the 
guiding principle of the modern era insofar as its traditions, institutions, and values are 
held together by the belief that the course of history can be suddenly begin anew and a 
story that has never been told before can start to unfold. In this, she says, “Revolutions 
are the only political events that confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of 
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new beginnings.”427 According to Arendt, the phenomenon of revolution is unique to the 
modern era insofar as it is driven by the two-fold aim of liberating the oppressed for the 
sake of creating a permanent foundation for freedom. While a conception of political 
freedom based on the human capacity for new beginnings was well understood in 
antiquity, she explains, “The revolutionary spirit of the last centuries, that is the 
eagerness to liberate and to build a new house were freedom can dwell, is unprecedented 
and unequalled in all prior history.”428 On her view, the revolutions of the late eighteenth 
century brought a pathos of novelty into existence in the political sphere, or a belief, not 
merely in change, but in the possibility of ushering in an entirely new epoch aimed 
above all at the political constitution of a space for freedom.429  
In being bound up with this pathos of novelty, Arendt argues that the 
revolutionary spirit of the modern era has also brought the problem of freedom into the 
space of politics more forcefully than ever before. She says: 
If foundation was the aim and the end of revolution, then the revolutionary spirit 
was not merely the spirit of beginning something new but of starting something 
permanent and enduring; the lasting institution, embodying this spirit and 
encouraging it to new achievements, would be self-defeating. From which it 
unfortunately seems to follow that nothing threatens the very achievement of 
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revolution more dangerously and more acutely than the spirit which has brought 
it about.430  
On her view, the French and American revolutions are emblematic not only of this 
revolutionary heritage, but also of the tensions involved in the two-fold aim of liberation 
and foundation that is contained within the modern notion of revolutionary freedom. 
While the French failed to develop a constitution that could preserve this revolutionary 
spirit in its political institutions in order to provide a lasting foundation for freedom, the 
Americans, who succeeded in developing such a constitution, failed to develop a 
mechanism for remembering its revolutionary origin. This, she argues, has produced a 
society of citizens in twentieth century America who are afraid of revolution and 
unwilling to enter into the space of politics for fear of disrupting the status quo.431 
Arendt thus believes that in order to understand the world we live in, we must consider 
the general implications of the complexities and tensions inherent in revolution for 
modern man’s political existence so as to reclaim and preserve the revolutionary spirit of 
the modern age.432     
Whereas Arendt emphasizes the importance of the French and American 
revolutions, my aim in this section will be to add another dimension to her analysis by 
considering the place of the Haitian Revolution in this heritage of modern political 
revolution. In so doing, I will argue that the revolutionary tradition we have inherited 
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and are now responsible for preserving is even more complex than Arendt suggests. In 
order capture the stakes involved in this revolution for understanding the revolutionary 
spirit of the modern age, it is necessary to consider its relation to the French Revolution. 
Focusing on the work of French historian François Furet, I will consider briefly the 
initial moments of the French Revolution, turning in particular to the democratic 
vocabulary that Furet believes was set forth by the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen. According to Furet, this document introduced an unprecedented 
language of revolutionary freedom to the space of politics that continues to frame the 
historical narrative of our democratic institutions today. I will therefore turn to Furet’s 
discussion to suggest that this dimension of the revolutionary tradition is emblematic of 
the memorial past, or that part of the revolutionary tradition that can be held together 
with the modern Enlightenment narrative and, as such, is able to be brought into 
appearance as a part of our collective memory.  
I will then consider this in light of several key events that took place at the same 
time as the French Revolution on the other side of the Atlantic in the colonial context of 
French Saint-Domingue. The Haitian Revolution is an especially complex example of 
modern revolution that has been complicated even further by the relatively sparse 
historical documentation that exists to account for it. Widespread illiteracy among the 
enslaved in Saint-Domingue and general neglect of the voice of the masses in the 
historical record make it difficult to discern from first hand accounts what the experience 
of emancipation might have been like for those engaged in this revolution. As Carolyn 
Fick explains, “For the vast majority [of the slaves], the ability to read and write was an 
 227 
unknown luxury. So they left no memoirs, pamphlets, tracts, nor accounts of events.”433 
In light of this, my aim is not to offer an original historical account of the Haitian 
Revolution, but rather to use those narratives of it that are especially helpful as a 
platform for clarifying the theoretical significance of this event for deepening our 
understanding of the revolutionary tradition.434 With this in mind, I will thus turn to 
several turning points during the Haitian Revolution including the initial uprising of the 
enslaved in 1791, the abolition of slavery in 1794, and the Leclerc Expedition (1801-
1803), which set the stage for Haitian independence in 1804. In so doing, I will suggest 
that the Haitian Revolution represents a central thread of the modern tradition, the 
significance of which is distinct from that of the French and American Revolutions in 
two respects.  
First, it marks decisive and perhaps originary failure of Enlightenment 
citizenship to bring those who were once cast out into the space of appearance. As I will 
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suggest, the formerly enslaved attempted to enact themselves as French citizens in 
precisely the way that Arendt recommends, affirming the spirit of the French 
revolutionary tradition rather than withdrawing their consent from the French political 
community on the basis of the violence and exclusion they suffered under slavery. Yet, 
the event of appropriation that the formerly enslaved attempted to participate in was 
ultimately forestalled, revealing that citizenship was not enough to overcome their 
previous exclusion. I therefore wish to show that the Haitian Revolution offers an 
important counter-example to Arendt’s own notion of citizenship, indicating that even 
her lived and embodied conception of it may not be enough to overcome the history of 
violence and exclusion that is entailed by the implementation of Enlightment citizenship. 
Second, I will suggest that this failure of Enlightenment citizenship to overcome 
the violence and exclusion of the past reveals another dimension of the revolutionary 
tradition that Arendt’s analysis of revolution does not capture. Specifically, the Haitian 
Revolution is emblematic of the birth of the pariah tradition in the modern era, and, with 
this, the fact that the very expansion of Enlightenment citizenship in the modern era will 
always involve the covering over of those histories of violence and exclusion that are too 
traumatic to come into presence as a part of our collective memory. By turning to this 
example, we find that the European legacy of slavery and colonization did not disappear 
with the implementation of French citizenship during the Haitian Revolution, but instead 
left its trace in the political institutions and traditions into which the formerly enslaved 
entered, only to be repeated in the racialized violence and exclusion that continued to be 
carried out after citizenship was granted. The Haitian Revolution thus provides a unique 
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point of departure for considering the impact of the immemorial violence and exclusion 
of the past on modern political life. Moreover, this revolution illustrates that in order to 
take responsibility for the world we have inherited, it is necessary to attend not just to 
the memorial past, but also to the immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed by 
the expansion of Enlightenment citizenship. Hence, in turning to the Haitian Revolution, 
my aim is to provide a platform for considering the responsibility citizens have, not only 
to commemorate the memorial past as Arendt suggests, but also to come to terms with 
those histories of violence and exclusion that may fail to come into full presence as a 
part of our collective memory but that nevertheless keep those who were once cast out 
from appearing in the modern political arena.  
On August 26, 1789, working against the backdrop of the chaos and uncertainty 
surrounding the initial moments of the French Revolution, the members of the newly 
formed French National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen.435 Furet explains that those who drafted the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen sought to enumerate a social contract based on natural law that would 
guarantee equal rights to those who entered into it. In proclaiming that “men are born 
and remain free and equal in rights,” it gave political articulation to a universal and 
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inalienable conception of human rights.436 Moreover, it generated a new conception of 
national identity, whereby what it meant to be French was to belong to a democratically 
enlightened and emancipated political community.437 
In stipulating that these rights were deducible through reason, requiring no 
appeal to an external authority, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 
even more so than the American Declaration of Independence, brought a new conception 
of the human being to bear on the political sphere. Though the idea of inalienable human 
rights had been introduced to the modern political tradition a century and a half earlier, 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen gave unprecedented political 
significance to this conception of the human being.438 According to Lynn Hunt, the 1789 
French declaration constituted a particularly radical moment in Europe as it extended 
these rights universally and without reference to particular groups, proclaiming that all 
human beings, regardless of religion, class, sex, or race had an irreducible and pre-
political claim to the rights of man. For this reason, Hunt explains, “The challenge to the 
old order of Europe could not have been more forthright.”439  
It was well understood by members of the French National Assembly that the 
implementation of this document would initiate an irreversible break from the 
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monarchical order of the past. Hence, while the idea of “the rights of man” had been 
widely accepted prior to the storming of the Bastille on July 14, Furet says that the 
debates leading up to the final formulation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen were “long, complex, contradictory, and passed through the filter of numerous 
preparatory drafts.”440 In the midst of growing anxiety about the future of France and 
widespread disagreement regarding the underlying aims of the revolution, the members 
of French National Assembly struggled to decide whether or not to adopt such a radical 
declaration of freedom. Unable to come to a resolution, the members of the Assembly 
compromised on a temporary draft of the document, and while they had planned to 
revisit it after drafting a new constitution, the question was never reopened.441 Hence, 
this temporary and highly contested document became the final version of the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.442  
While many of the Assembly members were reluctant to embrace this 
declaration, Furet argues that upon adopting it, they introduced what he describes as a 
new democratic vocabulary to the modern political arena. That is, he says:  
What the French brought into being at the end of the eighteenth century was not 
politics as a laicized and distinct area of critical reflection but democratic politics 
as a national ideology. The secret of the success of 1789, its message and its 
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lasting influence lie in that invention, which was unprecedented and whose 
legacy was to be so widespread.443  
Consequently, Furet explains that while the French Revolution might have failed to 
achieve its political goals, it nevertheless made a novel contribution to the modern 
world, providing the basis for a new revolutionary political culture, the vocabulary of 
which continues to frame the narrative of our modern political communities today. 
On the basis of Furet’s interpretation of the French Revolution, it seems that this 
thread of the revolutionary tradition occupies a place in our collective memory, 
memorialized in the language that frames the political culture of liberal democratic 
society. Yet, this memorial past cannot be thought apart from its immemorial counter-
part, or those legacies of violence and exclusion that are bound up with the 
Enlightenment narrative but that have been covered over with its expansion. While 
Arendt believes that these legacies of violence and exclusion fade into oblivion when 
citizenship is granted, I will suggest by turning to the Haitian Revolution that citizenship 
alone is not enough to overcome this history of violence and exclusion and, indeed, can 
even serve to reinforce the transgressions of the past.  
As the members of the French National Assembly were drafting the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, France was simultaneously engaged in the most 
lucrative colonial enterprise in the world. French Saint-Domingue, what is now Haiti, 
was France’s most prized colonial possession. Though Saint-Domingue was among the 
smallest of the European colonies in the Caribbean and Atlantic world, occupying the 
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western half of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, Laurent Dubois says, “The livelihood 
of as many as a million of the twenty-five million inhabitants of France depended 
directly on the colonial trade. The slave colonies of the Caribbean were an engine for 
economic and social change in metropolitan France.”444 By 1789, Saint-Domingue was 
exporting half of the world’s coffee and as much sugar as Jamaica, Cuba, and Brazil 
combined.445  
The economic success of Saint-Domingue depended on France’s investment in 
the Transatlantic Slave Trade.446 By 1789, nearly half a million enslaved Africans 
inhabited the colony, comprising ninety percent of its overall population and providing 
the labor force necessary to run Saint-Domingue’s eight thousand plantations.447 In 
accordance with the 1685 Code Noir, the enslaved in Saint-Domingue had no political 
status in 1789 and lacked most forms of legal protection.448 As this system of slavery 
was based on racial casting, French colonial law also prohibited the extension of 
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political rights to gens de couleur libres, or free men of color. 449 Hence, in 1789, no 
person of African descent in Saint-Domingue, whether enslaved or not, had the rights of 
French citizens.  
As word of the French Revolution spread throughout the French Antilles, it 
became clear that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen had set in motion a 
revolutionary break, not just with the ancien régime in metropolitan France, but also 
with the French colonial regime, providing the grounds for those of African descent in 
Saint-Domingue to assert their inalienable human rights in the spirit of the ideals of 
revolutionary France. While it was not clear whether the 1789 revolutionary principles 
accepted in Paris would be applied to the colonies, Dubois explains that the Saint-
Domingue planters “saw the universalist Declaration as a clear threat to slavery, reacting 
as if it were a disease to be quarantined.”450 It was well understood by the planters and 
colonial administrators in Saint-Domingue, as well as their representatives in Paris, that 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man had the potential not only to provide legitimate 
legal ground for the abolition of slavery, but also to incite the slaves to rebel if word of 
the French Revolution reached the Antilles. Given that the enslaved vastly outnumbered 
the white planters in Saint-Domingue, whites were keenly aware of the danger of slave 
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rebellion, structuring the legal and political institutions of the colony in order to prevent 
such an event. Hence, extraordinary measures were taken throughout 1789 to control the 
circulation of information about the French Revolution throughout the colonies.451 Even 
so, word of the French Revolution eventually reached Saint-Domingue, and, by the fall 
of 1790, the impact of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen on the colonial 
world was beginning to be felt. In October of 1790, Vincent Ogé, a free man of color 
initiated a rebellion in Cap Français, or Le Cap, the capital city of Saint-Domingue, after 
being been denied the right to vote.452 Though Ogé was arrested and publicly executed 
by the French colonial authorities in Le Cap, this initial uprising provided the impetus 
for the unprecedented slave revolution that would unfold over the course of the next 
thirteen years in Saint-Domingue. 
The Haitian Revolution began on August 22, 1791 when one hundred thousand 
slaves in the northern province of Saint-Domingue rose up, killing their masters and 
burning plantations throughout the region. The revolution was set in motion by the 
coordinated efforts of 200 “privileged” slaves who had earned the trust of their masters 
and had been given special occupations along with relative freedom of movement.453 
Serving as delegates of their plantations, these slaves had gathered secretly a week prior 
to the start of the revolution on August 14, 1791 at the Lenormand de Mézy plantation to 
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plan the insurrection.454 The fact that these slave delegates were able to organize 
thousands of slaves across plantations separated by significant distances, while under the 
close supervision of their masters and overseers who, at this time, had an especially 
heightened awareness of the threat of slave insurrection, is without question, one of the 
most remarkable feats of the Age of Revolution.455 Moreover, the sophistication of the 
slave delegates’ strategies for organized resistance speaks to the enduring and 
widespread urge for freedom that had been cultivated in the decades leading up to the 
Haitian Revolution.456 
After this meeting of the slave delegates, the enslaved were prompted to action 
by the Vodou priest Boukman who held an infamous Vodou ceremony at Bois Caïman 
just before the revolution began. The Bois Caïman Vodou ceremony has become 
legendary, symbolizing not only of the beginning of the Haitian Revolution, but also the 
history of the violence and exclusion that shaped the experience of the enslaved in Saint-
Domingue. As Jean-Price Mars has argued in his seminal early twentieth century work, 
So Spoke the Uncle, the Haitian tradition of Vodou, as well as Haitian Creole, are unique 
creations, born out of a drive for liberation and freedom that is specific to experience of 
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modern slavery and colonization. Price-Mars explains that while aspects of Haitian 
Vodou can be traced to a number of different religious practices in Africa, Vodou itself 
cannot be found anywhere on the African continent. For this reason, Prices-Mars argues, 
Vodou is the product of the creative appropriation of pre-colonial African religions and 
the Christian practices that were violently imposed on the enslaved upon arriving in 
Saint-Domingue, held together by a spirit of resistance that distinguishes it from both.457 
Price-Mars makes a similar argument in the case of Haitian Creole. He says: 
We will agree without any difficulty that our Creole is a collective creation 
arising from the need of masters and slaves to communicate their thoughts with 
one another. As a consequence, it bears the imprint of the vices and qualities of 
the human milieu and the circumstances which developed it.458  
Creole has its roots in Spanish, English, and French, as well as in the languages of Africa 
that the enslaved brought with them to Saint-Domingue. Creole, Price-Mars explains, 
thus has an “unsuspected depth,” riddled with ambiguity that gives the language, 
particularly in its spoken form, great subtlety.459 According to Price-Mars, Creole, 
whether spoken or sung, expresses through this ambiguity a deeper, common history 
unique to the Haitian. This common history has the two-fold significance of reflecting an 
inability to return to a pure pre-colonial African origin and the impossibility of 
assimilating completely to the traditions, values, and institutions of the European.  
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The Vodou ceremony at Bois Caïman thus reflected the internal complexity of 
the colonial situation out of which this revolution was born, marking the beginning of 
what would be an exceptionally violent insurrection guided by multifarious and, at 
times, contradictory, political goals.460 Though some of the enslaved declared from the 
outset that their efforts were aimed at securing the Rights of Man in the spirit of the 
ideals of liberty and equality set forth by the French Revolution, others took the side of 
the royalists, believing that the king would be able to assure a more humane system of 
slavery than French republicanism.461 Yet, the remarkable success of the slave insurgents 
against the French troops during the first years of the revolution set the course of these 
events on an irreversible path towards emancipation.  
In response to the crisis in Saint-Domingue, the French National Assembly 
granted the rights of French citizens to the gens de couluer libres in Saint-Domingue on 
August 4, 1792, in an effort to unite them with the French troops against the slaves. The 
French thus initially aligned themselves squarely against the insurgency with the 
intention of preserving slavery throughout the colony. This, however, began to change in 
1793 when François-Thomas Galbaud, a decorated French revolutionary general and 
plantation owner, arrived in Cap Français.462 Galbaud had been sent to command the 
French troops in Le Cap. Given Galbaud’s sympathy for white plantation owners, 
however, he was opposed to the decision to enfranchise free people of color. Galbaud’s 
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leadership in Le Cap thus threatened the position of the free people of color in the city 
and undermined the alliance that the commissioners had established with them.463 Well 
aware of the danger this posed to the position of the French in Saint-Domingue, the 
commissioners ordered Galbaud to return to France. Rather than obeying their orders, 
Galbaud instead joined forces with the British and Spanish, who wanted to gain 
possession of the colony for the sake of bolstering their own colonial enterprises, and 
mounted a rebellion against the French commissioners.464  
Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, the French commissioner of Saint-Domingue, realized 
that even when united with the free people of color, their forces would not be able to 
withstand Galbaud’s attack. Hence, on the evening of June 20, 1793, Sonthonax sought 
the help of the thousands of black slaves in the city, promising their freedom in return 
for their service to the French Republic.465 As Jeremy Popkin explains, this set off what 
would be the bloodiest urban conflict to take place in either metropolitan France or the 
Americas during the entire revolutionary period and, after three days of fighting, 
Sonthonax’s troops, together with the slave insurgents, succeeded in defeating 
Galbaud.466  
In response to these events, Sonthonax thus issued a “Decree of General Liberty” 
declaring on August 29, 1793 that “all nègres and mixed blood people currently in 
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slavery are declared free to enjoy all the rights of French citizens.”467 In addition to this, 
the decree stipulated that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen would go into 
effect throughout Saint-Domingue.468 Though there has been much debate regarding the 
extent to which Sonthonax was guided by a genuine concern for the emancipation of the 
enslaved or if this decree was issued out of desperation, it nevertheless paved the way 
for France to become the first nation in European to abolish slavery. The events in Saint-
Domingue thus forced, for the first time, a direct confrontation between the ideals of the 
European Enlightenment and the history of slavery and colonization that was bound up 
with this legacy.  
Many of the insurgent leaders, including Toussaint L’Ouverture, who would 
become the most distinguished military leader of the Haitian Revolution, were deeply 
suspicious of Sonthonax. Until 1793, the French republicans in Paris and the 
commissioners in Saint-Domingue had, for the most part, shown no interest in 
abolishing slavery. Thus, Popkins says, many of the insurgent leaders “saw the 
proclamation of June 20 as a desperate gamble by a defeated faction.”469 In an effort to 
demonstrate his commitment to ending slavery and to preserve his much needed alliance 
with the slave insurgents, Sonthonax held elections in Le Cap on September 23, 1793. 
According to some accounts, both the free people of color and the newly emancipated 
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slaves participated in this election. The purpose of the elections was to choose several 
deputies to represent Saint-Domingue in the newly formed French National Convention 
in Paris and push for emancipation throughout the French Republic. Among those 
elected were Jean-Baptiste Belley, a former slave, and the French official Louis Dufay. 
Together, Belley and Dufay succeeded in demonstrating the loyalty of the slaves to the 
French Republic, persuading the National Convention to adopt Sonthonax’s decree into 
French law.470 On February 4, 1794, a motion was made to ratify Sonthonax’s decree 
and abolish slavery throughout the French Republic “not by temporary enthusiasm but 
by the principles of justice, faithful to the Declaration of the Rights of Man.”471 The 
motion was accepted with out opposition and, in its final formulation, the proposal to 
abolish slavery read, “The National Convention declares that slavery of the nègres is 
abolished in all the colonies; consequently, it decrees that all men living in the colonies, 
without distinction of color, are French citizens and enjoy all the rights guaranteed by 
the constitution.”472  
These events during the Haitian Revolution marked a pivotal moment in the Age 
of Revolution, bringing the tension between France’s colonial enterprise and its 
revolutionary mission to the forefront. According to Dubois, the insurgents in Saint-
Domingue and the French Antilles more generally played a direct role in reshaping the 
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idea of Enlightenment citizenship in the early stages of the Haitian Revolution and, in so 
doing, radicalized the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.473 Through the 
efforts of the Haitian revolutionaries, those who had been excluded from the human 
community in which they found themselves were granted the right to appear as citizens 
in the full illumination of the public realm. In so doing, they brought the Enlightenment 
narrative of universal humanism to bear perhaps more powerfully than ever before on 
the modern political arena.  
The events of February 4, 1794 shifted the sentiments of the insurgent leaders, 
and especially those of L’Ouverture. Upon learning in June of 1794 that the National 
Convention had ratified Sonthonax’s emancipation decree, L’Ouverture declared his 
allegiance to the French, pledging to fulfill the ideals of the French Revolution by 
transforming Saint-Domingue into a “colony of citizens.”474 Under the leadership of 
L’Ouverture, the formerly enslaved would attempt to enact their new French citizenship 
in ways that are exemplary of the lived and embodied notion of citizenship that Arendt 
endorses.  
L’Ouverture, like many of the leaders of the Haitian Revolution, was an ex-slave, 
born into slavery in 1743 and freed in the 1770s.475 Yet, unlike most slaves, 
L’Ouverture’s father was a West African prince who had been captured and sold into 
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slavery in the 1720s. L’Ouverture, the eldest of his sons, learned the African language 
and traditions of his parents. Once they had died, he began learning geometry, French, 
and Latin from his godfather, Pierre Baptiste, a free African living in Le Cap.476 Hence, 
despite being born into a system of slavery that strategically denied the enslaved the 
opportunity to read or write, L’Ouverture had the unusual good fortune of being 
educated, not only in the European tradition, but also in the African traditions of his 
parents. As Dubois says, “Descendent of West African Royalty, but also raised Catholic 
and educated in European arts and sciences, [L’Ouverture] emerged from the crossing of 
these two traditions […]. He would draw on both experiences in governing the evolving 
colony of Saint-Domingue.”477 Though L’Ouverture was simply known as Toussaint 
during the initial stages of the revolution, in 1793, he came to be recognized by the slave 
insurgents and French colonial administrators alike as  “L’Ouverture,” or “the opening,” 
both for his genius as a military and political leader and for the new beginning he was 
initiating in Saint-Domingue. Though some have suggested that the French 
commissioners gave Toussaint this name because of his ability to find openings in the 
battlefield, others have argued that he chose this name for himself in order to remind 
those under his rule that he was an agent of radical change, responsible for bringing 
something new into the world.478 As CLR James says in The Black Jacobins, perhaps the 
most famous historical narrative of the Haitian Revolution to date, “If the Republic, 
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liberty and equality, gave the army its morale, its center was Toussaint himself. His 
presence had that electrifying effect characteristic of great men of action.”479 Upon 
swearing his allegiance to the French Republic after learning of the 1794 emancipation 
decree, L’Ouverture remained unwavering in his commitment to the ideals of liberty and 
equality. His commitment to the French republican ideals was coupled with an equally 
enduring commitment to prevent the restoration of slavery in the Antilles, two goals that 
L’Ouverture believed were compatible in 1794.  
Returning now to Arendt’s notion of the revolutionary tradition of the modern 
age, we see that insofar as L’Ouverture was responsible for overseeing the first major 
transition from slavery to freedom in the New World, he was leading a revolution guided 
by an especially pronounced pathos of novelty, bringing into existence a story about the 
experience of human freedom that had never before been told.480 Under the leadership of 
L’Ouverture, the events of the Haitian Revolution unfolded according to his concern for 
liberating the masses from the oppression of slavery and establishing a new and stable 
foundation for freedom in Saint-Domingue. As such, the story of the Haitian Revolution 
appears to be embody the spirit of revolution that Arendt associates with the modern 
political tradition. Beyond this, while the abolition of slavery in the French Antilles 
created great unrest, confusion, and violence throughout the region, the formerly 
enslaved who achieved French citizenship nevertheless participated in the lived and 
embodied form of citizenship that Arendt endorses. That is to say, under L’Ouverture’s 
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leadership, the new French citizens affirmed, rather than withdraw their consent from the 
sensus communis that had, until 1794, been predicated on the tacit exclusion of African 
descended people even after the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen in 1789. As James says: 
Despite the ignorance and confusion there was a new spirit abroad. Black [Saint-
Domingue] had changed and would never be the same again […]. All the French 
blacks, from the labourers at Port-de-Paix demanding equality, to the officers in 
the army, were filled with an immense pride at being citizens of the French 
Republic, ‘one and indivisible’ which had brought liberty and equality into the 
world. Five years of revolution had wrought these astonishing changes. Toussaint 
always addressed the blacks as French citizens: what will France think if she 
learns that your conduct was not worthy of true republicans?481 
In the period between 1794 and 1801, L’Ouverture had a number of military successes, 
driving the Spanish and the British from Saint-Domingue, and preserving the colony for 
the French. Moreover, he managed to secure the position of the formerly enslaved on the 
island, resisting the attempts of the free people of color in the south to claim the colony 
for themselves and return it to a plantation society. Despite these successes, however, 
L’Ouverture struggled during this period to effectively transition Saint-Domingue from a 
colony of slaves to a colony of citizens. Doubling down on his loyalty to the ideals of the 
republic, he began instituting policies that were designed to ensure that the colony 
remained economically profitable without compromising the liberty of the enslaved. In 
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so doing, however, the laws he implemented made the colony look more like the 
plantation society it once was than like the free society it was striving to become, 
justifying these laws by arguing that they were in the spirit of transforming the former 
slaves into disciplined, self-reliant, and self-respecting French citizens.482  
Recently, there has been much debate surrounding the historical L’Ouverture, 
particularly regarding the extent to which his own interest in laying claim to the 
economic potential of the island’s sugar plantations informed his revolutionary aims.483 
Yet, despite the importance of these discourses, his symbolic significance as the 
founding father of the post-colonial world cannot be doubted. Indeed, the events that 
took shape under his leadership were unprecedented, bringing the ideals of the 
revolutionary Enlightenment into direct confrontation with the European legacy of 
slavery and colonization. Beyond this, however, he oversaw what may be described as a 
limit-experience of Enlightenment citizenship, which, as we will eventually see, brings 
into focus a contradiction internal to the concept of citizenship and the ideal of universal 
inclusion set forth by the Enlightenment project. For the purposes of this discussion, 
then, L’Ouverture’s symbolic significance, particularly as it concerns his attempt to 
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appropriate the ideals of the French Revolution in the context of a former plantation 
society, is of central concern. L’Ouverture’s 1801 constitution reveals the tension at the 
heart of the situation in which the new French citizens found themselves, coming into 
full view with L’Ouverture’s demise in 1802 and the call for Haitian independence in 
1804.   
By 1801, Napoleon Bonaparte had seized power in France, instituted his own 
constitution, and declared that the colonies would be governed by particular laws that 
were in the best interest of their populations, effectively undoing the decision of the 
1794 National Convention to extend the French Constitution and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen throughout the French Antilles. In response, L’Ouverture 
swiftly drafted a constitution in Saint-Domingue in order to “lay the foundations” for a 
prosperous and egalitarian society that would no longer be structured according to a 
racial hierarchy.484 In this, the constitution sought to establish an enduring space for 
freedom in the way that Arendt suggests is emblematic of modern revolutions, 
characterizing the conditions for the establishment of this space in terms of the liberation 
of oppressed. L’Ouverture’s 1801 constitution reasserted the 1794 French emancipation 
decree, proclaiming that slavery would be abolished permanently throughout Saint-
Domingue in the spirit of the laws of the French Republic. Yet, L’Ouverture also 
believed that in order for the colony to flourish, the transition to liberty had to be slow 
and the laws of the colony had to be appropriate to the specific history of Saint-
Domingue. The 1801 constitution was thus based on the sentiment that “all citizens owe 
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their services to the land which feeds them and in which they were born, to the 
maintenance of liberty and equality, of property whenever the law calls on them to 
defend it.”485 For L’Ouverture, this meant that the formerly enslaved would need to 
return to their plantations and work under the strict supervision of their former masters 
for several years before being granted the freedom of movement and the right to choose 
their own occupation. While L’Ouverture used the language of “cultivation” to describe 
this system of labor, it was nearly identical to the old system of slavery that had 
supposedly been abolished. As Dubois explains, “On the one hand, the project that all of 
the people of Saint-Domingue were called on to support was a project of emancipation, 
of freedom from racial hierarchy, of liberty for all in a land once dominated by slavery. 
At the same time, ex-slaves were given very particular responsibilities that were defined 
by their old status.”486 Hence, while L’Ouverture remained unwavering in his 
commitment to fulfilling the political goals of revolutionary France, he continued to be 
weighed down by the French legacy of slavery and colonization, which would ultimately 
forestall the event of freedom that he believed the formerly enslaved could achieve by 
affirming themselves as French citizens.  
L’Ouverture’s faith in the French Republic ultimately turned against him in 
1802. As L’Ouverture was working to implement this new constitution in Saint-
Domingue, Bonaparte was plotting his demise, having ordered his brother-in-law and 
fellow general during the French Revolution, Charles Leclrec, to bring 20,000 French 
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troops to the colony to arrest L’Ouverture and reinstate slavery throughout the French 
Antilles. Bonaparte had, to this point, shown only support for L’Ouverture’s service to 
France, promoting him to the position of commander-in-chief in Saint-Domingue and 
effectively giving him authority over any French official who arrived in the colony. By 
the fall of 1801, however, Bonaparte decided that L’Ouverture needed to be eliminated 
in order to rebuild France’s colonial economy.487 Though L’Ouverture was suspicious of 
Leclerc’s troops and began bracing the colony for the possibility of war before they 
arrived, he struggled to believe that the French would betray their own revolutionary 
ideals. Leclerc attempted to reassure L’Ouverture’s officers that he came with good 
intentions, sending messages explaining that the purpose of the mission was to protect 
Saint-Domingue from “enemies of the Republic” and preserve the freedom that the 
formerly enslaved had fought for in the name of the Republic.488 Hence, even after 
declaring war on L’Ouverture’s troops in Saint-Domingue in 1802, Leclerc, whose true 
goal had been to unseat L’Ouverture and return Saint-Domingue to a slave colony, easily 
caught him off guard. Upon enticing L’Ouverture to meet with a French officer to 
discuss the banditry that had been taking place in the region, Leclerc arrested L’Overture 
and deported him to Paris where he died in prison in 1803.489  
In the wake of Leclerc’s initial success in Saint-Domingue, Bonaparte signed 
several decrees re-establishing slavery in the various colonies throughout the French 
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Antilles. In May of 1802, Bonaparte had reopened the slave trade to French ships and, 
by October of 1802, it was clear that his intention, along with Leclerc’s, was to re-
establish slavery in Saint-Domingue, despite repeatedly vowing throughout 1802 to keep 
this colony free.490 In the midst of L’Ouverture’s absence, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, an 
ex-slave and general in L’Ouverture’s army, who had been suspicious of the French 
throughout much of the revolution, had taken his place as the leader of the Haitian 
Revolution. By March of 1803, after an extraordinarily violent period of fighting 
between Leclerc’s troops and the insurgents, Dessalines began calling his troops the 
“indigenous army.” 491 The betrayal of L’Ouverture and the efforts on the part of 
Bonaparte to reestablish slavery confirmed Dessalines’s suspicion that the presence of 
the white European on the island would always carry with it the threat of a return to 
slavery. Dessalines thus announced his intention to break with France by tearing the 
white out of the tricolor republican flag, signally his intention to eradicate the legacy of 
French slavery and colonization by destroying the white forces in Saint-Domingue. This 
blue and red flag, with the white torn out of it, would eventually become the flag of the 
independent nation of Haiti.492   
In the wake of the betrayal of L’Ouverture, Dessalines led the insurgents against 
the French, guiding them with the principle in mind that for the formerly enslaved, being 
French and free were mutually exclusive ends. Leclerc’s successor as general in chief of 
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the expedition, Rochambeau, having lost half of his troops to yellow fever and the 
increasingly violent attacks of the insurgents, surrendered to Dessalines’s new 
“indigenous army” in mid-November of 1803.493 Dessalines was thus in a position by 
the end of 1803 to declare independence from France, and while his call for 
independence was not the first of the Age of Revolution, it was certainly a distinctive 
one that would set off a series of independence movements throughout the Caribbean 
and Atlantic world over the course of the next century. While Dessalines and his 
followers had, for the most part, followed L’Ouverture in his loyalty to the French, 
L’Ouverture’s betrayal clarified to the insurgents that the presence of the French would 
always carry with it a trace of the colonial past and the possibility of a return to slavery. 
Dessaline thus maintained that achieving liberty depended on creating an independent 
nation for the formerly enslaved that was no longer haunted by the French legacy of 
slavery and colonization.494 On December 31, 1803, Dessalines drafted the Haitian 
Declaration of Independence with the aim of erasing the presence of the European from 
the island in order to provide a homeland for all indigenous and African descended 
people in the Americas who had suffered at the hand of European slavery and 
colonialism. The opening lines of the Haitian Declaration of Independence thus read:  
It is not enough to have expelled the barbarians who have bloodied our land for 
two centuries; it is not enough to have restrained those ever-evolving factions 
that one after another mocked the specter of liberty that France dangled before 
                                                
493 Ibid., 297. 
494 Ibid., 298. 
  252 
you. We must, with one last act of national authority, forever assure the empire 
of liberty in the country of our birth; we must take any hope of re-enslaving us 
away from the inhuman government that for so long kept us in the most 
humiliating torpor. In the end we must live independent or die.495 
Significantly, Dessalines’s declaration indicates that assuring “the empire of liberty” and 
removing “any hope of re-enslaving” African descended people on the island depended 
not just on the physical eradication of the French, but also on the destruction of the 
traditions, values, and institutions of the French—that is to say, the very, memory of the 
French, which, in their capacity as French citizens, the formerly enslaved had been 
tasked with preserving. Referring to L’Ouverture, Dessalines goes on to say: 
These generals who have guided your efforts against tyranny have not yet done 
enough for your happiness; the French name still haunts our land. Everything 
revives the memories of the cruelties of this barbarous people: our laws, our 
habits, our towns, everything still carries the stamp of the French. Indeed! There 
are still French in our island, and you believe yourself free and independent of 
that Republic, which, it is true, has fought all the nations, but which has never 
defeated those who wanted to be free.496   
With this, Dessalines’s declaration suggests that despite the enduring effort of the 
formerly enslaved to embrace the French revolutionary tradition, the legacy of slavery 
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and colonization did not disappear once the Enlightenment narrative had reached the 
shores of Saint-Domingue. On the contrary, even after the enslaved had become French 
citizens, a specter of this legacy of violence and exclusion continued to haunt the 
institutions, traditions, and values of revolutionary France, keeping the ex-slaves and ex-
colonizers alike from collectively appropriating a common world and bringing about an 
event of freedom. Thus, in his attempt to eradicate this legacy of French colonialism and 
slavery once and for all, Dessalines called for a radical break from the French in order to 
erase the memory of this legacy in its entirety: 
Let them tremble when they approach our coast, if not from the memory of those 
cruelties they perpetrated here, then from the terrible resolution that we will have 
made to put to death anyone born French whose profane foot soils the land of 
liberty. […] Therefore vow before me to live free and independent, and to prefer 
death to anything that will try to place you back in chains. Swear, finally, to 
pursue forever the traitors and enemies of your independence.497 
The emphasis in the 1804 Haitian Declaration of Independence on eradicating the 
memory of the French reveals a crucial dimension of the revolutionary tradition that 
Arendt fails to appreciate in her own account of citizenship, particularly with regard to 
the responsibility she believes citizens have to remember. The universalism of the 
Enlightenment project necessitates the covering over of those histories of violence and 
exclusion that are entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship but 
incompatible with the narrative of universal emancipation on which it is based. The 
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European legacy of slavery and colonization is among the most violent and exclusionary 
of these histories, inextricably bound up with the tradition of the modern era and the 
legacy of those who have become enfranchised through the expansion of Enlightenment 
citizenship. The Haitian Revolution offers a decisive illustration of an attempt on the 
part of the formerly enslaved to enter into the modern space of appearance by affirming 
themselves as citizens of the French Republic, attempting to carry the traditions, 
institutions, and values of revolutionary France into the future as a part of a common 
world. This world, as the story of L’Ouverture suggests, was one that was believed to be 
held together by the distinctively modern revolutionary goal of liberating the oppressed 
for the sake of providing a foundation for freedom’s appearance. Yet, even upon 
affirming their citizenship in the lived and embodied way that Arendt suggests, this 
legacy of violence and exclusion did not fall into oblivion as she believes it should have. 
On the contrary, the tacit threat of a return to slavery continued to haunt the new 
citizens, keeping them from coming into appearance as part of a common world bound 
together by the shared legacy of the revolutionary spirit of the modern era. While this 
legacy of violence and exclusion might have remained concealed, unable to come into 
full presence as a part of the Enlightenment narrative, the 1804 Haitian Declaration of 
Independence gave clear articulation to the way in which this immemorial past has the 
potential to keep those who were once cast out from fully appearing and participating 
with their fellow citizens in the event of appropriation that Arendt associates with human 
freedom.  
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On January 1, 1804, the Haitian Declaration of Independence was officially 
adopted, giving birth to the only independent nation born out of slave revolution. This 
declaration reshaped the Caribbean and Atlantic World, inspiring numerous slave 
rebellions and fueling the debate regarding abolition throughout the Americas.498 
Moreover, as Kersuze Simeon-Jones argues, the events that began in 1791 with the Bois 
Caïman Vodou ceremony and ended with the 1804 Declaration of Independence had a 
lasting impact of the political and intellectual traditions on the African Diaspora, laying 
the foundation in the nineteenth century for political movements such as Black 
Nationalism and the birth of the concept of black consciousness, while providing the 
inspiration for the political projects of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism in the 
twentieth century.499 The Haitian Revolution thus stands at the beginning of a long 
heritage of political thought aimed at addressing the forms of political exclusion that 
have been perpetuated by the global legacy of European slavery and colonization.500  
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Yet, Dessalines’s attempt to eradicate the memory of the French legacy of 
slavery and colonization proved short-lived in the context of Haiti. In the decades 
following the 1804 Declaration of Independence, Haiti remained, in one way or another, 
haunted by a specter of the violence and exclusion of the colonial past. Europe and the 
United States, for instance, refused to recognize the political existence of Haiti after the 
end of the revolution, effectively denying that the revolution had happened so as to 
undermine the legitimacy the former slaves’ claim to freedom.501 In order to sustain 
itself economically, Haiti thus agreed in 1825 to pay an indemnity to France in exchange 
for diplomatic recognition. Having lost their most prized colonial possession, the French 
government agreed to open diplomatic relations with Haiti only after it had paid 150 
million French francs, roughly equivalent today to 40 billion US dollars, for property 
lost during the Haitian Revolution, including the hundreds of thousands of slaves who 
had been freed. Unable to pay, the Haitian government was forced to take out loans from 
France, entering into a cycle of debt that destroyed the Haitian economy and plunged the 
island nation into poverty from which it has yet to recover.502  
As Mimi Sheller explains, the leaders of Haiti also struggled throughout the 
nineteenth century to build a new nation from the ashes of French Saint-Domingue that 
was founded on the principles of liberty and equality and devoid of any trace of the 
French. Sheller turns, in particular, to the nineteenth century image of the Haitian citizen 
soldier who was modeled after the slave insurgents and their efforts to liberate 
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themselves from slavery at the end of the eighteenth century. Sheller says, “A 
fundamental aspect of the Haitian nation-building project was the elevation of the black 
man out of the depths of slavery into his rightful place as father, leader, and protector of 
his own people.”503 In this, the image of the citizen soldier in Haiti was based not on a 
European figuration of liberty, but rather on an experience of freedom internal to the 
situation of the colonized. Sheller explains, however, that once the revolution had ended, 
what had been a symbol of freedom ultimately gave way to an elitist structure of 
citizenship and civic duty, creating a paradox whereby “the egalitarian and democratic 
values of republicanism were constantly undercut by the hierarchical and elitist values of 
militarism.”504  As Price-Mars explains, a new Haitian elite thus emerged by the end of 
the nineteenth century, who, he says, “donned the old frock of western civilization,” 
embracing the values of the French, repressing any trace of an African heritage, and 
implementing a plantation economy based on a cultural and racial hierarchy that was 
nearly identical to the French colonial regime of the past.505 
 More so than the French and American Revolutions, the Haitian Revolution puts 
into relief the effect of the immemorial histories of violence and exclusion that are 
entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship on the modern political 
arena. Through the example of the Haitian Revolution, we find that even if these 
legacies fail to come into appearance as part of our collective memory, they nevertheless 
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have the potential to forestall the event of appropriation that Arendt associates with 
human freedom. In her own account of citizenship, Arendt does not go far enough in 
considering the effect of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past on political 
life, assuming instead that citizenship is enough to overcome these histories of violence 
and exclusion. Yet, this comes into conflict with her own insistence on the responsibility 
citizens have to reconcile themselves to the past for the sake of carrying a common 
world into the future.  
My aim in what follows will be to rehabilitate Arendt’s political categories in 
light of this example. In so doing, I will argue that Arendt’s analysis of the responsibility 
citizens have to remember the legacy of their political communities reveals a paradox of 
remembrance that lies at the heart of the modern political tradition. By extending 
Arendt’s analysis beyond the French and American contexts to the Haitian Revolution, 
we find that this paradox is central to the revolutionary spirit that she believes we are 
tasked with preserving in the modern era. While Arendt fails to recognize the full 
implications of her concern for reclaiming the “lost revolutionary treasure” of the 
modern age, I will suggest that she nevertheless has an important contribution to make to 
the discourse concerning the European legacy of slavery and colonization. By 
considering this paradox of remembrance in relation to Arendt’s concern for 
remembrance in political life, it is possible to provide a frame for examining the 
repetition of this legacy in our present political structures. With this, however, I will 
suggest that taking responsibility for the world we have inherited will depend not only 
on citizenship, as Arendt suggest, but also on developing methods for coming to terms in 
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the space of politics with the immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed by the 
very implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. 
V.3. Arendt, Haiti, and the Paradox of Remembrance 
As I previously suggested, several scholars including Richard King, Nick 
Nesbitt, and David Scott have considered Arendt’s work in light of the Haitian 
Revolution. In so doing, each has developed an account of how the tension this 
revolution brings to bear on the modern political sphere complicates her analysis. With 
this, however, they have also suggested that by considering Arendt within this context, it 
is possible to develop the broader implications of her work for the world we live in 
today. While Arendt failed to appreciate the implications of her analysis, these scholars 
suggest, in contrast to Gines and Fischer, that she has the potential to open up new ways 
of thinking about the discourse concerning political exclusion in a post-colonial era. In 
this section, I will take my point of departure for thinking about Arendt in light of the 
Haitian Revolution from their work. In so doing, I will argue that the paradox of 
remembrance that is revealed by considering Arendt within the context of the legacy of 
European slavery and colonization does not merely point to a contradiction in her 
thought, but rather sheds light on a central problem of the modern political tradition. 
Specifically, it indicates that the legacy of the modern political tradition is one that will 
always contain within it the immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed by the 
implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. While this immemorial past may fail to 
come into full presence, I wish to show that we are nevertheless responsible for it and 
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must therefore reconcile ourselves to it if we are to appropriate the legacy of the world 
we have inherited and bring a common world into view. 
In response to those who have criticized Arendt’s omission of the Haitian 
Revolution from her analysis in On Revolution, King has argued that problematic as this 
omission is, her reluctance to embrace revolutions like it has a legitimate basis in her 
enduring concern for the creation of a “constitution of liberty.”506 While King is critical 
of Arendt’s outright dismissal of revolutions driven by the alleviation of poverty and her 
overly simplistic characterization of figures like Fanon, King argues that her concern for 
creating a foundation for freedom through revolution has important implications in the 
post-colonial world. To demonstrate this, he considers Arendt’s boomerang thesis in 
light of her omission of the Haitian Revolution from her analysis of the revolutionary 
period to show that while she undoubtedly holds problematic views regarding African 
descended people, “In the post-colonial era, Arendt’s focus on the importance of a 
‘constitution of liberty,’ implying for her a politics of democratic participation in the 
context of stable institutions, remains a worthy, if limited, goal.”507 King reminds us that 
On Revolution came out in 1963, the same year that both James’s revised edition of The 
Black Jacobins and Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth were published. During this 
period, national liberation movements were taking place throughout the Third World and 
the Civil Rights Movement was at its height in the United States.508 Keeping this in 
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view, he says, “On Revolution remains one of the most important, even if eccentric, 
post-1945 texts for rethinking the modern revolutionary tradition of the West and global 
revolutions.”509 Given the failure of this era of national liberation to truly emancipate the 
Third World, he argues that Arendt’s work warrants greater attention in the context of 
post-colonial discourses concerning the global impact of the legacy of European 
colonization and imperialism on non-European peoples. Rather than dismissing Arendt 
on the basis of her blindness to the experience of exclusion in the African Diaspora, 
King insists that what is called for today is greater consideration of her work within this 
context. In particular, he believes that Arendt’s analysis of statelessness has a crucial 
role to play in addressing the exclusion of non-European populations that have been 
rendered superfluous in their own political communities, becoming candidates for 
extermination as a result of the continued imposition of cultural and racial hierarchies 
that have been inherited from the legacy of European slavery and colonization.510  
Nesbitt has also considered the importance of Arendt’s thought within this 
context, though he turns to it to give full articulation to the significance of the Haitian 
Revolution. Nesbitt argues that while Arendt never acknowledges the Haitian 
Revolution, she develops a conception of human freedom, particularly in her essay, 
“What is Freedom?” that is deeply relevant for any interpretation of this event.511 Upon 
turning to Arendt’s notion of freedom, he says:  
                                                
509 Ibid., 31. 
510 Ibid., 45. 
511 Nick Nesbitt, Universal Emancipation, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 
126. 
  262 
The Haitian Revolution is of consequence insofar as it was a fully manifest 
human action, an intervention based upon principle in Arendt’s sense, in which 
human freedom as a universal and undivided concept could ‘become manifest 
only in the performing act itself’ […]. It was the first world-historical event to 
enact such a notion of universal human freedom not as a mere idea of the 
Enlightenment, nor as the hypocritical, cynical compromise of a ‘free’ nation 
economically and socially growing rich of slave labor (France and the United 
States), but as a principled human act of universal emancipation in consonance 
with reason. […] In its short appearance in the world […] it was truly a miracle 
of human creativity.512 
According to Nesbitt, the Haitian Revolution, perhaps more so than any other revolution 
during this period, truly intervened in the cyclical processes of nature, bringing about the 
end of slavery and, with it, a new beginning that interrupted what had been believed to 
be a part of the natural development of the modern world. He thus argues that those who 
participated in the Haitian Revolution embodied Arendt’s notion of human freedom, 
revealing that freedom is not a natural possession of the human being, but rather 
something that comes into existence through the human capacity for action or the ability 
to introduce something new and wholly unexpected into the world.513  
Whereas King and Nesbitt emphasize the importance of Arendt’s thought for 
capturing the significance of non-European revolutions, Scott considers Arendt’s work 
                                                
512 Ibid., 126–7. 
513 Ibid. 
  263 
in On Revolution in order to challenge current conceptions of the relation between the 
colonial past and post-colonial present. He argues in Conscripts of Modernity: The 
Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment that what is called for in today’s post-colonial era is 
not the romanticized narrative of anti-colonial revolution, but rather a tragic 
characterization of the Enlightenment that underscores the impossibility of returning to a 
pre-colonial past. In contrast to the romantic, anti-colonial narrative, he explains that in 
tragedy, the relation between past, present, and future is never guided by a “triumphant 
and seamless progressive rhythm, but a broken series of paradoxes and reversals in 
which human action is ever open to unaccountable contingencies and luck.”514  In order 
to illustrate the tragedy of the colonial Enlightenment, he offers a tragic re-reading of 
James’s revised 1963 edition of The Black Jacobins, focusing in particular on his 
characterization of L’Ouverture in the final chapter of the text.  
Scott argues that while L’Ouverture believed that embracing the ideals of the 
Enlightenment of the French Revolution would be enough to guarantee the freedom of 
the enslaved, James depicts L’Ouverture as coming to realize by the end of the Haitian 
Revolution that he would in fact have to decide between these two ends despite being 
wholly committed to both. In this, Scott says, James depicts L’Ouverture as a tragic hero 
who “must choose and yet cannot choose without fatal cost.”515 L’Ouverture’s 
predicament, Scott argues, is broadly representative of the tragedy of the colonial 
Enlightenment. By reading James this way, rather than as an anti-colonial thinker, Scott 
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suggests that the tragedy of the colonial Enlightenment comes to appear not as 
something to be overcome, but rather as “a permanent legacy that has set the conditions 
in which we make of ourselves what we make and which therefore demands constant 
renegotiation and adjustment.”516  In light of this, Scott turns to Arendt’s work in On 
Revolution, which he believes provides an important starting point for thinking about the 
tragedy of the colonial Enlightenment, offering a similarly tragic characterization of the 
Enlightenment through her discussion of the lost revolutionary treasure of the modern 
era.  
Scott argues that Arendt, much like James, is fundamentally concerned with the 
problem of freedom and its relation to tragedy. He explains that Arendt models her 
notion of political life after the Athenian polis because, he says, “As the birth place of 
tragic thought, it is well attuned to the fact of human actions exposure to contingencies, 
its vulnerability to the unexpected and unplanned for.”517 The polis is only a space of 
words and deeds insofar as it is also a space of “collisions and negotiations,” depending 
for its existence on an “acute sense of human fragility and the inherent mutability of 
human ends.”518 On Scott’s view, both On Revolution and the revised edition of The 
Black Jacobins are oriented by a tragic notion of freedom that guides their respective 
discussions of revolution and its implications for the world we live in today. 
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Turning to On Revolution, Scott argues that Arendt believes modern revolution is 
fundamentally tragic. Even the American Revolution, which she believes succeeded in 
laying a foundation for freedom, ended tragically, failing to establish political 
institutions that would ensure the preservation of the memory of this moment of 
foundation. According to Scott, Arendt thus believes that we are now responsible for 
remembering a revolutionary tradition that has been lost and this loss is inseparable from 
the legacy of the revolutionary spirit that we are now tasked with preserving. Turning to 
Arendt’s concluding reference in On Revolution to Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, 
Scott argues that Arendt settles on tragedy as the mode of remembrance in the modern 
age.519 Yet, he also argues that Arendt’s insights into the problem of remembrance in On 
Revolution reveal the political possibilities that emerge from tragedy. Scott says, “This 
loss, Arendt suggests, grave and dismaying as it is, is not—or at least, not necessarily—
final.”520 For Arendt, it is only insofar as human freedom is fundamentally characterized 
by tragedy that it allows for the possibility of new beginnings and thus, her analysis of 
the lost revolutionary spirit does not lead to tragic conflict and paralysis, but rather to the 
possibility for tragic reconciliation.521  
In light of this, Scott argues that Arendt’s characterization of the tragedy of the 
Enlightenment provides a decisive starting point for thinking about how to move 
forward in light of the colonial past. He attempts to bring this into view by developing 
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Arendt’s tragic figuration of the Enlightenment in relation to James’s account of the 
Haitian Revolution. He turns in particular to James’s depiction of L’Ouverture in a 1797 
letter to the French Directory in which, suspecting the French of attempting to re-
establish slavery, L’Ouverture clarifies that any attempt to do this “will be met with 
determined force: ‘we have known how to face dangers and obtain our liberty, we shall 
know how to brave death to keep it.’”522 According to Scott, James depicts L’Ouverture 
in this moment as the tragic hero of the colonial Enlightenment and an Arendtian 
political agent par excellence.523 As James says:  
Leader of a backward and ignorant mass, [L’Ouverture] is yet in the forefront of 
the historical moment of his time. The blacks were taking part in the destruction 
of European feudalism begun by the French Revolution and liberty and equality, 
the slogans of the revolution meant far more to them than to any Frenchman. […] 
Rivers of blood were to flow before they were to understand that elevated as was 
his tone Toussaint had written neither bombast nor rhetoric but rather the simple 
somber truth.524  
L’Ouverture, Scott explains, is forced to decide in this moment, coming to terms with 
the tragedy of his situation and acting in light of it with the eloquence and sophistication 
of the best European statesmen despite having been a slave until he was forty-five.525 In 
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light of this, Scott says, “The story of L’Ouverture in The Black Jacobins is, I believe the 
story of the tragedy of the revolutionary tradition that On Revolution wishes to 
remember.”526  Scott rightly notes, however, that Arendt’s reflections on tragedy as a 
mode of remembrance remain underdeveloped, and her account of the experience of 
revolution, disappointingly narrow. For Arendt, there are only two eighteenth century 
revolutions, the French and American, leading her overlook what is perhaps the most 
tragic event of the revolutionary period, the Haitian Revolution. As Scott says, “Arendt’s 
oversight is all the more puzzling, and all the more disappointing, because what she is 
lamenting is precisely the failure of memory; she is in fact urging the importance of 
‘remembrance’ to sustain the spirit of the revolutionary spirit.”527  
Scott thus suggests that it is necessary to consider Arendt in light of the Haitian 
Revolution in order to clarify the implications of Arendt’s thought that never became 
transparent to her but that are decidedly important for coming to terms with a world that 
has been so deeply impacted by the European legacy of slavery and colonization. 
Scott’s analysis of Arendt and James offers an important point of departure for 
thinking about the implications of Arendt’s analysis for the discourse in post-colonial 
theory. Following Scott, I wish to suggest that Arendt’s work helps to clarify that the 
legacy of slavery and colonization is a permanent feature of the world we have inherited, 
and the attempt to return to something prior to or divorced from this legacy is untenable. 
In this, her work has the potential to make an important contribution to this discourse, 
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pointing to the impossibility of overcoming exclusion through political projects like anti-
colonialism that seek to return to an age before colonialism by calling for the destruction 
of the reality of the post-colonial situation in which we find ourselves. By considering 
Arendt in light of the Haitian Revolution, however, we also find that she turns a blind 
eye to a revolution that illuminates an important thread of the modern political tradition. 
Consequently, she fails to appreciate the implications of her own insights into the role of 
remembrance in political life given the revolutionary tradition we have inherited. As I 
have tried to suggest, this revolution demonstrates that even after citizenship is granted, 
the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past has the potential to forestall the event 
of appropriation that Arendt associates with human freedom. It therefore puts into relief 
the limits of her notion of citizenship for overcoming the forms of exclusion that have 
become definitive of the modern age. As the struggles of L’Ouverture and Dessalines 
demonstrate, this immemorial past is bound up with the revolutionary spirit of the 
modern era that Arendt believes we are tasked with preserving, even though it has been 
covered over and is unable to come into appearance as a part of this legacy. 
By expanding Arendt’s political categories within this context, we thus find that 
her own account of the responsibility citizens have to remember, when considered in 
light of the Haitian Revolution, reveals a paradox of remembrance at the heart of the 
political tradition of the modern age. This paradox consists in the conflict between the 
responsibility citizens have to remember in order to preserve a common world, and the 
impossibility of bringing those histories of violence and exclusion that are entailed by 
the modern political tradition into appearance as a part of our collective memory. Arendt 
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is right to insist on the importance of remembrance in the modern age for renewing the 
meaningfulness of the world and returning individuals from their loneliness to 
themselves and others. Yet, considering Arendt in light of the Haitian Revolution raises 
the question of how we reconcile ourselves to the past for the sake of carrying a common 
world into the future if a part of the legacy of that world always remains hidden.  
Whereas Scott turns to tragedy, I will turn in the final chapter of this project to 
the philosophical concept of repetition to develop the implications of this paradox of 
remembrance for understanding political exclusion today. Focusing in particular on 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s development of this concept in his discourse on history and 
Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of it in his discussion Dasein’s inheritance in 
Being and Time, I will use this idea to frame the ontological concepts of homecoming 
and belonging that orient Arendt’s notion of citizenship. I will then turn to the work of 
Jacques Derrida, whose critique of the originality of the event of appropriation and the 
homecoming it promises in his work, Specters of Marx, provides an important point of 
departure for understanding the implications of the paradox of remembrance in 
contemporary political life. Specifically, I will suggest by way of Derrida’s notion of 
ghosts and specters that the concept of modern citizenship is self-effacing, as the very 
affirmation of one’s citizenship necessitates the covering over of those histories of 
violence and exclusion that are internal to the legacy of the modern revolutionary 
tradition but incompatible with the Enlightenment narrative of universal emancipation 
that forms the basis for the modern political community. As such, I will argue that 
citizenship itself keeps a part of the legacy that we are tasked with preserving from 
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coming into appearance, thereby necessitating the repetition of the immemorial violence 
and exclusion of the past in our political traditions, institutions, and values. On the basis 
of this, I will suggest that addressing political exclusion today depends on going a step 
further than Arendt does in her analysis of citizenship. By expanding Arendt’s thought 
within the context of the European legacy of slavery and colonization, we find that 
citizenship alone is not enough to bring a common world into appearance; beyond this, 
we are called upon to develop political practices that enable us to come to terms in the 
space of politics with those histories of violence and exclusion that have been covered 
over through the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship but that are nevertheless 
bound up with the legacy of the world we have inherited. I will therefore suggest that 
addressing the problem of political exclusion that Arendt introduces in her discourse on 
statelessness and deepens through her analysis of loneliness depends on developing a 
new and more expansive frame for the concept of belonging in political ontology that 
makes room in the space of politics not only for citizens, but also for the specters of the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that are necessitated by the 
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CHAPTER VI 




As we have seen, Arendt offers a prescient characterization of political exclusion 
through her analysis of statelessness and her diagnosis of the problem of loneliness in 
the modern era. Both statelessness and loneliness arise when individuals have lost their 
place in a political community. This, she explains, produces a feeling of homelessness or 
the sense of having been severed from the nexus of meaningful relations that grants us 
our singularity and reminds us of our responsibility to the world in which we find 
ourselves. Without a political community, or a place in the world where one can speak 
and act in order to realize one’s native capacity for new beginnings and come into view 
in the presence of others as radically unique and unrepeatable, human beings run the risk 
of becoming superfluous. Under these conditions, individuals cease to appear as human 
beings and are recognized instead only as interchangeable parts in the necessary 
processes that govern nature or history, thereby becoming vulnerable to totalitarian 
domination. Arendt thus insists that in order for human beings to find a home in the 
world, they must belong to political community. With this, she argues that combating the 
physical and existential displacement that has become widespread in the modern era 
depends on developing a conception of citizenship that is oriented not by the liberal 
concern for the expansion of rights in the private sphere, but instead by our shared 
responsibility to make one another visible in the public sphere.  
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The importance of Arendt’s insights into the dangers and limits of modern 
political life cannot be overlooked and will remain a guiding thread of the final chapter 
of this project. Yet, as I have suggested, the notion of citizenship that Arendt develops 
on the basis of her critique of the loneliness and world-alienation in modern political life 
does not go far enough. She argues that citizenship, conceived as self-enactment in the 
space of appearance, promises freedom insofar individuals are able to enter into the 
public realm and rise above their concern for their particular existence in private life by 
working in concert with others to appropriate the world they have inherited. This, she 
thinks, involves taking responsibility for preserving the traditions, institutions, and 
values of the past such that they can be renewed and carried forward as part of the shared 
reality of a common world. So long as individuals affirm their citizenship by taking 
shared responsibility for remembering and renewing the legacy of the world they have 
inherited, Arendt believes that they can enact their freedom and restore the 
meaningfulness of the world in which they find themselves. 
Arendt thus takes this notion of citizenship to provide the means for achieving a 
homecoming in the modern era, offering a solution to the problem of political exclusion 
that is grounded in the ontological conditions of human existence. Yet, by considering 
Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution, I have tried to show that her 
notion of citizenship reveals a conflict internal to the concept of modern citizenship that 
keeps it from achieving this end. The example of the Haitian Revolution indicates that 
the legacy of the modern political tradition necessitates what I have called the paradox of 
remembrance that keeps even Arendt’s radical conception of citizenship from making 
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good on the promise of political inclusion. As I have suggested, the very implementation 
of Enlightenment citizenship necessitates the covering over of those histories of violence 
and exclusion that cannot be held together with the Enlightenment narrative of universal 
emancipation. Yet, because the revolutionary Enlightenment demands the universal 
expansion of citizenship, these immemorial legacies of violence and exclusion cannot be 
thought apart from the legacy of the political tradition that we are tasked with 
preserving. Hence, while Arendt believes that citizens have a responsibility to preserve 
in their collective memory the legacy of the world they have inherited, a part of the 
modern political legacy will always remain covered over, unable to come into 
appearance as a part of a shared reality that can be appropriated and carried forward. As 
remembrance is necessary for rebuilding the world in the modern era and overcoming 
the problem of loneliness, I have thus argued that Arendt’s notion of citizenship falls 
short of achieving the homecoming that she believes it promises.  
By bringing this paradox of remembrance into focus, we find that the Haitian 
Revolution epitomizes an original failure of Enlightenment citizenship. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide an account of the echo of this original failure of Enlightenment 
citizenship in the racialized violence and exclusion that continues to haunt diasporic 
peoples decades and centuries after becoming enfranchised. To this end, I will turn to the 
philosophical concept of repetition that emerges in Friedrich Nietzsche’s account of 
history and genealogy. This notion of repetition provides a frame for the ontological 
conception of homecoming that Heidegger introduces in the twentieth century and that 
Arendt further develops in the context of her notion of political belonging. While 
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Heidegger and Arendt take this notion of repetition to provide the ground for the 
possibility of appropriating the world we have inherited so as to find a home in it, 
discourses in post-structuralism and post-modernism rely on this notion of repetition to 
emphasize the violence, disunity, and fragmentation that is repeated each time we 
inherit, rendering the event of appropriation and the homecoming it promises impossible. 
By focusing, in particular, on Jacques Derrida’s account in Specters of Marx of the 
ghosts of the inappropriable that are left behind only to return again with each new event 
of appropriation, I will use this notion of repetition to provide a frame for interpreting 
the return of the immemorial violence and exclusion that continues to keep those who 
were once cast out from coming into appearance in the modern political arena. As I will 
suggest, this repetition can be understood as an effect of the paradox of remembrance 
that is entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship, and, by turning to it, 
we find that the concept of modern citizenship is self-effacing. That is, because this 
paradox of remembrance is bound up with the legacy we are tasked with preserving as 
citizens, affirming it will always necessitate a covering over and subsequent repetition of 
those histories of violence and exclusion that citizenship promises to overcome.  
In light of this, I wish to show that addressing political exclusion today depends 
on going beyond the concept of citizenship to allow the immemorial legacies of violence 
and exclusion that are necessitated by it to come into appearance as part of the heritage 
of the modern world. While this immemorial past may fail to come into appearance as 
such, I will turn to Derrida’s notion of specters and ghosts to put into relief the trace 
these legacies leave in modern political communities. I will give further contour to the 
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political significance of the immemorial by considering the notion of “nonhistory” that 
Édouard Glissant develops to describe the way history is experienced by colonized 
peoples and the obsessive presence these intangible histories have in their lived 
experience. On the basis of this, I will argue that what is called for today is a new frame 
for the concept of homecoming in political ontology that is keyed to the finitude of our 
collective memory and the ghosts of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past 
that are produced by it.  
As I will demonstrate, Arendt fails to appreciate the political significance of 
these ghosts in the modern era because she develops her conception of political life on 
the basis of a notion of homecoming rooted in the Greek political tradition. Indeed, the 
Greek polis might have promised a home in the world that was uninhabited by ghosts. 
Yet, because the Greeks were not concerned in the wake of their colonial endeavors with 
the universal expansion Greek citizenship, they could appropriate the legacy of the 
Greek city-state without contradiction or remainder, leaving behind these histories of 
violence and exclusion and ridding the polis of any presence of ghosts. Historical 
examples like the Haitian Revolution, by contrast, illustrate that such a possibility no 
longer exists in the modern world, as the legacy of the modern political tradition will 
always contain within it a trace of the immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed 
by the implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. With this, I will suggest that Arendt 
may be right in her suggestion that in order for human beings to find a home in the 
world, they must belong to a political community. Yet, I will argue that in order for the 
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possibility of political belonging to be realized today, it is necessary to come terms with 
the fact that our home, in contrast to the Greek polis, is one that will always be haunted.  
On the basis of this, I maintain that finding a home in the modern world depends 
on rethinking the space of politics, not as a refuge from these specters of exclusion, but 
rather as a space in which they can dwell and help guide political practice. That is, rather 
than conceiving of the space of human belonging as a home that promises an escape 
from the transgressions of the past, as Arendt and Heidegger do, or as a space from 
which we are interminably exiled, as Derrida does, I will suggest instead that this space 
must be understood in the modern age as a haunted house. By denying the existence of 
these ghosts and excluding them from the space of politics, I will argue that we fail to 
take shared responsibility for the legacy of the world we have inherited, thereby 
perpetuating the problem of loneliness that has become pervasive in modern political 
life. If, by contrast, we come to terms with the fact that the modern world will always be 
haunted, we can begin addressing the problem of exclusion in a way that is attuned to the 
legacy of the political tradition we have inherited.  
Developing a political framework that enables us to care properly for the legacy 
of the modern political tradition will thus require going beyond humanism and 
Enlightenment rationality so that the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past can 
become a part of the shared reality of the common world. Likewise, it will depend on 
going beyond the concern for the universal expansion of citizenship to develop an even 
more inclusive model of political life that makes room in the space of politics not just for 
the living present and the knowable, but also for the presence of ghosts. Therefore, rather 
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than turning to the Greek polis or the European Enlightenment, I will suggest by way of 
conclusion that a more suitable model for political life today may be found in a pariah 
tradition such as Haitian Vodou. As this tradition emphasizes a notion of belonging that 
turns on the responsibility the living have to become accustom to being with ghosts, it 
offers a metaphor for political life that brings the legacy of the revolutionary tradition of 
the modern era into view more clearly. Hence, in turning to it, my aim is to provide an 
alternative frame for the task of politics that has the potential to open new paths to 
addressing the problem of exclusion today. 
VI.1. Repetition and Homecoming 
As I have suggested, the Haitian Revolution epitomizes an original failure of 
Enlightenment citizenship to make good on the promise of universal inclusion set forth 
by the revolutionary tradition of the modern era. My aim in what follows will be to 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding the echo of this original failure of 
Enlightenment citizenship through the concept of repetition that is entailed by Arendt’s 
figuration of the space of appearance. To this end, I will turn to Nietzsche’s conception 
of history and the role it plays in Heidegger’s ontological notion of homecoming as he 
develops it in Being and Time. With this, I will suggest that Arendt, following 
Heidegger, takes political action to be a dynamic re-enactment of the space of 
appearance, or a repetition of the moment of foundation or new beginning that gave birth 
to the world in which we find ourselves. This notion of repetition is integral to Arendt’s 
conception of political belonging and her belief that human beings can find a home in 
the world so long as they are able to come into appearance in their radical singularity 
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through speech and action in the space of politics. On her view, this homecoming is 
promised by the appropriation of our inheritance, which Heidegger describes in terms of 
our thrownness, in the space of appearance. For Arendt and Heidegger alike, we inherit 
only insofar as we find ourselves always already thrown into language and history. 
Through our appropriation of language and history—which amounts for Arendt to 
speaking and acting in the space of politics—we repeat, hold open, or hand down a space 
of belonging or a home in the world where freedom can make its appearance. Hence, the 
notion of repetition that Nietzsche introduces particularly in his account of history 
provides an important frame for capturing the notion of homecoming or belonging that 
forms the basis for Arendt’s political ontology. As I shall demonstrate, however, the 
concept of repetition also forms the basis for post-structural and post-modern critiques of 
the violence inherent in the event of appropriation and the impossibility of finding a 
home in the world in virtue of the repetition of this violence. By turning to these 
critiques, and especially Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive political analysis of language 
and history, I will suggest that Arendt’s notion of citizenship necessitates the repetition 
of the paradox of remembrance, keeping those who were once cast out from 
participating fully in the event of appropriation that she believes is necessary for finding 
a home in the world.  
Nietzsche’s characterization of the notion of repetition as it unfolds in his 
genealogical approach to morality and his closely related account of history marks a 
decisive break with modern approaches to history and provides an important frame for 
understanding Arendt’s ontological account of the political sphere. Most relevant for our 
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purposes is Nietzsche’s discussion in The Advantage and Disadvantage of History for 
Life, where he takes to task modern historiography and the “superhistorical” standpoint it 
takes to evaluating the events of the past. According to Nietzsche, the “superhistorical” 
person believes that history functions in the service of pure knowledge, revealing truths 
about the world that hold universally across time. Those who adhere to such a 
conception of history, Nietzsche argues, agree that “the past and present are one in the 
same, that is, typically alike in all manifold variety and, as omnipresence of imperishable 
types, a static structure of unchanged value and eternally the same meaning.”528 Yet, 
such a conception of history overlooks the forgetfulness that is inherent in all human 
remembrance. Whereas the superhistorical person presumes that our capacity for 
remembrance is infinite, elevating us above the status of animals, Nietzsche suggests 
that we are worse off than the animals, as they have the good fortune of being able to 
forget without remainder. Beasts, he explains, are essentially unhistorical, incapable of 
recalling the past. It is in virtue of their unhistorical nature that they have no need for 
language. They simply appear as they are, unhidden and honest, free of any inclination 
to account for themselves beyond the present moment. Human beings, by contrast, are 
conditioned by the impulse to resist the burden of the past through remembrance.529 Yet, 
while we are able to remember, this capacity for memory is finite, as all action involves 
some measure of forgetting. Hence, Nietzsche explains that what comes to appear 
through action as historical will always be born of the unhistorical or what has been 
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forgotten for the sake of the coherence of the story we tell of ourselves. Whereas the 
superhistorical person is driven by the misguided desire to be essentially historical, 
Nietzsche says, “The unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary for the health 
of an individual, a people, and a culture.”530 He thus wishes to bring into focus the line 
that divides “the observable brightness from the unilluminated darkness,” so as to 
remind us that history never reveals universal truths about the world, but instead takes 
shape within a specific context or limited set of horizons that encircle one’s particular 
existence.531 For remembrance to be a life affirming venture, Nietzsche thus insists that 
our impulse towards it must be tempered by our awareness of the forgotten 
contingencies, transgressions, and errors that have given rise to those moments of 
greatness that we preserve in our collective memory. He argues, in light of this, that each 
imitation or repetition of the original historical moment will not be identical to it, as the 
superhistorical person suggests, but will instead be infused with difference, interpreted 
anew and more meaningfully with each repetition. Therefore, by coming to understand 
ourselves as both historical and unhistorical, we find that our engagement in rituals that 
commemorate the past through our re-enactment of an original moment of foundation, as 
well as our efforts to imitate the great deeds of our ancestors, will always be novel. That 
is, he says, “As long as the past must be written about as worthy of imitation, as capable 
of being imitated, with the possibility of a second occurrence, history is definitely in 
danger of becoming something altered, reinterpreted into something more beautiful, and 
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thus coming close to free poeticizing.”532 For Nietzsche, while each repetition of the past 
will be distinct and distant from the origin it seeks to repeat, its difference from this 
origin is precisely what enables great individuals to bring new meaning into the world. 
Nietzsche thus challenges the modern obsession with transforming history into a science. 
While we may have encyclopedic knowledge of the Greeks, Nietzsche explains that 
modern man’s restless effort to fill himself with knowledge of an alien age, philosophy, 
religion, and culture only reveals that he lacks a culture of his own.533 On Nietzsche’s 
view, the effort to achieve encyclopedic historical knowledge will always be a life-
denying endeavor because it involves a failure to embrace the creative possibilities that 
are opened up, not just by the human being’s historical nature, but also by her 
unhistorical nature. Nietzsche thus argues that if history is to function in the service of 
life, it requires that great individuals have the strength to forget in order to allow the 
difference that is entailed in every repetition of the past to come into appearance and 
give birth to a new and superior culture.534  
This notion of the interplay between repetition and difference and, with it, the 
sentiment that the unhistorical, repressed, and forgotten cannot be thought apart from the 
historical, expressed, and remembered has been decisive for the development of the 
major theoretical currents of the twentieth century. It plays a central role, for instance, in 
Heidegger’s ontology in Being and Time of the event-character of being and his account 
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of the existential constitution of Dasein, particularly as it unfolds in his characterization 
of authentic Dasein’s relation to its thrownness and the possibilities that are opened up 
by Dasein’s appropriation of its heritage. Heidegger’s development of the notion of 
repetition is crucial for understanding the trajectory of twentieth century discourses in 
phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics concerning the question of belonging, 
particularly as it unfolds in Arendt’s thought.  
As we saw in Chapter One, Heidegger believes that the emphasis in western 
metaphysics on discerning the fixed properties and eternal essences that lie behind 
appearances has led us to forget the ground of being as it reveals itself in what comes to 
appear in the world. Divorced from the inherent meaningfulness of the world, modern 
man has thus become alienated and homeless. In order to overcome this homelessness, 
Heidegger thus calls for the destruction of metaphysics so as to bring about a return to 
the ontological ground of being. In order for ontology to set the being of beings into 
relief, Heidegger argues that it is necessary to employ the method of phenomenology, 
which takes truth and meaning to flow not from fixed and pre-given essences imposed 
from without, but rather from the phenomena themselves.535  
As Heidegger explains, the phenomenon is not merely an appearance or self-
showing that reveals itself in the same way each time it comes into appearance. On the 
contrary, Heidegger argues, the phenomenon can only show itself meaningfully as what 
it is insofar as it also conceals itself. 536 That is, the condition for the possibility of its 
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coming into appearance as meaningful is its concealment or the fact that with each 
appearance in the world, it “precisely and continually veils what it is in itself.”537 Hence, 
truth and meaning in the ontological sense are distinct from metaphysical and 
epistemological conceptions of truth and meaning insofar as what is discovered in 
“letting [beings] be seen as something unconcealed” never exhausts the ground of 
being.538 That is, the phenomenon never gives itself over entirely as what it is and must 
therefore be uncovered or discovered anew in our encounters with it. In this, Heidegger 
argues, the method of phenomenology must be understood in terms of the interplay 
between phenomenon and logos, as it is through language or discourse that we wrest 
beings from their concealment such that they come to appear in the world as 
meaningful.539 The truth of being thus makes its appearance in the world because we are 
able “to take beings that are being talked about...out of their concealment; to let them be 
seen as something unconcealed (ἀληϑές); to discover them.”540 That is, for Heidegger, 
the truth or meaning that emanates from the phenomenon is never absolute, but must 
instead be drawn out and made meaningful through discourse. Thus, through discourse, 
we discover anew the inherent truth of the phenomenon, thereby bringing about an event 
or interruption in our everyday dealings with things that introduces new meaning into the 
world. In this, truth and meaning are not pre-given or universal, but must instead be 
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discovered anew through discursive engagement, or our appropriation of language, 
which brings the meaningfulness of the world into appearance. 
Heidegger’s ontological account of being provides the frame for his investigation 
into the being of human beings and their relation to history. What it means to enact 
oneself fully as a human being, Heidegger argues, consist not in actualizing a pre-given 
essence, but instead in deciding to seize upon the possibilities that are opened up by the 
finite set of horizons that encircle one’s particular existence. The freedom that emerges 
from this decision depends on Dasein’s temporality, or the fact that Dasein is essentially 
futural in being-towards-death, while equiprimodially “having-been,” constituted by its 
throwness.541 In §74 of Being and Time, Heidegger draws on Nietzsche’s notion of 
repetition in order to develop an account of how it is that Dasein can return to itself from 
out of these conditions in order to be free for its own most possibilities to be. 
Being free, Heidegger argues, always involves a resolute decision to take over 
one’s thrownness, a decision that amounts to the appropriation of one’s inheritance. In 
this, he says, the resolute decision of authentic Dasein always involves “handing oneself 
over to traditional possibilities, though not necessarily as traditional ones.”542 This 
handing over of oneself to one’s throwness is also a handing down, or as, Heidegger 
explains, a repetition. He says, “Repetition is explicitly a handing down [Überlieferung], 
that is, going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there.”543 Resoluteness 
                                                
541 Heidegger, 366. 
542 Ibid., 365. 
543 Ibid., 367. 
  285 
thus involves Dasein’s decision to hand itself down by gathering together and 
interpreting anew its inherited possibilities in light of the freedom that emerges from its 
being-towards-death in order to “take over its thrownness and be in the Moment for ‘its 
time.’”544 Authentic historicity, fate, or destiny, as Heidegger describes it—or what 
might be described in Arendt’s language as the traditions, institutions, and values that 
constitute the world in which we find ourselves—are thus given to us by the repetition of 
the possibilities of Dasein’s existence through the resolute decision to take over one’s 
inheritance. This repetition, however, is not identical to what came before, nor does it 
“disclose the Dasein that has been in order to actualize it again.” 545 As Heidegger 
explains:  
Arising from resolute self-projection, repetition is not conceived by ‘something 
past,’ in just letting it just come back as what was once real. Rather, repetition 
responds to the possibility of existence that has been there. But responding 
[Erwinderung] to this possibility in a resolution is at the same time, as a response 
to belonging to the moment, the renunciation [Wilderruf] of that which is 
working itself out in the today as ‘past.’ Repetition neither abandons itself to the 
past, nor does it aim at progress. In the Moment, authentic existence is indifferent 
to both of these moments.546 
                                                
544 Ibid., 366 
545 Ibid., 367. 
546 Ibid. 
  286 
In this, Heidegger argues, history cannot be understood as the free-floating succession of 
the experiences of subjects, nor can it be understood as a mere chronicle of what has 
happened. Moreover, our repetitions of the past are not identical to the origin they seek 
to repeat. On the contrary, history is born out of Dasein’s authentic being-towards-death, 
or the finitude of the temporality of Dasein that orients it towards the future. Dasein, in 
being temporally constituted hands down only by appropriating anew the possibilities 
that emerge from its thrownness or its inheritance, which always contain within them the 
possibility of being free for its death and its own most possibilities to be. That is, 
Heidegger says, “Dasein does not first become historical in repetition, but rather because 
as temporal it is historical, it can take itself over in its history, retrieving it.”547 The 
repetition of the past, on Heidegger’s view, is thus the repetition of the enactment of 
Dasein’s existential choice to be free.  
History, understood in terms of Dasein’s authentic historicity tells the story of 
Dasein’s being at home in the world, whereby Dasein brings itself into accord with the 
conditions of its existence by choosing to enact its own most possibilities to be from out 
of its thrownness. That is, history arises through appropriation, whereby Dasein brings 
new meaning into the world through its enactment of those possibilities that are most its 
own. Insofar as Dasein is finite, this event of appropriation, or the discovery of new 
meaning that is brought to bear on the world through Dasein’s actualization of those 
possibilities that are most its own, will always involve the simultaneous covering over of 
the possibilities it chooses not to enact. Hence, because Dasein can only authentically 
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appropriate its inheritance by first coming to terms with the radical singularity and 
unrepeatability that is given by its being-towards-death, the repetition of its thrownness 
will always be keyed to this singularity, differentiating it from what came before and 
leaving the origin it seeks to repeat partially concealed. In this, what it means for Dasein 
to be historical is also to be unhistorical, falling into forgetfulness with each resolute 
decision to appropriate the past anew. Yet, in much the same way as Nietzsche, 
Heidegger suggests that it is only in virtue of this forgetfulness that Dasein can return 
authentically to itself from out of its finitude. That is, it is only in virtue of Dasein’s 
ability to bring its inheritance into accord with its own most possibilities to be that it can 
take ownership of the world in order to renew its meaningfulness and find a home in it.  
 While the notion of historical destiny that Heidegger employs in this section of 
Being and Time has been interpreted as an expression of his political and ideological 
involvement in National Socialism, his account of repetition as the handing down of 
Dasein’s existential possibilities has deep resonances with Arendt’s concern for tradition 
and the role she suggests it plays in preserving the space of appearance. Likewise, while 
Arendt is deeply critical of what she describes as Nietzsche’s rebellion against tradition, 
her own account of history is unquestionably rooted in it.548 As we have seen, Arendt 
challenges the way in which history in the modern era has come to be understood 
scientifically and the events of the past reduced to a process that serves to explain these 
events, not as meaningful in themselves, but rather as a means towards the fulfillment of 
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a future destiny of mankind. On Arendt’s view, the original task of history was to “save 
human deeds from the futility that comes from oblivion,” preserving in our collective 
memory those moments of foundation that remind us of who we are in our freedom and 
of the world to which we belong.549 In the attempt to explain away the unpredictable by 
totalizing the events of the past as process, Arendt argues that such conceptions of 
history not only cover over our finitude but, in so doing, also keep us from taking 
responsibility for appropriating our inheritance anew and ensuring the continuation of 
the world from the generation to generation. In this, Arendt’s critique of modern history 
echoes the work of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, insofar as she emphasizes the way in 
which this totalizing approach to history leaves us alienated from ourselves in our 
freedom. Moreover, in much the same way as Nietzsche and Heidegger, Arendt 
emphasizes the finitude of memory, or the forgetfulness that is inherent in the task of 
remembrance, and the fact that what we come to call history is conditioned by the 
unhistorical or those contingencies and errors that give birth to the events we have 
preserved in our memory but that have fallen into oblivion, failing to come into 
appearance as a part of the reality of the world we share in common. In this, history does 
not reveal the totality of what has happened, but instead preserves in our memory only 
those words and deeds that are too important to be forgotten, reminding us of our 
freedom and the fact that we belong to the world in which we find ourselves. 
 Arendt’s political ontology and the emphasis she places on the need in political 
life to preserve the traditions, institutions, and values of the past can thus be understood 
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in terms of the notion of repetition that arises in Nietzsche’s account of history and 
Heidegger’s further development of this idea in his account of the existential constitution 
of Dasein as being-in-the-world. As we have already seen, especially in Arendt’s 
account of Roman political practice, she insists that preserving the traditions of the past 
means taking responsibility for the legacy of one’s freedom manifest in the beginning or 
foundational moment of a political community.550 In this, taking responsibility for one’s 
inheritance involves handing down the traditions, institutions, and values that constitute 
the common world through the repetition of this moment of beginning. Yet, the meaning 
that is sustained through this repetition arises not from its identity to the origin but rather 
from being augmented or appropriated anew by each generation that inherits it. Hence, 
the preservation of this beginning will always involve the dynamic and novel re-
enactment of it, differentiating it from its origin such that it becomes a part of a shared 
reality that belongs to the present and can, in turn, be carried forward into the future.  
In light of this, we find that Arendt’s notion of political action can be understood 
in terms the repetition of this moment of origin.551 By speaking and acting in concert in 
the space of appearance, human beings appropriate the world anew and in so doing enact 
their freedom. Hence, political action is itself a repetition of the original moment of 
foundation. This repetition is possible only insofar as the founding moment is 
appropriated anew in light of the conditions in which we find ourselves such that it can 
be carried forward into the future. Hence, repetition in Arendt’s work can be understood 
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as the handing down or carrying forward of natality and plurality, or the existential 
conditions for the possibility of human freedom. In this, the enactment of one’s freedom 
through speech and action in the space of politics is itself a repetition of the beginning, 
and this repetition, along with the difference it necessitates, is the condition for the 
possibility of finding oneself at home in the world. By announcing who we are through 
speech in the space of politics, we appropriate our thrownness as it is manifest in 
language, coming into appearance in our radical singularity so as to realize our inherent 
capacity for new beginnings manifest in the human condition of natality. Likewise, 
action marks a new beginning only insofar as it involves the appropriation of history, or 
the preservation and augmentation of the traditions of the world we have inherited so 
that it can be carried forward into the future. In this, speech and action in political life 
can be seen as the handing down or repetition of the legacy of human freedom, holding 
open a space in the world where human beings can come into accord with themselves in 
their natality and plurality. It is therefore in virtue of the repetition of the moment of 
foundation, or the appropriation of language and history through speech and action in the 
political sphere, that human beings, Arendt thinks, are able to find a home in the world. 
Moreover, while the event of appropriation is a new beginning in itself, it is precisely 
this repetition of human freedom that we preserve in our collective memory as history, 
reminding us of our ability to rise above the finitude of our particular existence by taking 
responsibility for a world that existed before us and will outlast our lives in it.  
The work of each of these figures marks a radical departure from modern 
conceptions of history, putting into relief the finitude of human memory and, with it, the 
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fact that our origins, whether as individuals or as members of a community, will always 
remain inaccessible in their entirety. Moreover, each suggests that the decision to act 
into the future will always involve the covering over of that which no longer has a place 
in the shared reality of the common world. In this, each suggests that the re-enactment of 
the past will never be identical to the origin it seeks to repeat, but will instead be 
differentiated from it and, as such, will always involve some measure of forgetting. Yet, 
these figures also suggest that this forgetfulness is the condition for the possibility of 
human freedom, enabling us to act into the future by offering a novel interpretation of 
what came before. With this, Arendt and Heidegger maintain that the possibilities that 
arise from our finitude, or the fact that we always already find ourselves encircled by a 
finite set of horizons, constitute the condition for the possibility of a homecoming. 
Hence, rather than longing melancholically for a past that no longer exists by developing 
encyclopedic knowledge of it, these figures emphasize the need in modern life to 
embrace the redemptive and creative possibilities that are opened up by forgetting. That 
is, they call on us to develop the ability to perceive both historically and unhistorically, 
suggesting that it is necessary to consign the wounds of the past to oblivion in order to 
open up new and more meaningful relations that enable us to find a home in the world. 
Hence, Nietzsche’s challenge to the “superhistorical” standpoint of the modern 
individual gives birth to a redemptive conception of forgetting, leading figures like 
Arendt to suggest that while modern man may be alienated from himself, this does not 
preclude the possibility of finding a home in the world. Achieving such a homecoming, 
however, depends first on coming to terms with the finitude of our existence. For Arendt 
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and those like her it is only in virtue of our forgetfulness that we are able to bring 
something new into the world and, in so doing, enact our freedom.  
VI.2 Repetition and Exile 
Whereas these figures emphasize the possibility of finding a home in the world 
by coming to terms with the finitude of our memory and the difference it entails in each 
repetition of the past, more recent discourses in post-structuralism and post-modernism 
suggest that such a notion of homecoming does not do enough to carry Nietzsche’s 
insights into the contingency of meaning and history to its logical conclusion. Rather 
than emphasizing the redemptive and creative possibilities that are born out of the 
temporality of human existence and finitude of human memory, figures such as Jean-
Françoise Lyotard, Jean-Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault turn to the 
notion of difference and repetition to draw attention to the violence that is bound up with 
each moment of foundation. In so doing, they take the concept of repetition to reveal that 
each event of appropriation necessitates the repetition of an originary violence, re-
inscribing with each “handing down” the very disunity, fragmentation, contingency, and 
error that appropriation attempts to resolve.  
Foucault’s work in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,” epitomizes the post-
modern or post-structuralist interpretation of the stakes involved in Nietzsche’s 
conception of history and genealogy. In this text, Foucault employs the method of 
genealogy to go beyond Nietzsche in order to evaluate the effective role that the 
immemorial past plays in the production of power and knowledge. Foucault argues that 
while genealogy is concerned with the question of descent, it stands in opposition to the 
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search for pure origins and teleological explanations of history, working instead to 
identify the accidents and faulty calculations that gave birth to the truths that exist 
today.552 Such an approach to history, Foucault insists, is crucial for exposing the fact 
that what we know and who we are reveals neither truth nor being. On his view, 
genealogy addresses the question of descent not by building mythical foundations, but 
rather by exposing the fractures in these foundations and the social deformities that have 
been inscribed in us by the history of errors our ancestors have committed and that we 
have, in turn, inherited.553 Foucault’s thus draws on the method of genealogy in the 
service of uncovering the endlessly repeating play of domination and violence involved 
in the appropriation of the past and the production of knowledge, logic, and law.554 With 
this, Foucault suggests that if history is understood genealogically, it forms the basis for 
a vital critique of traditional histories, “introducing discontinuity to our very being” by 
drawing attention to the disunity and fragmentation that gets carried through with every 
repetition of the past.555  
In contrast to Arendt, figures who engage Nietzsche this way presume that the 
difference inherent in every repetition of the past exposes our interminable exile from 
ourselves and the world we have inherited. Whereas Arendt takes human finitude to 
create an opening for finding a home in the world, these figures suggest that such 
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notions of homecoming overlook the way in which the originary violence inherent in the 
moment of foundation gets repeated in the structures that organize social and political 
life with each event of appropriation. For Foucault, every repetition of the origin is at the 
same time a repetition of the violence, impurity, or fracturing entailed by this origin that 
we may have forgotten, but that nevertheless re-inscribes itself in each new generation. 
Our blindness to the violence and disunity that is imbedded within each moment of 
foundation is an ineluctable feature of the finitude of human memory. Thus, for these 
figures, the task of resolving this disunity will never be complete and the appropriative 
event that promises belonging will always be self-effacing, reifying the violence, 
impurity, or fracturing of the moment of foundation with each repetition of it. Rather 
than searching for a home in the world, these figures suggest instead that we come to 
terms with the fact that our inheritance will always leave us alienated from ourselves. On 
the basis of this, they suggest that rather than searching for a home that does not exist, 
we should instead remain vigilant in our critique of the violence and exclusion that gets 
repeated in every event of appropriation.556  
This notion of exile and the opposition it forms to the concept of homecoming is 
perhaps no more salient than in the work of Jacques Derrida. We have already seen how 
Derrida’s notion of deconstruction works in “The Force of Law” to expose the violence 
inherent in the foundation of law and the way in which the originary cut or divide that is 
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inherent in this foundation is repeated in every attempt to restore justice through its 
execution. His concern for the question exile comes into view even more clearly in his 
political discourses concerning language and history, where he suggests that our the 
effort to take over our thrownness through the appropriation of language and history will 
always leave behind a remainder, or an inappropriable other, that reveals the 
impossibility of ever returning to ourselves entirely. In The Monolingualism of the 
Other, or the Prosthesis of Origin, for instance, Derrida deconstructs the presumed 
purity of his mother tongue in order to put into relief the impossibility of the 
homecoming that figures like Heidegger and Arendt suggest is promised by our relation 
to language. To this end, he turns to his own experience as a French speaking Algerian 
Jew to show that while we only ever have one language, this language is never our own, 
exposing us, in our very intimacy with it, to the exile in which we always already find 
ourselves.557 In a rare moment, Derrida takes direct aim at Arendt in this text, calling 
into question her proclaimed affection for the German language in her 1964 interview 
with Günter Gaus, where she suggests that even in the aftermath of Auschwitz, her 
mother tongue remains, promising a homecoming or a return to an originary and 
orienting context of meaning.558 Derrida explains that he, like Arendt, has a deep and 
abiding affection for his mother tongue. Yet, he turns to his own experience as a French 
colonial subject to show that the language he calls his own is in fact other to him, 
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imposed from without by an unknown source in the colonial motherland. Derrida takes 
this experience of language to be disclosive of a universal structure of language, 
whereby we find ourselves always already alienated from the pretense of our “mother 
tongue” or the language that purports to promise a metaphorical homecoming through 
the restoration of our relation to the world. In this, Derrida argues, the language that is 
assigned to us does not return us to ourselves, as Arendt suggests, but instead points to 
something outside, a law originating elsewhere that keeps us from ever fully 
appropriating or taking over our thrownness. He maintains, too, that the claim to the 
purity of one’s relation to one’s mother tongue is not only self-effacing but also contains 
within it a violent colonial impulse to eradicate difference or the otherness that is always 
disclosed in the intimacy of our relation to language. That is, he says, “The 
monolingualism imposed by the other operates by relying upon the foundation, here, 
through a sovereignty whose essence is always colonial, which tends, repressively and 
irrepressively to reduce language to the One, that is, to the hegemony of the 
homogenous.”559 Hence, Derrida insists that while we find ourselves thrown into a 
language, the very intimacy of our relation to it only ever discloses our distant and 
fractured relation to the homecoming it promises. Derrida thus maintains that the 
expansion and repetition of those foundations and origins that promise unity will always 
be self-effacing, exposing us to the impossibility of returning to the home we seek to 
rebuild or renew through an event of appropriation.  
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Derrida gives articulation to the political implications of the inappropriable in the 
context of memory, inheritance, and generation in his discussion of ghosts in Specters of 
Marx. Derrida’s specific concern for the ghost or specter can be traced to a conflict he 
identifies in the concept of the new beginning or event that is central to the thought of 
both Heidegger and Arendt. He takes his point of departure for thinking about ghosts 
from two modern specters, Marx’s specter of communism and the ghost of Hamlet’s 
father, both of whom stand at the opening of two distinctively modern events. Derrida 
says: 
The first noun of the Manifesto, and this time in the singular, is ‘specter.’ ‘A 
specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism.’ Exordium or incipit: 
this first noun opens, then, the first scene of the first act: ‘Ein Gespenst geht um 
in Europa—das Gespenst des Kommunismus.’ As in Hamlet, the Prince of a 
rotten State, everything begins by the apparition. More precisely by the waiting 
of this apparition. […] The revenant is going to come. Still more precisely, 
everything begins in the imminence of a re-apparition of the specter as apparition 
for the first time in the play.560    
These figurations of the specter form the basis for Derrida’s critique of the pure 
originality and singularity of the event of appropriation. Insofar as we only project from 
out of our inheritance, he argues that the new beginning or event is conditioned by the 
re-apparition or repetition of something past. Action that gives birth to the event is only 
possible to the extent that we find ourselves haunted by the feeling that something 
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remains in need of appropriation. This feeling arises from our inheritance and is a fact of 
our birth, leaving us from our beginning with the task of gathering together what came 
before in order to bring ourselves into alignment with the present. Yet, inheritance 
always resists unification, remaining disparate and heterogeneous, as a result of the 
finitude of our memory. Derrida thus argues that the appropriation of our inheritance, or 
the gathering together of the past for the sake of carrying a common world into the 
future, will always involve a decision that cuts, and this cut is necessitated by the 
responsibility we have to take over our inheritance. He says: 
Its presumed unity, if there is one, cannot exist without injunction to reaffirm by 
choosing. ‘One must’ means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out 
several possibilities that inhabit the same injunction. […] The critical choice 
called for by any reaffirmation of the inheritance is also, like memory itself, the 
condition of finitude. The infinite does not inherit (from) itself. The injunction 
itself (it always says ‘choose and decide from among what you inherit’) can only 
be one by dividing itself, tearing itself apart, differing/deferring itself, by 
speaking at the same time several times and in several voices.561   
The injunction, or the decision that cuts, thus reveals that our inheritance can never be 
one with itself, brought together with the living present, but will instead only ever 
inhabit the present as temporally disjointed and phenomenologically out of place. The 
event itself will always carry with it a trace of the inappropriable other, or “what would 
have happened otherwise and thus also happens, like a specter, in that which does not 
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happen.” 562 The specter thus represents an originary wrong or birth wound of 
inheritance, revealing that there can be no event or new beginning without this 
concomitant haunting. In other words, Derrida says, “One never inherits without coming 
to terms with some specter, and therefore with more than one specter.” 563 On Derrida’s 
view, then, the event of appropriation will always begin with a specter, or a repetition of 
the inappropriable or immemorial past. This specter is at once beyond the 
phenomenological presence of the event, while at the same time felt in our anticipation 
and anxious waiting for a return or reapparition of the departed.564 That is, Derrida says, 
it is “a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a haunting of both memory and 
translation.”565 Because these specters are reapparitions or repetitions, rather than novel 
and phenomenally robust eruptions of meaning, they fail to come into full presence. As 
such, Derrida says, the ghost or specter is  “something that one does not know precisely, 
and one does not know if precisely it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and 
corresponds to an essence.”566 And yet, its absence is felt immanently, as if interred 
within the event, undermining the cathartic release and the pure originality that is 
promised by each new beginning.  
Derrida’s discussion in this text turns on the question of justice, understood not 
as a matter of law or right, but rather as a matter of the infinite responsibility we have to 
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bear the weight of our inheritance. The concept of responsibility, Derrida argues, is 
thinkable only because it is keyed to the paradoxical absence of those who have yet to be 
born and those who have already died. That is, to find oneself responsible is to feel the 
burden, not of the living present, but rather of one’s inheritance and the manifestation of 
this inheritance in what is owed to the future.567 Responsibility thus involves being 
accountable for something that no longer is or has yet to come into being, temporally out 
of joint with the living present and, in this, hidden from view.  Hence, in order to begin 
addressing the question of justice, Derrida argues that our investigation must begin, not 
with the events of birth and death, but rather with what is beyond or between the two.568 
This, he argues, points to a new kind of politics that involves learning to live ghosts, or 
the immemorial violence and exclusion that gets repeated in the event of appropriation. 
Politics today must involve being-with specters, and, he says, “This being-with specters 
would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, or inheritance, and of 
generation.”569 Hence, rather than calling for a political ontology, Derrida calls instead 
for a political “hauntology” that investigates the question of the event not in terms of the 
freedom it promises from the wounds of the past, but instead in terms of our encounter 
with ghosts and specters, or the inappropriable that is entailed by every attempt to 
appropriate our inheritance.570 
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In light of this, we find that the concept of repetition not only provides a frame 
for understanding Arendt’s conception of the political action, but also brings into focus 
the broader implications of political ontology that Arendt, in her indebtedness to the 
tradition of phenomenology, fails to appreciate. In what follows, I will use Derrida’s 
hauntalogy to suggest that Arendt’s conception of citizenship necessitates an encounter 
with ghosts; that is, it necessitates the repetition of the inappropriable or the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past that fails to come into presence in the space of 
appearance, but that nevertheless haunts our political traditions, institutions and values. 
This notion of ghosts offers an interpretive frame for understanding the repetition of the 
paradox of remembrance that is entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment 
citizenship and its implications for contemporary political practice. This, in turn, will 
help to show that the modern concept of citizenship itself is self-effacing, undermining 
the belonging or homecoming that Arendt believes is necessary for overcoming 
loneliness in the modern era.  
VI.3. The Self-Effacing Character of Enlightenment Citizenship 
As we have seen, Arendt gives political articulation to her concern for belonging 
through her conception of citizenship. Rather than conceiving of citizenship in terms of 
the liberal concern for securing rights in the private sphere, she argues instead that 
citizenship must be understood as a lived and embodied activity in the public sphere that 
involves speaking and acting in concert with others in order to carry a common world 
from the past into the future. In this, her account of citizenship is oriented by the 
responsibility citizens have to preserve the legacy of the world they have inherited for 
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the sake of appropriating it anew and ensuring its continuation for future generations. On 
Arendt’s view, it is only by participating in such an event of appropriation that human 
beings can realize their freedom. Moreover, as this event of appropriation depends on 
taking responsibility for the world one has inherited, the political belonging that Arendt 
believes is promised by her conception of citizenship depends on remembrance or the 
preservation of the legacy of one’s political community. In the context of modern 
political life, she argues, remembrance, or the appropriation of the legacy of the 
revolutionary spirit of the modern age, is crucial for rebuilding the world and finding a 
home in it.  
 Yet, as I have tried to show, Arendt fails to appreciate the paradox of 
remembrance that lies at the heart of the revolutionary tradition of the modern age that 
she suggests must be preserved and renewed if we are to find a home in the world. By 
framing Arendt’s conception of the political sphere in terms of the notion of repetition, 
we find that this paradox of remembrance is necessitated by the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship. As we saw through the example of the Haitian Revolution, 
the universal humanism of the Enlightenment project necessitates the covering over of 
those histories of violence and exclusion that are bound up with the legacy of the modern 
political tradition but that are incompatible with the narrative of universal emancipation 
on which the expansion of Enlightenment citizenship is based. As such, the very 
implementation of citizenship in the modern era renders the legacy that must be 
preserved in our collective memory if we are to renew the meaningfulness of the world 
incapable of being fully memorialized. The European legacy of slavery and colonization, 
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which is among the most violent and exclusionary of these histories, is a feature of the 
tradition of the modern era. Yet, because this history cannot be held together with the 
ideal of universal emancipation inherent in the narrative of the Enlightenment, the very 
expansion of Enlightenment citizenship to those who bear the burden of these histories 
covers over it, keeping it from coming into appearance as a part of the common world.  
A conflict thus arises between the responsibility Arendt suggests modern citizens 
have to preserve the legacy of the revolutionary tradition and the fact that this legacy 
will always contain within it a history of violence and exclusion that has been forgotten, 
failing, in turn, to come into appearance as part of the shared reality of the common 
world. This conflict reveals that the concept of citizenship in the modern era is self-
effacing. Its affirmation depends on the repetition of the revolutionary spirit of the 
modern age, which, in disclosing the meaning of this heritage, simultaneously covers 
over those parts of it that cannot be held together with the Enlightenment narrative. On 
Arendt’s view, citizenship promises political belonging only insofar as citizens take 
responsibility for bringing the legacy of their political community into full view in the 
space of appearance such that it can be appropriated and carried forward as part of a 
common world. Yet, because this paradox of remembrance is bound up with the 
revolutionary spirit of the modern age, fulfilling one’s responsibility as a citizen to 
preserve the legacy of the modern political tradition will at the same time always involve 
the preservation or repetition of the immemorial history of violence and exclusion that is 
entailed by this legacy. Hence, the promise of political belonging that citizenship makes 
remains unfulfilled in the modern era, as the legacy that we are tasked with remembering 
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can never come into full view, and the very appropriative event that is required in order 
to achieve this will always involve the repetition of the inappropriable or the 
immemorial violence and exclusion that is entailed by the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship.   
 The paradox of remembrance that is internal to the revolutionary spirit of the 
modern era thus has a central role to play in understanding the character of political 
exclusion today. In light of it, we see that the racialized violence and exclusion that 
continues to haunt diasporic people decades and centuries after becoming citizens can be 
understood as a repetition of the original failure of Enlightenment citizenship epitomized 
by the Haitian Revolution. This failure of Enlightenment citizenship discloses the 
paradox of remembrance at the heart of the revolutionary tradition that we are tasked 
with preserving in the modern era. Because the French legacy of slavery and 
colonization could not be held together with the Enlightenment narrative of the French 
Revolution and carried forward as part of a common world, it was left unappropriated 
and covered over. Yet, rather than fading into oblivion, this unappropriated legacy 
continued to haunt French Saint-Domingue in the form of the threat of a return to 
slavery, or a repetition of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that failed 
to be appropriated. The repetition of the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past 
thus comes to appear through this example as a part of the legacy of the revolutionary 
tradition that we are tasked with preserving in the modern era. However, because the 
very implementation of Enlightenment citizenship necessitates the covering over of this 
history of violence and exclusion, this threat of a return to the violence and exclusion of 
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the past fails to come into full presence, remaining unappropriated and returning again 
with each re-enactment of the political sphere.  
 Édouard Glissant’s account of “the quarrel with history” that he suggests 
characterizes the problem of historical consciousness in the Caribbean helps to clarify 
both the character and effect of the hiddenness of these histories in light of the memory 
of slavery and colonization in the African diaspora. Focusing on the French Antilles, and 
Martinique in particular, he says, “The French Caribbean is the site of a history 
characterized by ruptures that began with a brutal dislocation, the slave trade.”571 
Because of this, he maintains, a historical consciousness could not be deposited or 
sediment in the Caribbean. Whereas European histories, Glissant argues, can be retained 
in our historical memory, appearing as unbroken continuums that claim to clarify the 
reality of a people, the history of the Caribbean came together “in the context of shock, 
contradiction, painful negation, and explosive forces,” and, as such, cannot be absorbed 
in its entirety into a collective consciousness.572 As this history was born not of a 
historical continuum, but through the displacement of this continuum in the colonies, it 
appears out of joint and discontinuous with history and, in its dislocation, partially 
concealed. For this reason, he explains, the particular experience of history in the 
Caribbean and histories of a colonial origin more generally have taken on the character 
of “nonhistory.”573 As nonhistory, these histories negatively manifest themselves as 
                                                






  306 
something that has been erased in the official documents and excluded from our 
collective memory. Yet, Glissant argues that while one may expect these histories to 
fade into oblivion, they in fact remain “obsessively present” in the lived experience of 
the daily reality of those who continue bear their burden.574  
Because such histories or nonhistories are displaced or dislocated from the 
continuum that characterizes history in the European colonial motherland, Glissant 
argues that they come into appearance, not with clear consistency and linearity, but 
instead with stunning unexpectedness. He says: 
The emergence of this common experience broken in time (of this concealed 
parallel in histories) that shapes the Caribbean at this time surprises us before we 
had even thought about this parallel. That means also that our history emerges at 
the edge of what we can tolerate, this emergence must be related immediately to 
the complicated web of events in our past. The past, to which we were subjected, 
which has not yet emerged as history for us, is, however, obsessively present.575 
Glissant argues that those living in a colonial context thus find themselves faced with 
laying claim to a history that cannot be known or brought fully to consciousness, but that 
nevertheless remains obsessively present, coming to appear with eruptive force at the 
outer edges of what one can comprehend. This, he explains, constitutes the quarrel with 
history that characterizes the longing and simultaneous impossibility of memorializing a 
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history born out of the legacy of European slavery and colonization in the African 
diaspora.  
On the basis of this, Glissant explains that his task is to examine this obsessively 
present nonhistory and clarify its relevance in the lived reality of those who those who 
continue to carry these legacies. In so doing, however, he believes we find that this 
experience of the obsessive presence of nonhistory is not something that characterizes 
the specific situation of the colonized subject. On the contrary, it exposes a truth that 
underlies the notion of history more generally. Specifically, it reveals that history as it 
has come the be understood in the West has shattered in the face of global expansion, 
such that no one can claim to have mastery or ownership over it.576 In this, these 
nonhistories reveal the myth of ideal of history in the west and, particularly, the 
emphasis placed in this tradition on preserving one’s heritage or line of descent for the 
sake of transcending one’s finitude. Moreover, in revealing this myth, it simultaneously 
exposes the oppressive colonial impulse that lies behind it, working to suppress those 
histories or nonhistories that break apart the continuity and linearity of the narrative we 
tell of ourselves. This, he says, can be seen in the difficulty involved for those living in a 
colonial context of knowing one’s history, which, in remaining out of reach, “provokes 
the deepest isolation” and a feeling of complete disorientation.577  
In this, Glissant’s discussion offers an important critical perspective on Arendt’s 
account of remembrance in political life, putting into relief the danger involved in failing 
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to appreciate the significance of the immemorial past on present political life. In 
“provoking the deepest isolation,” the yearning for an ideal history and the failure to 
remain open to these unknown histories can be seen as further perpetuating the isolation 
and loneliness that Arendt believes keeps a common world from coming into view. 
Moreover, the propagation of the myth of ideal history has the potential to destroy 
plurality and natality, or the “stunning unexpectedness” and irreducible diversity that is 
revealed in the obscurity of these histories. As we have seen Arendt, resists notions of 
history that reduce the spontaneity of human action to process. Yet, we may wonder 
whether her account of the responsibility citizens have to remember in political life runs 
the risk of covering over a new iteration of human plurality that has come to appear in 
these nonhistories as a result of the global impact of the European legacy of slavery and 
colonization.  
Glissant insists that by coming to terms with this shattering of history and 
learning to dwell in the obscurity it necessitates, it is possible to develop methods of 
resistance to the forms of oppression that continue to haunt diasporic peoples.  He uses 
the metaphor of the communities of escaped slaves that emerged in the forests and 
mountains of the Caribbean to elucidate this dilemma of history, along with the 
possibilities for resistance that emerge from it. He says: 
The forest of the maroon was thus the first obstacle the slave opposed to the 
transparency of the planter. There is no clear path, no way forward, in this 
density. You turn in obscure circles until you find the primordial tree. The 
formulation of history’s yearned for ideal, so tied up with its difficulty, 
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introduces us to the dilemma of peoples today still oppressed by dominant 
cultures.578 
This dilemma consists in the need to know one’s history and appropriate one’s legacy 
while coming to understand that this task is not only impossible but also furthers the 
oppressive colonial impulse inherent in the myth of ideal history. He thus calls on those 
who continue to carry these legacies to embrace nonhistory by considering the 
possibilities for resistance that are opened up by its obscurity and fragmentation. He 
believes that the very rebellion of the maroon is emblematic of the way in which this 
obscurity can be used as a mode of resistance, in much the same way as the Caribbean 
folktale, which, he says, “zeroes in on our absence of history.”579 These tales, he 
explains, are often fragmented in nature, such that no clear chronology can emerge. They 
involve sudden changes in tone, abrupt physiological twists, a taste for excess, and, in 
their discontinuity, resist the myth of history as systematic process. He says, “The taste 
for excess, this is, in the first place the total freedom with regard to the paralyzing fear of 
repetition.”580 On the basis of this, Glissant thus argues that resisting oppression in a 
globalized, post-colonial world depends on remaining open to this excess. That is, he 
says:  
The Caribbean, the Other America. Banging away incessantly at the main ideas 
will perhaps lead to exposing the space they occupy in us. Repetition of these 
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ideas does not clarify their expression; on the contrary, it perhaps leads to 
obscurity. We need those stubborn shadows where repetition leads to perpetual 
concealment, which is our form of resistance.581  
In this, Glissant not only gives articulation to the ways in which the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past remains a present and powerful force in the lives of 
those who continue to bear the weight of these legacies, but also clarifies the need in 
contemporary political life to remain open to the excess these histories necessitate and 
the possibilities of resistance that come to appear in them. 
In light of this, the repetition of the paradox of remembrance in present political 
life can perhaps be understood in terms of the ghosts or specters that Derrida suggests 
stand at the opening of each new beginning, along with Glissant’s notion of non-history, 
making their appearance with stunning unexpectedness at the outer edges of what can be 
comprehended. If we take seriously the effect of the paradox of remembrance in the 
modern era, then the legacies of violence and exclusion that get covered over with the 
implementation of citizenship remain unappropriated, failing to come into full presence 
in the space of appearance. Even so, because they are entailed by the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship, they nevertheless remain “obsessively present,” continuing to 
re-appear in the form of a threat of the return of the violence and exclusion of the past 
and lingering in the traditions, institutions, and values that constitute the common world. 
These forms of exclusion thus have a spectral quality, coming back with each dynamic 
re-enactment of the moment of foundation, keeping this moment from ever bringing 
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something entirely new and unencumbered by the transgressions of the past into 
appearance.  
This repetition can be seen, for instance, in the anti-black racism that continues to 
be carried out against African descended people in the United States. While Arendt 
upholds the United States as a paragon of the modern political community, one wonders 
whether this original crime of slavery and the tacit exclusion that she argues is contained 
within its original founding moment can be held together with the modern revolutionary 
tradition. While this history of violence and exclusion is bound up with the legacy of the 
American political community, its immemorial status keeps this history from coming 
into appearance as part of its collective memory. As immemorial, it thus appears as a 
specter, or a return of something past and unappropriated. The return of this immemorial 
past can be seen as clearly as ever today in the ongoing police shootings, white 
supremacist violence, and systemic racism that continues to keep African Americans 
from coming into appearance as members of the American political community. These 
racialized forms of violence and exclusion can thus be seen as repetitions of the paradox 
of remembrance, continuing to haunt the African American community in the form of 
the threat of a return to this legacy of violence and exclusion.  
These specters of the immemorial violence and exclusion that continue to haunt 
modern political communities thus indicate that citizenship in the modern era is not 
enough to overcome the forms of exclusion that are distinctive of the present age. 
Arendt, for her part, does not believe in ghosts. That is, she fails to appreciate the 
implications of the immemorial past for addressing the problem of political exclusion in 
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modern political life. This, it seems, is because Arendt develops her conception of the 
event of appropriation on the basis of a notion of homecoming rooted in the Greek 
political tradition. As we have seen, Arendt conceives of speech and action from out of 
the model of political life represented by the Greek polis. As she explains, the Greeks 
conceived of the polis as a space where men could engage in the “sharing of word and 
deed” and, in this, hold open a space where the least tangible of man-made things could 
be preserved.582 That is, she describes the function of the polis as providing “a remedy 
for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving of fame would 
not be forgotten, that it would actually become ‘immortal,’ were not very good.”583  The 
polis thus created a space where the words and deeds of great men could be remembered 
and immortalized so as to “inspire admiration in the present and in future ages.”584 In 
conceiving of citizenship from out of the notion of speech and action that emerges in the 
context of the Greek polis, Arendt is thus led to conceive of the space of human 
belonging as one that promises, through citizenship, the possibility of appropriation 
without remainder, or a home in the world that is not haunted by the transgressions of 
the past.   
To be sure, the Greek polis might have promised a home in the world for its 
citizens that was uninhabited by ghosts. Yet, the Greeks were not concerned in the wake 
of their colonial endeavors with the universal expansion Greek citizenship and, as such, 
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could appropriate the legacy of the Greek city-state without contradiction or remainder, 
while ridding the polis of any specters of the violence and exclusion of the past. Hence, 
the dimension of human finitude that is revealed through the modern paradox of 
remembrance remained covered over in the context of Greek political life.  We find 
through examples like the Haitian Revolution, by contrast, that this is not a viable model 
for politics in the modern era. While it may be true that political belonging is necessary 
for finding a home in the world, such belonging can only be realized today if we come 
terms with the fact that our home, unlike the Greek polis, is haunted.  
In light of this, I will suggest in what follows that what is called for today is a 
new concept of belonging in political ontology that is keyed to the finitude of our 
collective memory and the fact that taking responsibility for the legacy of the modern 
world depends on learning to live with ghosts and specters in the modern political arena. 
I use the notion of ghosts and specters to describe these repetitions in order to put into 
relief the uncanniness of their appearance as something out of joint with the times or 
improper to the world in which we find ourselves. On the one hand, the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past remains obsessively present in the lived experience of 
those who bear the weight of these hidden histories, repeating itself again and again in 
their daily reality. On the other hand, because this history of violence and exclusion has 
not been appropriated, failing, in turn, to come into appearance as a part of the collective 
memory of the modern political community, its repetition provokes disbelief. As 
apparitions, these ghosts of the immemorial are almost accessible, but not quite, evoking 
a double take, while at the same time confounding reason’s ability to know with clarity 
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what has been seen. In this, the ghostly repetition of the immemorial violence and 
exclusion of the past has an unnerving effect, prompting one to recoil and reassert reason 
by claiming that what one thought was saw was not real. That is, these repetitions 
provoke fear, and, in lacking the courage to face them in political life and instead 
doubling-down on the traditional principles of Enlightenment humanism and rationality, 
we fail to take responsibility for the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that 
is internal to the legacy of the world we have inherited.     
So long as we deny the existence of the specters of exclusion that are 
necessitated by the paradox of remembrance in the modern era, a common world will 
continue to fail to come into appearance, precluding the possibility of overcoming the 
loneliness and world-alienation that Arendt diagnoses. Moreover, if we insist, as Arendt 
does, that the affirmation of one’s citizenship alone is enough to overcome the legacy of 
American slavery that preceded the implementation of citizenship then political action 
can never address the repetition of this legacy If, on the other hand, we allow these 
ghosts to dwell with us in the space of politics, it becomes possible to bring the shared 
reality of a common world into appearance and begin addressing the problem of political 
exclusion in modern political life. I will therefore suggest in what follows that what is 
called for today is a model for political life that is keyed to the political implications of 
the hiddenness of the pariah tradition, and, with this, open to the immemorial violence 
and exclusion that may escape our collective memory, but that refuses to fade into 
oblivion because it is bound up with the legacy of the world we have inherited. 
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VI.4. A New Concept of Belonging in Political Ontology: Ghosts and Specters in the 
Modern Political Arena 
Whereas Arendt develops a lived and embodied notion of citizenship that she 
believes promises political belonging in the modern era, I have tried to show that her 
conception of citizenship reveals a conflict internal to the concept of modern citizenship 
that keeps it from achieving this end. In light of the paradox of remembrance that I have 
outlined above, I have suggested that in order to address political exclusion today, it is 
necessary to go beyond the concept of citizenship so that the immemorial violence and 
exclusion that are necessitated by it can come into appearance as part of the legacy of the 
world we have inherited. While this immemorial past may fail to come into appearance 
as such, I have used Derrida’s notion of specters and ghosts as an interpretive frame for 
capturing the implication of these legacies in contemporary political life.  
Yet, rather than suggesting, as Derrida does, that these specters disclose our 
interminable exile from the world and the impossibility of finding a home in it, I 
maintain that what is called for today is a new conception of political belonging. If we 
take seriously the legacy of the modern political tradition, what it means to find oneself 
at home in the world is to find oneself living in a haunted house, or a world that cannot 
be thought apart from the specters of exclusion that are necessitated by the modern 
paradox of remembrance. While these specters may fail to come into full presence, 
addressing the problem of exclusion today depends on coming to terms with the fact that 
we are nevertheless responsible for answering to them in the space of politics.  
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With this in mind, it is possible to see that citizenship is no longer enough to 
overcome the problem of exclusion in the modern era, as the space of politics can no 
longer be thought of as a space that is reserved for human beings alone. On the contrary, 
the legacy of the modern political tradition makes it the case that the ghosts of the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of the past also belong to the space of politics. By 
excluding these ghosts from the political arena, we fail to take shared responsibility for 
the legacy of the world we have inherited and, in so doing, perpetuate the forms of 
exclusion that have become endemic in modern life, which include, in addition to 
physical exclusion, the existential exile and loneliness that has become widespread in the 
modern era.  
Perhaps the appropriate model, then, for rethinking politics in the modern world 
is not the Greek polis or the model of the revolutionary Enlightenment, but a tradition 
that is closer to the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past that is necessitated by 
the paradox of remembrance, such as Haitian Vodou. As we have already seen through 
the work of Jean Price-Mars, Vodou is a distinctly modern product of the legacy of 
European slavery and colonization. While aspects of this tradition can be traced to 
various religions practices of West Africa, as well as European Catholicism, it is 
identical to neither, containing within it a politics of resistance that is definitive of the 
experience of modern slavery.585 Significantly, this tradition centers on a concern for 
memory and an ethics oriented by the responsibility the living have to engage with 
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spirits of these ancestors.586 For this reason, most Vodou ceremonies begin with a 
recitation of the history of one’s lineage and conclude with a song that begins by 
announcing that the bones of the ancestors still walk the land.587 The spirits of the 
ancestors, or Lwa, remind the Haitians of the legacies of the various people brought 
together in Haiti through colonization. They are not knowable in their entirety, but 
instead manifest themselves as “invisible powers” or “mysteries” who continue to 
inhabit the island despite no longer belonging to the living present .588 While these spirits 
lack a tangible presence, those who practice Haitian Vodou nevertheless believe that 
they have an ongoing responsibility to serve the Lwa and allow these spirits, in turn, to 
guide their action.589 
Though there is much to say about the practices of Haitian Vodou, it is of 
particular importance for the purposes of this discussion that it engages these spirits for 
the sake of unifying an a community that lacks a memorial legacy.590 The name Haiti, 
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which Dessalines gave to the island upon declaring independence from France, derives 
from the Taino-Arawak term, Ayiti, often thought to be the original name of the island, 
meaning “land of the mountains” or “homeland.”591 With this, Dessalines declared Haiti 
an independent nation that promised to unite all those who had been exiled by the 
European legacy of slavery and colonization. Significantly, the concept of home or 
belonging that emerged in this context seems to be grounded in the sentiment that such a 
diverse and displaced a people cannot be unified without practices of historical memory 
that enable individuals to take responsibility for a past that cannot be fully memorialized. 
In emphasizing the responsibility individuals have to engage and seek guidance from the 
ghosts of the past that continue to haunt the island, Vodou can perhaps be understood as 
precisely this kind of practice. While Dessalines vision for Haiti failed to come to 
fruition, this model of belonging nevertheless seems especially fitting if we are to take 
responsibility for the legacy of the world we have inherited. A product of the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of European slavery and colonization, this model 
points to a new conception of homecoming that does not deny the specters of exclusion 
that are bound up with the modern political tradition, but engages them directly. 
 If the world in which we find ourselves is haunted, then addressing exclusion 
today will depend on going beyond traditional notions of humanism and Enlightenment 
rationality in order to make room for the presence of ghosts in political life. That is, it 
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will involve holding open a space in politics for those immemorial histories of violence 
and exclusion that exceed the living present and, as such, cannot be known in their 
entirety, but that nevertheless continue to have an obsessive presence in the immediate 
reality of those who were once cast out. In order to begin taking responsibility for the 
legacy of the revolutionary Enlightenment as Arendt suggests we should, it is thus 
necessary to go beyond her concern for citizenship to begin developing an even more 
inclusive conception of the space of politics that is able to attend to the repetition of the 
immemorial violence and exclusion of the past. While this notion of politics would be 
oriented above all by the concern for creating a space in which humans can enact their 
freedom in the space of politics, it would achieve this orientation through its openness to 
the hiddenness of the pariah tradition and the uncanny repetition of the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past that is necessitated by the implementation of 
Enlightenment citizenship. Because the ghostly repetition of these histories of violence 
and exclusion continue to keep those who were once cast out from coming into 
appearance in the modern political arena, what seems to be called for today is a more 
expansive notion of the political sphere that exceeds the European Enlightenment and 
the Greek polis so that we are able to take responsibility for the specters of exclusion 
that continue to haunt the modern world. For this reason, the model of Haitian Vodou, 
and the hidden tradition of the pariah more generally, may provide an important point of 
departure for developing a post-Enlightenment politics. If we understand Vodou, not as a 
religious tradition, but instead as a political practice that is oriented above all by a 
politics of memory, then it offers an important frame for rethinking contemporary 
  320 
political life in a way that has the potential to bring us into accord with the legacy of the 
revolutionary tradition in its entirety so as to reintroduce the possibility of a 


























The principal aim of this project has been to intervene in current discourses 
concerning the problem of political exclusion in order to provide a new frame for 
addressing this problem in ways that are responsive to the post-Enlightenment world in 
which we find ourselves. To this end, I have turned to Arendt to put into relief the 
dangers and limits of mainstream liberal approaches to exclusion that emphasize the 
global expansion of liberal democracy and the forms of citizenship that sustain it. By 
developing Arendt’s analysis of political exclusion not only in terms of her account of 
statelessness and the “right to have rights,” but also in terms of her discourse on 
loneliness and the susceptibility of the structures of modern liberalism to totalitarianism, 
I have tried to show that she offers novel critical insights into the liberal tradition that 
have yet to be fully appreciated. 
Arendt’s analysis of loneliness provides a crucial point of departure for clarifying 
the nature of the problem of political exclusion today. By developing Arendt’s 
characterization of exclusion, not just in terms of her analysis of statelessness, but also in 
terms of her account of the problem of loneliness, we find that the emphasis in liberal 
political theory on the global expansion of rights only addresses exclusion in an ontic 
register, failing, in turn, to capture the ontological basis of the problem of political 
exclusion as it unfolds in the experience of the loss of a world, or the nexus of 
meaningful relations, that enables human beings to come into appearance in their 
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singularity. In only offering an ontic solution to the problem of exclusion, Arendt’s 
analysis indicates that liberal approaches to this problem have the potential to cover over 
and perpetuate this experience of worldlessness, failing to address the feeling of 
superfluity that arises when one no longer belongs to a world and thus becomes 
susceptible to totalitarian domination. Those who focus on Arendt’s discussion of rights 
for the sake of advancing liberal political theory imply in their approach to her work that 
the forms of exclusion epitomized by statelessness stand outside the structures of liberal 
democracy. Yet, Arendt’s account of loneliness suggests that the experience of no longer 
belonging to a world may be endemic for those who live within political structures of a 
liberal provenance. If political exclusion is understood as the loss of one’s place in the 
world, then overcoming this loss involves more than simply extending the rights of 
citizenship to those who have yet to be integrated with the structures of liberal 
democracy; beyond this, Arendt’s analysis suggests that what is called for is a critique of 
these structures and the very notion of citizenship on which they are based. In turning to 
loneliness, we therefore find that Arendt’s notion of citizenship forms the basis for a 
deeper critique of the liberal tradition that remains underdeveloped in her discussion of 
the right to have rights, but that is nevertheless integral to her broader insights 
concerning the failures and dangers of politics in the modern age.  
While Arendt’s prescient characterization of the problem of exclusion in the 
modern era has been a guiding thread of this project, I have also suggested that it reveals 
a broader problem with the concept of modern citizenship that Arendt fails to appreciate. 
By expanding Arendt’s analysis of exclusion beyond the European nation-state to a more 
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global set of concerns raised in colonial and post-colonial theory regarding the legacy of 
European slavery and colonization, I have attempted to put into relief, in a more 
pronounced way than Arendt, the stakes involved in her analysis of exclusion. In view of 
her critique of liberal approaches to the problem of exclusion, I have suggested that 
Arendt attempts to provide an ontological solution to the problem of exclusion by 
developing a lived and embodied conception of citizenship that emphasizes the 
responsibility citizens have to remember and appropriate the institutions, traditions, and 
values of the world they have inherited for the sake of carrying a common world into the 
future. On Arendt’s view, this conception of citizenship has the potential to offer a 
remedy to the problem of exclusion so long as individuals enact their citizenship by 
working in concert in the space of politics to bring the legacy of the world they have 
inherited into appearance in the full illumination of the public realm.   
By considering Arendt in light of an analysis of the Haitian Revolution, however, 
I have tried to show that the political tradition of the revolutionary Enlightenment that 
we are tasked with preserving does not admit of complete memorialization. This, I have 
argued, is a function of the paradox of remembrance that is necessitated by the 
implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. That is, in order to affirm oneself as a 
citizen, one must, at the same time, cover over those legacies of violence and exclusion 
that are incompatible with the Enlightenment narrative of universal inclusion that holds 
the modern political community together. Yet, insofar as the Enlightenment project 
demands universal inclusion through the expansion of citizenship, these histories of 
violence and exclusion do not stand outside of or in opposition to the legacy of the 
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tradition we are tasked with preserving, but are instead bound up with it. Hence, insofar 
as the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past is entailed by the expansion of 
Enlightenment citizenship, the very implementation of citizenship will always involve 
the covering over of a part of the legacy of the modern tradition that must be 
remembered if we are to bring a common world into appearance. 
With this, I have attempted to give further contour to the nature of the modern 
political legacy to show that it is not just liberal citizenship, as Arendt suggests, but the 
concept of modern citizenship itself that is inadequate to the task of addressing the 
problem of exclusion in contemporary political life. Insofar as the immemorial violence 
and exclusion of the past gets repeated with each dynamic re-enactment of the space of 
appearance, I have therefore suggested that we are called upon to develop a more 
expansive frame for the concept of homecoming or belonging in political ontology that 
goes beyond citizenship to make room in the space of politics for the immemorial 
violence and exclusion of the past. That is, rather than conceiving of the revolutionary 
tradition of the modern age as something other to or distinct from these histories of 
violence and exclusion, I have suggested that taking responsibility for the world in 
which we find ourselves depends on coming to terms in the space of politics with the 
fact these histories continue to haunt the modern political arena. Hence, rather than 
conceiving of the space of politics as a home that promises an escape from the 
transgressions of the past, I have argued that this space must be understood as a haunted 
house. With this, I have suggested that true political belonging depends not only on the 
universal inclusion of human beings within the space of politics through the expansion 
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of citizenship, but also on the inclusion of the ghosts or specters of exclusion that 
continue to haunt our political traditions, institutions, and values.  
By expanding the concept of political belonging or homecoming in this way, I 
have suggested that it is possible to open new paths to addressing the problem of 
exclusion today. As these ghosts are bound up with our inheritance, I have argued that it 
is only by allowing them to dwell with us in the space of politics, rather than denying 
their existence, that we can begin renewing the world we have inherited so as to address 
the problem of exclusion that Arendt diagnoses through her respective analyses of 
statelessness and loneliness.  
In proposing this new concept of political belonging, whereby the space of 
politics is understood not simply as a home in the world for human beings, but also for 
the ghosts of the past that are entailed by the implementation of Enlightenment, my aim 
is not to propose specific policy changes or political practices for addressing exclusion 
today. Instead, I wish to give new orientation to the task of politics more generally so as 
to open new paths to addressing the distinctive character of political exclusion that has 
been produced by the revolutionary spirit of the modern era. It is not difficult to see that 
the aims of the Enlightenment project are far from being fulfilled. Indeed, with the 
global expansion of Enlightenment citizenship, we find that citizenship continues to 
remain inadequate to the task of ensuring that those who were once cast out no longer 
find themselves subject to the threat of a return to the violence and exclusion of the past. 
This, I believe, constitutes the central problematic of political life in the post-
Enlightenment era and, thus, offering a new frame for the task of politics that is keyed to 
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the problem of historical memory entailed by the global expansion of Enlightenment 
citizenship is crucial if we are to begin addressing exclusion today.   
 One figuration of this that has been orienting for my project, though not 
developed at length, concerns the racialized violence and exclusion that has been carried 
out against African descended people in the United States since receiving the rights of 
American citizenship in 1868. If we insist, as Arendt does, that citizenship alone is 
enough to overcome the legacy of American slavery that preceded the implementation of 
citizenship, then political action can never address the repetition of this legacy in events 
such as the 2014 police shooting of African-American teenager, Michael Brown, in 
Ferguson, Missouri, or the 2015 white supremacist shootings at the Immanuel AME 
church in Charleston, South Carolina. The phenomenality of these repetitions is 
uncanny, which often leads to the neglect or denial of their existence. These phenomena 
appear not merely as what they are, but also as something past that cannot fully be 
accounted for in and through the phenomenon itself. In other words, Michael Brown’s 
death appears not just as it is, but also as something out of joint with the times, improper 
to the world in which we find ourselves and incapable of being held together with the 
enlightened democratic narrative we tell of the American political community. Yet, 
despite the intangibility of these repetitions, they nevertheless remain obsessively 
present in the lived reality of those who continue to carry these immemorial histories of 
violence and exclusion precisely because they are bound up with the political tradition of 
the revolutionary Enlightenment. Hence, while these repetitions may be uncanny, we are 
nevertheless responsible for them and, thus, bringing the shared reality of a common 
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world into view so as to begin to addressing the worldlessness that has become endemic 
in modern political life depends on coming to understand these ghostly repetitions as 
properly political.   
 The ontological concept of political belonging that I have proposed makes it 
possible to understand these repetitions not merely as a consequence of prejudice, but as 
a deeper and more widespread failure on the part of modern political communities to 
take responsibility for the world they have inherited.  In this, my project has the potential 
to contribute in three ways to contemporary discourses in political philosophy. First, by 
drawing attention to the responsibility we have to come to terms with the political 
consequences of the transgressions of the past, it has the potential to give greater contour 
to debates concerning democracy, demonstrating that democratic practice concerns not 
only citizenship and the pursuit of liberal inclusion, but also political forms of historical 
memory that make visible the legacies of violence and exclusion that prohibit the 
complete enfranchisement of those who were once cast out. By reframing the task of 
politics not just in terms of the living present and the knowable, but also in terms of the 
specters of exclusion that continue to haunt the space of politics today, my aim is to 
suggests that fulfilling the principle of universal inclusion set for the by the 
revolutionary tradition of the modern age depends on going beyond models of political 
practice that emphasize Enlightenment humanism and rationality. As I have suggested, 
the legacy of the modern world is one that will always remain, at least in part, irrational, 
unable to be held together consistently. Hence, rather than taking our point of departure 
for thinking about democratic practice and policy formation from those features of the 
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modern political tradition that are consistent with this narrative, it seems that a more 
adequate approach may involve working from out of those features of it that are 
inconsistent with this narrative. In the context of the United States, for instance, this may 
mean taking an alternative approach to reading the Constitution. Rather than interpreting 
the Constitution solely in terms of those aspects of it that are consistent with the 
Enlightenment narrative, we might instead take our point of departure from features of it 
such as the three-fifths clause that highlight these inconsistencies and bring into view the 
transgressions of the past that may escape our collective memory, but that nevertheless 
continue to reappear in the racialized violence and exclusion that is carried out against 
diasporic peoples today.  Such a conception of democratic practice would thus be 
predicated on a notion of political responsibility that does not end when citizenship is 
granted, but rather extends interminably even after those who were once cast out become 
enfranchised, thereby providing a platform for developing political practices of historical 
memory that enable the transgressions of the past to come into appearance in the space 
of politics. 
 Second, the frame I have proposed for understanding the modern political arena 
also has the potential to contribute to discourses in Africana philosophy, critical race 
theory, and post-colonial theory. By challenging and deepening Arendt’s notion of 
citizenship in light of discourses concerning the memory of slavery and colonization in 
the African diaspora, my project provides a frame for capturing the political significance 
of race and racism in ways that Arendt fails to appreciate. With this, however, it also 
takes seriously her concern for conceiving of the space of politics as a realm in which 
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human beings can come into appearance, not as members of a particular group, but 
rather in their unrepeatable uniqueness as individuals. As I have suggested, holding open 
a space for human plurality in the modern world depends on addressing the repetition of 
the immemorial violence and exclusion of the past. Hence, by keying the problem of 
exclusion to the limits of historical memory in the modern era, my project makes it 
possible to conceive of race and racism as political issues without doing so in terms of 
identity politics and, in this, avoids reducing human plurality in the way that Arendt, in 
her own analysis of totalitarianism, rightly warns against. Hence, while this project does 
highlight Arendt’s blindness to issues concerning the political significance of race and 
racism, it also deepens her insights into the problem of exclusion and, in so doing, brings 
one of the most important political philosophers of the last century into the global 
context of colonialism, thereby introducing a new voice to the discourse on exclusion in 
colonial and post-colonial theory.  
 Finally, this project has the potential to advance discourses in political ontology, 
shifting the concept of belonging so as to renew the possibility of finding a home in the 
modern world. As I have argued, the reality of the world in which we find ourselves is 
one that will always be haunted. For this reason, addressing the problem of exclusion 
will depend not simply on citizenship, as Arendt suggests, but rather on developing a 
more expansive account of the responsibility citizens have to care for this space, 
requiring of us that we remain open to the ghostly repetition of the immemorial that is 
necessitated by the very implementation of Enlightenment citizenship. By conceiving of 
the modern political arena as a haunted house, I wish to rehabilitate the notion of 
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homecoming in a way that is responsive to post-modern critiques developed by figures 
like Derrida, who suggests that these ghosts of the inappropriable leave us in a condition 
of interminable exile. In contrast to Derrida, I maintain that while they may be bound up 
with the existential conditions of human existence, these ghosts and specters do not point 
to exile, but rather to an overcrowding in modern life, whereby we find ourselves 
overwhelmed by the presence of more than we can grasp. In light of this, the problem of 
political exclusion can perhaps be framed in ontological terms as a failure to stand in an 
authentic relation to this condition of overcrowding.  
 Conceiving of the notion of homecoming this way thus allows for a deepening of 
the concept of thrownness, such that authentically being-in-the-world means being at 
home with ghosts. While these ghosts may not be knowable in their entirety, they are 
nevertheless bound up with the political existence of the modern individual and, thus, 
overcoming the problem of world-alienation depends on standing in an authentic relation 
to them in the space of politics. This, in turn, opens up the possibility for a new 
understanding of the political virtue of courage that echoes Arendt’s but goes a step 
further. If we conceive of the modern political arena as a haunted house, then rising 
above the necessity of one’s particular existence in order to care for the world depends 
on having the courage to come to terms with the presence of the uncanny in modern 
political life. Hence, the political virtue of courage may be understood on the basis of 
this notion of homecoming in terms of overcoming our fear of ghosts by working in 
concert in the space of politics to make them a meaningful part of the shared reality of 
the common world. 
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